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This dissertation examines an important, but understudied period in Mexican-U.S. 
migration history during the 1940s and early 1950s.  The joint introduction and 
sanctioning, by the U.S. and Mexican governments, of the bracero program also initiated 
a large illegal migration of agricultural workers to the United States. This was a period 
characterized by high levels of temporary legal migration and illegal migration, as well as 
intense levels of immigration enforcement. These simultaneous processes confound a 
simplistic view of U.S. history as a sequence of alternating periods of immigration 
expansion and restriction. U.S. immigration law and policy does not resemble a 
pendulum swinging first one way then the other; rather, both expansion and restriction 
characterized the 1940s and early 1950s. This study focuses on South Texas and El Paso, 
both border regions with dominant agricultural economies as well as a significant 
presence of Border Patrol officers. By focusing on these border regions, this dissertation 
examines the relationship between immigration laws and policy and the agricultural labor 
relations between growers and workers on the ground.  
This dissertation is concerned with state formation on the U.S.-Mexico border, 
and its relationship with labor mobility. The process of state and border formation did not 
originate in the central seats of federal authority, Washington, D.C., and Mexico City, to 
 x 
be applied and exerted on the furthest reaches of their territories. Growers and workers 
created, negotiated, and experienced and challenged the power and meaning of the border 
in the agricultural fields during daily interactions. Individual Border Patrolman made the 
border every day in the choices they made about where and where not to patrol, and 
which friendships to make and maintain. The border was simultaneously a federal and a 
local space. As the introductory anecdote suggested, the different sites of power were 
continually at work and intertwined. The Border Patrol did not have to be present to have 
an effect on the power dynamics in the moment. These interconnecting authorities, each 
shaping the other, and workers negotiations of such dynamics are what I term the social 
space of agriculture on the border. Growers often projected themselves in opposition to 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and government intervention, arguing 
that it disrupted their access to Mexican laborers. In truth, the presence of the Border 
Patrol, and the threat of deportation the police force carried, was crucial in shaping the 
social space of agricultural production and securing growers’ undocumented labor force. 
 
 xi 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ....................................................................................................... xiii 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................... xiv 
Introduction ..............................................................................................................1 
Methodology and Theoretical Framework ....................................................12 
Outline of Chapters .......................................................................................15 
A Note on Terms ...........................................................................................18 
Chapter One: Selling the ‘Magic Valley’: Promotional Brochures and Narratives of 
Migration in Early Twentieth Century South Texas .....................................20 
Migration and Social Change in South Texas and Northern Mexico ...........22 
Narratives of the Frontier and Progress in Land Promotional Brochures .....30 
South Texas Excursions:  Buying and Selling Land and Images of the Border
..............................................................................................................45 
Results of the Trip .........................................................................................59 
Chapter Two: The Social Space of Agriculture .....................................................62 
A Peak Period in South Texas Agriculture ...................................................65 
Compromised Mobility and the Role of Protection in Grower-Worker 
Relationships ........................................................................................70 
Camping Out in the Brush ............................................................................81 
A Transborder Family and Community ........................................................92 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................99 
Chapter Three: The Flexible Border: Mobility Within Restriction in U.S. Immigration 
Laws and Enforcement ...............................................................................101 
U.S. Immigration Legislation and Its Effects on Mexican Immigration, 1917-
1939....................................................................................................105 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service Border Patrol: Legal and Political 
Foundations of Power ........................................................................112 
Voluntary Departure and the Maintenance of a Flexible Border ................118 
The Contested Terrain of Border Patrol Practices ......................................126 
 xii 
Border Patrol Collusion in South Texas .....................................................137 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................150 
Chapter Four: Exploitative Villain or Community Leader? Agricultural Labor 
Contractors, the State, and Control over Worker Mobility .........................152 
Controlling Mexican Migration: Texas Employment and Labor Agency Law154 
Migrant Crews: Exploitation or Self-Organization? ...................................164 
South Texas Interaction with the Bracero Program ....................................171 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................182 
Chapter Five: El Paso/The Passage: The 1948 El Paso Incident and the Politics of 
Mobility.......................................................................................................185 
Workers’ Migrations and the State .............................................................189 
Struggling to Place Recruitment Centers: Labor and the Border ...............194 
Narrating Mexican Migration .....................................................................206 
President Truman Visits El Paso.................................................................211 






List of Tables 
Table. 3.2. Deportations and Voluntary Departures. Modified from table in U.S. 
Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, (1950), 50. .................................................121 
 xiv 
List of Figures 
Fig. 1.1 Detail from Sales Packet, “Now! A Sharyland Citrus Grove Within Reach of 
All,” Publications, Box 1, John H. Shary Collection, Library Archives 
and Special Collection, University of Texas-Pan American, Edinburg, 
TX. ....................................................................................................21 
Fig.1.2.  Note the young girl standing in front of house on left and group of people in 
background. Detail from “In Rio Grande Valley, Paradise, Sharyland: 
Where Nature Produces the World’s Sweetest Fruit.” ......................35 
Fig. 1.3.  Juxtaposed images of landscape transformed through commercial 
agriculture. On the left a photo, with an inscription, “raw cactus land”. 
In stark contrast to the wildness and disorder of the image on the left, the 
photograph on the right depicted an aerial view of a citrus orchard, each 
tree placed within a tight geometrical grid. From promotional brochure, 
“McAllen, TX, The City of Palms,” c. 1927, Publications, Box 1, 
Folders 1-63, Shary Collection, LASC, UTPA.................................37 
Fig. 1.4.  Detail from the back cover of promotional brochure, “In Rio Grande Valley, 
Paradise, Sharyland: Where Nature Produces the World’s Sweetest 
Fruits.” The dark ring even more emphatically encloses the scene as a 
tableau, visually connecting the young woman in the foreground and the 
Mexican worker in the background. .................................................43 
Fig. 2.1. Map of South Texas border region. .........................................................63 
 xv 
Fig. 3.1. Mexican Emigration to the United States, 1940 to 1964. Graph detail taken 
from Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond 
Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic 
Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 38. ........111 
Fig. 5.1. Map of Mexico. .....................................................................................195 
Fig. 5.2. The character of Abner explains the many functions of shmoos. Detail from 
Al Capp, The Short Life and Happy Times of the Shmoo, with an 








One warm early summer morning in the Rio Grande Valley during the late 1940s, 
a crew of Mexican agricultural workers toiled in farmer Carrol Norquest’s fields picking 
cotton before the day’s heat became too oppressive. The crew supervisor in this instance 
was Carrol Norquest’s young teenage son Rikki.1 Teresa, one of the workers, stood in 
the trailer to retrieve her cotton sack when she caught sight of a large black car, 
approaching along the road adjoining the field. Her experience of Border Patrol’s 
methods made her instantly apprehensive and she raised an outcry to alert the rest of the 
workers that La Migra was near. In an instant, all the workers stopped their task and ran 
away as fast as they could, trying to avoid being caught by the Border Patrol’s pursuit. 
Rikki soon realized that Teresa was mistaken about the car, but his shouts to the workers 
to return to the fields were too late—everyone had left. Rikki trudged home, the work 
done for the day. 
A few days later, the entire crew had made their way back to the Norquest farm; 
some had returned the same day as the apparent near raid, but others had waited. Some of 
the workers had taken the opportunity to return to Mexico to “cool off,” the elder 
Norquest later surmised. The workers “were all back on the job—well rested,” Norquest 
later wrote, “including Teresa with a fresh red skirt over her jeans.”2 The crew was again 
picking cotton in the field, when Rikki spotted his cousin driving up the dirt road in the 
family’s new maroon sedan. In a spirit of mischief, made possible by his greater power 
                                                 
1 This story is taken from Carrol Norquest’s unpublished manuscript, “The Swarming of the 
Wetbacks,” graciously shared by his son Kelly Norquest. In addition to his unpublished stories, 
Carrol Norquest also published a book of stories about agricultural life and work in South Texas 
during the mid-twentieth century, titled Rio Grande Wetbacks: Mexican Migrant Workers 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972). 
2 Carrol Norquest, “They Flushed Like Quail,” in “The Swarming of the Wetbacks.” 
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and privilege, Rikki decided to play a joke on the workers. “La Chota! Allí viene la 
Chota!” he cried while pointing at the oncoming car. The workers reacted immediately. 
Dropping their cotton sacks, some hid on their bellies amongst the plants, while others 
rushed out of the field. This time, the workers had not gone far before they noticed Rikki 
laughing at them and cheering. “They spent fifteen minutes yelling at Rikki—and Rikki 
razzed them right back. No real harm done…and in retrospect, [they] had some fun.”3  
In his writing, Carrol Norquest undoubtedly felt he was recalling an amusing 
memory of a teenager’s harmless prank. From another point of view, the incident 
encapsulates the ordinary violence that pervaded the daily life of agricultural workers 
along the U.S.-Mexico border in Texas. The combined power of growers and federal 
authorities forced workers to interrupt their routines, hide, and flee. Needed at one 
moment, scorned at others, workers moved back and forth across the U.S.-Mexico border 
subject to the power of growers, the U.S. government, and even mischievous white 
teenagers. Yet, the different times of workers’ return to the fields suggest that workers 
retained some control over their movements. Norquest’s story provides a small but vivid 
snapshot of the politics of mobility on the U.S.-Mexico border during the mid-twentieth 
century. 
This dissertation examines an important, but understudied period in Mexican-U.S. 
migration history during the 1940s and early 1950s.  The joint introduction and 
sanctioning, by the U.S. and Mexican governments, of the bracero program also initiated 
a large illegal migration of agricultural workers to the United States. This was a period 
characterized by high levels of temporary legal migration and illegal migration, as well as 
intense levels of immigration enforcement. These simultaneous processes confound a 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
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simplistic view of U.S. history as a sequence of alternating periods of immigration 
expansion and restriction. U.S. immigration law and policy does not resemble a 
pendulum swinging first one way then the other; rather, both expansion and restriction 
characterized the 1940s and early 1950s. This study focuses on South Texas and El Paso, 
both border regions with dominant agricultural economies as well as a significant 
presence of Border Patrol officers.4 By focusing on these border regions, this dissertation 
examines the relationship between immigration laws and policy and the agricultural labor 
relations between growers and workers on the ground. 
This dissertation is concerned with state formation on the U.S.-Mexico border, 
and its relationship with labor mobility. The process of state and border formation did not 
originate in the central seats of federal authority, Washington, D.C., and Mexico City, to 
be applied and exerted on the furthest reaches of their territories. Growers and workers 
created, negotiated, and experienced and challenged the power and meaning of the border 
in the agricultural fields during daily interactions. Individual Border Patrolman made the 
border every day in the choices they made about where and where not to patrol, and 
which friendships to make and maintain. The border was simultaneously a federal and a 
local space. As the introductory anecdote suggested, the different sites of power were 
continually at work and intertwined. The Border Patrol did not have to be present to have 
an effect on the power dynamics in the moment. These interconnecting authorities, each 
shaping the other, and workers’ negotiations of such dynamics are what I term the social 
space of agriculture on the border. Growers often projected themselves in opposition to 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and government intervention, arguing 
that it disrupted their access to Mexican laborers. In truth, the presence of the Border 
                                                 
4 The Border Patrol was the enforcement body of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
charged with policing the border. 
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Patrol, and the threat of deportation the police force carried, was crucial in shaping the 
social space of agricultural production and securing growers’ undocumented labor force. 
 (Im)migration has held an important place in the histories of the Mexican 
American experience.5 Most works that have dealt with Mexican American community 
and identity formation, racialization, political organizing, and labor history have 
addressed the question of continued migration from Mexico to the United States 
directly.6 Scholars have long argued about the inappropriateness of applying the classic 
assimilative narrative of American immigration history to the history of Mexican 
migration to the United States.7 Many factors militated against Mexicans’ easy 
                                                 
5 I use this formation to link two concepts, immigration and migration, that are very often thought 
about distinctly and separately. Migration has often been used to refer to movement within the 
borders of a nation-state, while immigration and emigration denoted movement across 
international borders. While not wanting to lose the distinction of the power of the nation state to 
create and enforce these different categories of mobility, my work seeks to disrupt those 
conceptual boundaries and think of them in tandem. In the dissertation, I most often use the word 
migration to refer to workers’ movements, across international and internal borders. 
6 For a few examples of the centrality of the politics of immigration to scholars’ analyses in 
Mexican American history, consider these important works. To understand the culturally 
regenerative effects of immigration on Mexican American community formation, as well as the 
ways in which nativity and citizenship status became places of fissure in Mexican American 
political organizing, see David Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican 
Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). In 
George J. Sanchez’s history of Mexican American Los Angeles, he identifies the repatriation 
campaigns of the 1930s as an important turning point in the transformation of a Mexican-
identified community to a Mexican American cultural and political identification. George J. 
Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 
1900-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). In Vicki Ruiz’s history of Mexican 
American women, Mexican women’s experiences crossing the U.S.-Mexico border and 
negotiating Progressive-era Americanization programs often aimed at women exemplified their 
resilience and adaptive resources. Vicki Ruiz, From Out of the Shadows: Mexican Women in 
Twentieth-Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
7 Oscar Handlin is the exemplar of the assimilation argument. See Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: 
The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People (Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Co., 1951).  Of course the field of European migration history has changed a great deal over 
the years, rejecting the assimilationist model, such as with John Bodnar, The Transplanted: 
History of Immigrants in Urban America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), and 
then reassessing assimilation from a critical perspective, with the very influential whiteness 
studies. For a good historiography of the concept of assimilation see Russell A. Kazal, 
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incorporation into U.S. society—from racist views of Mexicans dating back to the 
Mexican American War, the discrimination that relegated Mexicans to places of social 
marginalization throughout the twentieth century, as well as the continued migration from 
Mexico, leading to perceptions among the U.S. public of a permanently immigrant 
Mexican community. And while scholars noted these barriers to upward social mobility 
in the United States, and criticized the assimilation narrative of U.S. immigration history 
for providing a false, teleological and Eurocentric view of immigrants’ experiences, they 
in turn have been critiqued recently for being too focused on the United States. In 
addition to the valuable critiques of the assimilation model put forth by scholars of 
Mexican migration, new works have expanded the complex terrain of Mexican 
immigration history by examining migration from a bi-national perspective, and/or by 
reversing the traditional direction of these studies to examine migrations and travels from 
the U.S. to Mexico.8 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American Ethnic 
History,” American Historical Review 100:2 (April 1995), 437-471. Recent trends in Euro-
American migration history reflect ideas guiding other fields of migration studies as well, such as 
transnationalism and concepts of diaspora. 
8 Recent works from Deborah Cohen and Ana Rosas on the bracero program have relied on 
research conducted in Mexico and the United States, and examined the effects of the bracero 
program on Mexican masculinity, and upon Mexican families in a transnational context, 
respectively. Deborah Cohen, Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the 
Postwar United States and Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). Ana 
Elizabeth Rosas, “Flexible Families: Bracero Families’ Lives Across Cultures, Communities, and 
Countries, 1942-1964,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2006). In an update of the 
internal colonial argument popular in Chicano studies during the 1970s, Gilbert Gonzalez 
examined Anglo American travel narratives about Mexico, which he coupled with growing U.S. 
economic dominance of Mexican industries during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He 
argues Mexico became an economic colony of the United States, with the discourses created 
within the travel narratives constructing a cultural apparatus of empire, with consequences on 
Mexican migrants once they were in the United States. Gilbert Gonzalez, Culture of Empire: 
American Writers, Mexico, and Mexican Immigrants, 1880-1930 (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2004). 
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 My work closely examines the politics of workers’ mobility and immobility, 
crosses back and forth between the United States and Mexico, considers the stakes both 
governments had in Mexican migration, as well as the social space created within these 
movements. By considering how each government had to respond to, and sought to 
control, workers’ movements, this study also challenges a uni-directional reading of 
immigration history. Mexican migration affected, and was affected by, both countries at 
the same time. 
The two most influential works in migration history in the past decade have 
employed comparative approaches to demonstrate the ways in which restriction, deciding 
who did not belong, characterized U.S. immigration policy as much or more so than 
admittance, or deciding who did belong. In her history of Chinese migration to the United 
States, Erika Lee argues for the centrality of Chinese restriction laws in creating the state 
apparatus of immigration enforcement so characteristic of the twentieth century.9 I agree 
with her and other scholars who have pointed out that initial border policing at the U.S.-
Mexico border was targeted toward keeping out Chinese migrants, thus disrupting 
essentialist notions of the U.S.-Mexico border as a political barrier used to separate only 
Mexicans from Americans. However, I caution against the implication that Mexican 
migrants were simply entangled in an enforcement regime meant for others. My work 
examines the ways in which border officials and law enforcement crafted strategies and 
modified immigration laws to respond specifically to the context of Mexican migration. 
Studying immigration law enforcement policy crafted at the U.S.-Mexico border to 
                                                 
9 Lee challenges the periodization that had located the advent of immigration restriction with the 
quota acts of 1924. Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration During the Exclusion 
Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 
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manage Mexican migration demonstrates the ways that immigration laws and 
enforcement created a context of simultaneous mobility and restriction.  
Mae Ngai’s comparative legal history of immigration during the first half of the 
twentieth century has been instrumental in showing the limits and contradictions in U.S. 
immigration policy. Far from the idealized image of the U.S. as a liberal democracy with 
a clearly defined and inclusive path from immigrant to citizen with the power to 
transform anyone in the world into American citizens, Ngai demonstrates how 
immigration laws instead created the illegal alien, an “impossible subject” that could best 
be understood as belonging to a “caste, unambiguously situated outside the boundaries of 
formal membership and social legitimacy.”10 While Ngai’s work has been very valuable 
in understanding the legal construction and social meanings of the category of the illegal 
alien in the United States, my work questions the image of permanence and rigidity that 
the word caste implies. While the category of illegal alien has remained stable and 
exclusive in immigration law, the migrants themselves negotiated various statuses and 
categories, citizen and alien, in contexts that were sometimes very ambiguous. In one act 
of illegal crossing, for example, a Mexican migrant could assert his rights as a Mexican 
citizen, while entering into a status of illegal alien in the U.S., defined by precariousness 
and vulnerability. 
Studies about the U.S.-Mexico border have generally fallen into two conceptual 
camps—those emphasizing the gradual hardening of border laws and infrastructure, and 
those emphasizing the continued movement of people, commodities, and ideas across the 
border.11 These two different approaches to the power and influence of the nation state 
                                                 
10 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 2. 
11 Examples of works emphasizing the growing power of the state and rigidity of the border are: 
Timothy Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low Intensity Conflict 
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on the border have shared one assumption: that harsher laws and border infrastructure 
signified a strong state establishing itself and asserting its power, while continued 
movements across borders, especially illegal movements undermined the power of the 
state and demonstrated its limits. 12 In addition, scholars have defined a temporal aspect 
to this dichotomy; that is, they have argued that the interconnectedness and fluidity of 
movement characterized the border during the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth 
century, and noted the transition to the militarization of the border and fragmented 
migration of the present day.13 This work, however, sees the mobility within restriction, 
and thus no clear dichotomy regarding movement and state power. 
Instead of viewing illegal migration solely as a challenge to the sovereignty of the 
nation-state, this study traces the ways in which workers’ movements, and the U.S. and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Doctrine Comes Home (Austin: CMAS Books, University of Texas Press, 1996); Joseph Nevins, 
Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico 
Boundary (New York: Routledge, 2002); Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Migra!: A History of the U.S. 
Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); and Eithne Luibhéid, Entry 
Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). 
A group of works on state power and public health destabilize the location of the border, finding 
it in immigrant urban areas, but nonetheless emphasize the power of the government to mark 
immigrants as outsiders. See Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San 
Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and Natalia Molina, Fit 
to be Citizens? Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006).  
12 Examples of works that highlight the complex processes of migration as resistances to the 
ordering power of the nation-state, contesting the line, are, Emma Pérez, The Decolonial 
Imaginary: Writing Chicanas into History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); and 
Alicia Schmidt Camacho, Migrant Imaginaries: Latino Cultural Politics in the U.S.-Mexico 
Borderlands (NY: New York University Press, 2008). While these works view migrations as 
forms of resisting and undermining the border, they do not discount the power and importance of 
the border as a force. 
13 One exception to this view are scholars of late capitalist globalization, who have pointed to the 
supranational power of corporations, beyond the bounds of accountability of the nation state, as 
well as, global information networks like the internet, also transcending national boundaries. See 
Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1996). See also, Manfred B. Steger, ed., Globalization: The Greatest Hits, A 
Studies Reader (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010). 
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Mexican governments’ responses to them, both forged as well as challenged, state power. 
In the case of the U.S., the border represented an important site for the concentration of 
federal authority, especially in matters over international migration. Immigration issues 
rested within the almost exclusive authority of the executive branch of the U.S. national 
government, since most decisions were handled administratively, without judicial 
reviews or constraints.14  
Although this authority informed the U.S. government’s strategies of interdiction, 
the barring the entrance of goods and people at the border, state authority was not based 
on interdiction, but in the management of people’s mobility. For the United States, 
managing illegal mobility at the border did not always mean stopping its entrance. During 
times of contestation between Mexican and U.S. officials over the migration of Mexican 
workers to the United States, the U.S. sometimes found that a demonstration of 
Mexicans’ unregulated mobility undermined the Mexican government’s position in labor 
negotiations.  
If managing Mexican migration formed a key site for U.S. state formation, its 
importance for Mexican state formation was even greater. Scholars have increasingly 
begun to study the history of Mexican emigration laws.15 Those works, as well as the 
works detailing the Mexican government’s continued reach in Mexicans’ lives in the 
United States challenge the notion of a Mexican policy of non-intervention in Mexican 
migration.16 Rather than explaining Mexico’s interest in negotiating the bracero program 
                                                 
14 Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007). 
15 See David FitzGerald, “Inside the Sending State: The Politics of Mexican Emigration Control,” 
International Migration Review 40 (Summer 2006), 259-93; and A Nation of Emigrants: How 
Mexico Manages Its Migration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).  
16 For the presence and influence of Mexican consulates in U.S. Mexican communities see, 
Francisco E. Balderrama, In Defense of la Raza: the Lost Angeles Mexican Consulate and the 
Mexican Community, 1929 to 1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982); and Gilbert 
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as a mechanism to serve mainly as a safety valve for problems in the Mexican economic 
and political structure, this dissertation places issues of sovereignty in a more central role 
in Mexican emigration policies during the mid-twentieth century.  Inspired by John 
Torpey’s thesis that establishing a “monopoly of the legitimate means of movement” of 
people has been central to modern state formation, I argue that the concerns about 
maintaining a monopoly over the legitimate means of movement motivated the Mexican 
government regarding the emigration of its citizens to the United States.17 My study of 
the ways that U.S. and Mexican federal and state governments responded to, and tried to 
manage workers’ migrations provides insight into the multidirectional pressures of state 
power, mobility, and labor. 
The history of the bracero program exemplifies the importance of examining the 
interconnectedness between local and national sources of authority in agricultural labor 
relationships. Responding to demands from California growers who feared a labor 
shortage in their fields because of the wartime draft and war-fueled industrial activities, 
U.S. government officials approached the Mexican government in 1941 to discuss a 
possible temporary labor importation program.18 After initial reluctance, the Mexican 
government agreed to the bi-national program to provide seasonal workers for U.S. 
agricultural and railroad industries if the U.S. could guarantee a series of measures 
designed to protect Mexicans while they were in the U.S., and guarantee workers’ return 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gonzalez, Mexican Consuls and Labor Organizing: Imperial Politics in the American Southwest 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999). For a work connecting Mexican American civil rights 
activists and the Mexican government during World War II, see Emilio Zamora, Claiming Rights 
and Righting Wrongs in Texas: Mexican Workers and Job Politics during World War II (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009). 
17 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
18 Otey Scruggs, Braceros, “Wetbacks,” and the Farm Labor Problem: Mexican Agricultural 
Labor in the United States, 1942-1954 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988), 155-161. 
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to Mexico after the season’s end. First, growers had to provide housing and food for 
workers, as well as access to medical care. Second, growers had to pay braceros the 
prevailing wage for agricultural labor in a given region, with a minimum wage guarantee 
of thirty cents per hour.19 Third, the employer had to pay the cost of workers’ 
transportation to and from Mexican recruitment centers. And finally, the Mexican 
government stipulated that no racial discrimination against braceros would be 
tolerated.20 To demonstrate their resolve on this issue, Mexican officials refused to allow 
growers in the state of Texas to participate in the bracero program until 1947, because of 
the state’s long history of discrimination against people of Mexican descent. 
Scholars of the bracero program have divided its twenty-two year span (1942-
1964) into three phases, defined by shifting power dynamics between the different groups 
involved—the U.S. government, the Mexican government, and growers. For their part, 
although Mexican workers did not have enough political clout to have a place at the 
negotiating table, workers’ migrations had a powerful influence on the governments’ 
negotiating power within the program. The first phase was the wartime bracero program, 
(1942-1947), characterized by a relatively strong position by the Mexican government 
because of its key role as a wartime ally of the U. S. During this period, the U.S. 
government also played an active role in the administration of the bracero program, 
shouldering much of the costs of transporting workers to and from Mexico.21 The second 
                                                 
19 The stipulation of paying the prevailing wage was meant to address the Mexican government’s 
determination that braceros should not be used to displace domestic agricultural workers and 
depress wages. Also, the minimum wage rate of thirty cents per hour was a feature of the original 
bracero agreement of 1942. This minimum wage guarantee changed over time during subsequent 
bracero negotiations. 
20 For a list of all the elements of the 1942 bracero agreement, see Scruggs, Braceros, 
“Wetbacks,” and the Farm Labor Problem, 178-179. 
21 Richard Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1971), 36-52. 
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phase of the program (1948-1951) was characterized by a diminution in the Mexican 
government’s negotiating power, as the increasing illegal migration of Mexican workers 
undermined the Mexican government’s attempt to control the emigration of its citizens. 
The U.S. government stepped back from its active administration of the bracero 
program.22 U.S. growers assumed more visible roles, forcing the Mexican government to 
deal with them directly.23 This period, often thought of as chaotic and tumultuous, 
brought to the surface the complex dynamics of local and national authorities that were 
always intertwined, but sometimes hidden. The third phase of the bracero program (1951-
1964) began with the passage of Public Law 78 in the U.S., which instituted the labor 
importation program as a permanent part of U.S. law. This phase signaled the U.S. 
government’s re-intervention in the program, and its pledge to enforce the elements of the 
agreement.24  
 
METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Movement and the control over workers’ movement was fundamental to many of 
the social processes on the border, from immigration law enforcement to agricultural 
labor relations. Yet mobility at the border was much more complex and nuanced than 
merely prohibiting or permitting entrance. Henri Lefebvre’s concept of using rhythm as a 
category of analysis illuminates the collision of circular and linear notions of time and 
movement in workers’ migrations and border formation.25 One notion of time and 
                                                 
22 This dissertation will show, however, that U.S. governmental action did not cease to be 
influential during this period. 
23 Craig, Bracero Program, 53-55. 
24 Ibid., 72. Of course critics of the bracero program pointed out the government’s deficiencies in 
its oversight of the bracero program. 
25 Henri Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time, and Everyday Life, translated by Stuart Elden 
and Gerald Moore (London: Continuum, 2004). 
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movement, circular, is often associated with the organic processes of nature; think of 
seasons for example. Another notion of time and movement, linear, is associated with 
human construction; such as the “march of progress” or history. This dissertation 
considers the connection between the two notions of time in the experiences of Mexican 
agricultural migrants, both in the larger legal structures of the border, but also in the 
daily, lived experiences of workers.  But the two aspects of time do not connect smoothly 
as Lefebvre notes: 
The relations of the cyclical and the linear—interactions, interferences, the 
domination of one over the other, or the rebellion of one against the other—are not 
simple: there is between them an antagonistic unity. They penetrate one another, but in an 
interminable struggle: sometimes compromise, sometimes disruption.26  
  
For instance, many migrants from Mexico came to the U.S. to work as 
agricultural laborers. Growers’ demands for labor were cyclical, patterned by the rhythms 
of the seasonal calendar. Yet, even though Mexican migrants responded to the fluctuating 
labor conditions of a seasonal industry, their movements were racialized as instinctual, 
and they were defined as if they were homing pigeons. Thus, Mexican migrants’ circular 
migrations were attributed to their perceived proclivities, and not to the economic 
realities of the agricultural industry, nor to the INS’s law enforcement activities. 
Furthermore, though the demands of agricultural industries were cyclical in 
nature, immigration laws were constructed in a linear fashion. In general, the U.S. 
constructed immigration laws based on the expectation of permanency and eventual 
                                                 
26 Lefebvre, 76. 
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naturalization.27 The U.S. assigned visas on the basis of which migrants the government 
deemed worthy to become U.S. citizens, a very narrow category. The exceptions to this 
linear approach to immigration laws existed at both land borders, with border crossing 
cards that permitted people to cross into the U.S. daily for work. Through their 
enforcement methods, Border Patrol officers used a flexible method of deportation in 
voluntary departure to manage a seasonal demand for labor in Southwestern agricultural 
region, thereby using deportation to create a process of circularity within a linear system 
of immigration.  
In order to explore the interconnections between the state and everyday life on the 
border in the social space of agriculture, I studied diverse sources. In the national 
archives in Washington, D.C. and the archives of the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 
(SRE) in Mexico City, I saw both governments struggling to maintain control over the bi-
national labor importation program, and respond to conflicting agendas and interests of 
their constituents. The archival collections of two South Texas growers proved useful in 
getting at the day-to-day workings of large farming operations, as well as the dense 
network of relationships between growers in South Texas and El Paso, and their 
relationships to power in Washington, D.C. Carrol Norquest’s ethnographic anecdotes of 
Mexican workers, published in 1972, provided an intimate look at growers’ identity 
formation in relation to workers, and details about daily life on a South Texas farm.  
Though the book was rich source material, it created an image of agricultural 
relations and representations of Mexican workers only from his perspective as a farmer. I 
conducted oral histories with a former worker on the Norquest farm, and relatives of 
former workers, to create additional narratives that complicated Norquest’s 
                                                 
27 Of course the U.S. did issue temporary visas for visitors, but those included strict instructions 
prohibiting or limiting the visa holders’ ability to work in the U.S. 
 15 
characterization of Mexican migration and social relations between him and workers. The 
circuitous manner by which I found some members of the Magallan family who worked 
for Norquest, exemplifies the extensive bi-national kinship networks that emerged as a 
central aspect of the family’s story.28 
 
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
In Chapter One, “Selling the Magic Valley,” I trace the development of the 
agricultural industry in South Texas, analyzing the promotional brochures railroad and 
land companies produced to attract farmers from other regions in the U.S. to purchase 
land and move to the border. The materials recycled the 19th century idea of the frontier 
in a new time, weaving it with images of Progressive era capitalist expansion and 
modernity. Mexican labor was central to their plans for a modern agricultural economy, 
yet area boosters still cast Mexican laborers as pre-modern peones. I also examine the 
various demographic changes and migrations occurring in south Texas and northeastern 
Mexico, which made the development of a large-scale agricultural economy possible. 
Chapter Two, “The Social Space of Agriculture,” explores the everyday social 
relations between Anglo growers and Mexican undocumented workers in South Texas, 
who lived and worked on farmers’ lands. The Border Patrol played an important role in 
shaping these relations by inhibiting workers’ mobility. This chapter draws upon the 
                                                 
28 In an interview with Carrol Norquest’s son, he told me the last name of the extended family 
that worked for the Norquests over the years, as well as the name of Rancho Grande, the small 
town they were from in Tamaulípas, but he did know about the current whereabouts of any of the 
members of the family. A friend who founded the Llano Grande Center for Research and 
Development, and who now teaches at the University of Texas Pan American uses family and 
community history in his pedagogical approach in training educators in South Texas. Because of 
this, he knew of a former student from the small town located across the river in Rancho Grande. 
She knew some members of a Magallan family in Granjeno, and through her I met Alberto 
Magallan who took me to Rancho Grande to interview Noe Magallan, a former worker on the 
Norquest farm. 
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history of paternalism within slavery in the ante-bellum South to gain insight into how 
growers in South Texas took advantage of workers’ compromised mobility to construct 
images of their relations with workers as familial. Unequal and racialized agricultural 
relations defined in familial terms formed an important part of the history of agrarian 
system in the U.S. Agricultural relations in South Texas were informed by the cultural 
system of knowledge about agricultural workers produced in plantation slavery; they 
were not replicated in South Texas.  I also examine the ways in which Mexican migrant 
workers negotiated the logic of paternalism expressed by some growers by nurturing and 
maintaining their own extensive kinship family networks. 
Chapter Three, “The Flexible Border: Mobility within Restriction in U.S. 
Immigration Laws and Enforcement,” looks at U.S. immigration laws and INS law 
enforcement practices during the first half of the twentieth century. I argue that even 
during a period of increased restriction U.S. laws allowed for the migration of Mexican 
laborers, but within temporary and limited parameters.  Immigration law enforcement 
through the deportation method of voluntary departure became the primary method the 
U.S. government used to manage Mexican migration. Voluntary departure, which 
provided an easier and less punitive alternative to formal deportation, allowed for the 
movement of laborers, but not their legitimation. This chapter looks at the ways in which 
growers contested the Border Patrol’s reach on the ground in El Paso and South Texas. 
The dynamics of that struggle also shaped Border Patrol enforcement practices, which 
represented intertwined local and federal authority on the border. 
Chapter Four, “Exploitative Villain or Community Leader?” considers the role of 
the crew leader in the South Texas agricultural system. Often, crew leaders were either 
Mexican American or long-term Mexican residents of the U.S., former farm workers who 
had accrued enough capital to buy a truck to transport workers and crops, and their work 
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crews were either predominantly Mexican American or a mix of Mexican Americans and 
Mexican nationals. Acting as intermediaries between farm owners and workers, crew 
leaders organized groups of farm workers, found work and negotiated wages with 
farmers, provided transportation to the fields, and if the work was required long distance 
travel, found housing for workers during the season. In the name of maximizing the 
efficiency of the Texas agricultural labor market, Texas labor officials used laws 
regulating labor agencies to also target crew leaders, seeking to keep Mexican American 
migrant farm workers from leaving the state. Focusing on Mexican American farm 
workers in the context of this dissertation shows the collateral effects of border laws and 
policies on a mobile Mexican American population. Looking at the vilification of crew 
leaders in the context of both Mexican American migrant farm work and the 
undocumented labor system employed along the border, demonstrates the centrality of 
the control over Mexican (and Mexican American) workers’ mobility to the agendas of 
state and national governments on both sides of the border. 
The final chapter of the dissertation, “El Paso/The Passage: The 1948 El Paso 
Incident and the Politics of Mobility” picks up on the dissertation’s international 
approach to the politics of the border by examining how the U.S. and Mexican 
governments tried to manage Mexican workers’ mobility. The two governments vied 
with each other to maintain control over the bracero program and the border itself.  The 
El Paso Incident resulted from that struggle, and the politics of the El Paso Incident 




A NOTE ON TERMS 
In this dissertation I mainly used “undocumented” or “unauthorized” migrant 
when referring to people who crossed the border into the U.S. without permission. I used 
the terms “illegal immigrant,”  “illegal alien,” or “illegal migration,” only when I was 
trying to draw attention to the person’s legal status, or when the fact of the worker’s 
illegality was significant in the sentence. When I included quotes I retained the original 
language used in the quote. Frequently that meant I had to use the word “wetback,” 
despite its racist and offensive connotations, because the word was in common usage 
during the mid-twentieth century.  
At certain points in my dissertation I carefully distinguish between Mexican 
nationals and Mexican Americans, and sometimes I do not, which can seem confusing. In 
Chapter One, I do not distinguish between the two, referring to both as Mexicans. (They 
would have referred to themselves as mexicanos.) I begin to distinguish between 
Mexicans and Mexican Americans from Chapter Two on, because the growing presence 
of the Border Patrol makes the distinction necessary for my argument. 
The complex intricacies of power at the border during the mid-twentieth century, 
with two states vying for control over workers’ mobility would suggest a picture of the 
border as a space of dynamic and dramatic change. Growers’ own assertion of power 
over workers’ movements, which paradoxically relied upon, yet also came into conflict 
with U.S. federal authority also deepened the complexity, further suggesting a state of 
change as different groups acquired greater power at different times. Underlying all the 
change, however, is an element of continuity that links this period on the border to others 
during the twentieth century and to the present day as well. The U.S. government has 
long considered Mexican migrants to the U.S. as temporary sojourners within a system of 
immigration ideologically based on permanency and assimilation. That contradiction 
 19 
created the problem of what to do with a permanent population of Mexicans who were 
never meant to be permanent in the first place. In the present day, whatever their political 
affiliation, observers agree that the U.S. immigration system is broken. As the histories of 




Chapter One: Selling the ‘Magic Valley’: Promotional Brochures and 
Narratives of Migration in Early Twentieth Century South Texas 
 
South Texas underwent great physical and social transformation during the first 
few decades of the twentieth century in a painful transition from a cattle ranching 
economy to large-scale agricultural production. Historians have written extensively about 
this shift, which destabilized existing race and class relations among Mexicans in South 
Texas and reconfigured divisions of race and class between Anglos and Mexicans.29 
Less has been written about the cultural apparatus that supported and mobilized the 
migration of farming families from the Midwest, the Great Plains states, and the South 
during the early twentieth century. Promotional brochures produced by land and railroad 
companies during the 1920s and 1930s, employed images and invoked cultural systems 
of the frontier and modernity to create a unitary view of the region that supported the 
companies’ social and economic agendas. Both the physical process of altering the 
landscape—from laying irrigation infrastructure for citrus orchards to building the 
railroads to carry the product to market—and the advertisements created to promote the 
area to potential buyers from the U.S. Midwest and South worked together to claim the 
border as modern and American from a perceived Mexican undeveloped wilderness. This 
chapter studies the various tropes land companies employed to sell the Rio Grande Valley 
as well as the mechanisms they used to physically bring visitors to visit a region they 
termed the “Magic Valley.” Taking advantage of the railroad as a symbol of 
                                                 
29 I use Anglo and white as interchangeable categories. These two terms, like all racial categories 
are socially constructed, therefore have a historical genealogy. However, despite the term’s 
association with an Anglo Saxon racial identity originating in the British Isles, in Texas the word 
Anglo was used as a catchall term to refer to white people. For more on the origins of Anglo-
Saxon identity, see Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American 
Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.) 
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modernization, and working with the railroad industry’s equal commitment to the 
agricultural development of the area, land companies designed lavish three-day 
excursions to attract people to South Texas. 
 
Fig. 1.1 Detail from Sales Packet, “Now! A Sharyland Citrus Grove Within 
Reach of All,” Publications, Box 1, John H. Shary Collection, Library 
Archives and Special Collection, University of Texas-Pan American, 
Edinburg, TX.  
 
This illustration (fig. 1.1), from a Southwestern Land Company’s pamphlet aimed 
at absentee investors, encapsulates the notion that social relations formed in the border 
region in South Texas had a greater reach than its geographical boundaries. As the 
gentleman in this picture relaxed on his front porch, feet propped up on an ottoman, 
reading with a drink by his side, he could luxuriate in the knowledge that the work taking 
place on his investment property gave him the means to work less and enjoy his leisure 
time. The man’s geographical location is ambiguous, but his business suit suggests an 
urban or suburban rather than a rural context. In this image, all distance between his 
 22 
home and the U.S.-Mexico border has collapsed, and the Mexican workers are working in 
his front yard. Far from being a remote, potentially dangerous or threatening place, the 
border has become a domestic and productive space populated with industrious Mexicans 
whose labor supported American prosperity. 
The interactions between land companies and potential buyers, in producing and 
consuming the messages in the promotional literature, and in traveling on excursions, 
together engaged in the process of defining the region from a Mexican to a U.S. space. 
For those men and women who took the next steps and purchased land and moved with 
their families to South Texas, the processes of journeying to South Texas on the 
excursions to see the land, the people, and the economic possibilities, formed the first 
stage of their transformation into border growers. 
 
MIGRATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOUTH TEXAS AND NORTHERN MEXICO 
 
Scholars writing about South Texas have characterized the region as a previously 
isolated, self-contained, and somewhat static social world, disrupted by two periods of 
transformation, one directly after the Mexican American War in 1848, and the other more 
profound change at the beginning of the twentieth century with the change from a cattle 
ranching to a crop-based agricultural economy.30 Notwithstanding the significance of 
these developments, dramatic changes also occurred in northern Mexico during President 
Porfirio Diaz’s regime (1877-1911) that also affected South Texas. Railroad construction 
and the development of large-scale industries in northern Mexico spurred a greater 
                                                 
30 For this view, see Jovita González, Life Along the Border, edited by María E. Cotera (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006); Américo Paredes, With His Pistol in His Hand: A 
Border Ballad and its Hero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958); David Montejano, Anglos 
and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987). 
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amount of internal migration in the region. Though agricultural industry boosters initiated 
deep changes in the economy, society, and culture in South Texas, they did not create an 
agricultural empire out of the wilderness, as they were wont to suggest. The Porfirian-era 
modernization projects induced demographic change in northern Mexico, creating the 
mobile labor force crucial to South Texas agriculturalists’ development plans.31  
Traditionally, power in northern Mexican region during the nineteenth century 
inhered in the social space of the cattle ranch, which formed the basis of the economy and 
also organized the social and religious lives of its inhabitants. The patriarch of each ranch 
community held authority over his dependents—his wife, children, and the laborers who 
lived on the ranch, the latter bound to the land by debt peonage.32 The first period of 
transformation began after the Mexican American War and the region’s legal 
incorporation into the United States, and continued through the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. The intermittent, yet frequent mobilization of American military 
troops to the South Texas-Mexico border during these years left a residual presence of 
former soldiers and support staff who stayed in the region, married into local elite 
Mexican families, became merchants and cattle ranchers, and began to take dominant 
positions in the local economic, social, and political structure.  
Though some amassed large ranches at the expense of Mexican landowners, and 
often through violence and intimidation, some scholars have argued that the presence of 
                                                 
31 To understand more about economic, social, and demographic changes brought about by 
Porfirio Diaz’s policies, as well as the role of U.S. capital in the development of northern 
Mexican industries, see John Mason Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico 
Since the Civil War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). For a work that links the 
U.S. dominance of northern Mexican industries and the creation of an imperialist discourse about 
Mexicans produced in U.S. travel writing to the displacement and racialization of working-class 
Mexicans, see Gilbert Gonzalez, Culture of Empire: American Writers, Mexico, and Mexican 
Immigrants, 1880-1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004). 
32 Jovita González, 76-78. 
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Anglos did not fundamentally change cultural and social life in South Texas. Cattle 
ranching still dominated the economy, though now integrated into a larger U.S. 
marketplace, instead of the regional Mexican market the ranches had previously served. 
Patriarchs still dominated familial dependents and laborers, though now the ranch 
patriarch might have an English or Irish last name.33 Furthermore, because many Anglo 
men had married into elite Mexican families to establish themselves socially and 
economically, these alliances preserved the Spanish language, the Catholic religion, and 
the prevailing social class structure as the dominant cultural forms in the region. 
 Historian David Montejano has described the attempts by the Mexican elite 
seeking to keep their power and accommodate into a new political reality, as the “peace 
structure.”34 The peace structure, however, did not actually promote peace. Periods of 
violence and unrest punctured the region as some American newcomers consolidated 
their power through the paramilitary force of the Texas Rangers. Others placed pressure 
on the newly formed boundaries of the U.S.-Mexico border through armed incursions 
into Mexico, called filibusters. Furthermore, tensions escalated as some Mexican border 
residents struggled against these changes through armed resistance.35   
A second profound transformation of South Texas occurred in the early twentieth 
century, after the coming of the railroad dramatically changed the region’s economy, 
                                                 
33 Montejano, 75-85. 
34 Ibid., 34-37. For a work that argues for a more economically aggressive and successful tenure 
by Tejanos in South Texas during the latter nineteenth century see, Armando C. Alonzo, Tejano 
Legacy: Rancheros and Settlers in South Texas, 1734-1900 (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1998). 
35 For works that explore both Anglo violence against Mexicans during the nineteenth century as 
well as Mexican armed resistance to social changes occurring in South Texas and throughout the 
Southwest see, Robert Rosenbaum, Mexicano Resistance in the Southwest (Dallas: Southern 
Methodist University Press, 1998); and Manuel Callahan, “Mexican Border Troubles: Social 
War, Settler Colonialism, and the Production of Frontier Discourses, 1848-1880,” (Ph.D diss., 
University of Texas at Austin, 2003).  
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demographics, and the entire social structure. The St. Louis, Brownsville, and Mexico 
Railroad connected the Rio Grande Valley with Corpus Christi to the north during the 
summer of 1904, and the prospective development spurred intense land speculation in 
South Texas.36 The same large tract of land that once belonged to a Tejano family, might 
have changed hands several times in a few short years, as different groups of investors 
sought to find the right tract of land to begin to advertise in the Midwest, the Middle 
Plains, and the South.37 Land companies proliferated quickly in South Texas, and they 
organized excursions, which brought thousands of prospective investors to South Texas 
per month on the premise that the “Magic Valley” was a future agricultural paradise.  As 
a result of these efforts, the demographics of South Texas changed rapidly: Hidalgo 
County alone averaged a 125 percent increase in population every ten years between 
1900 and 1930, growing from 6,837 in 1900 to 77,004 in 1930.38 While the county was 
almost exclusively Mexican throughout the nineteenth century, by 1930, Mexicans only 
made up about 53 percent of the population.39  
The demographic shifts brought other more substantial economic and social 
changes in their wake. Fired by the spectacle and promise of the physical transformation 
of the land for intensive agricultural production, early twentieth century white migrants 
were determined to modernize a region they perceived to be pre-modern and backward. 
Disturbed by what they judged to be corrupt machine politics based on the manipulation 
                                                 
36 J. Lee Stambaugh and Lillian J. Stambaugh, The Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas (San 
Antonio: The Jenkins Publishing Co., 1974), 173. 
37 David E. Vassberg, Stockholm on the Rio Grande: A Swedish Farming Colony on the Mesquite 
Frontier of Southernmost Texas, 1912-1985 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 
12-15. 
38 Historical Census Browser, from the University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data 




of an uneducated illiterate Mexican vote, “good government” leagues associated with the 
new migrants sought to disenfranchise Mexican voters through the application of poll 
taxes.40 New towns built along the newly constructed railroad supplanted the old 
ranches, now depicted as quaint relics of an earlier time. Agricultural land developers 
touted the progressiveness of their bustling communities with their modern new buildings 
and churches. They organized the towns, from their inception, as segregated towns, with 
the Anglo residential spaces and the Mexican Town or Mexican Colony clearly defined 
and delineated in their blueprints. Thus Mexicans’ spaces were relegated to small, dense 
corners of townships, marginalized from new spaces of public and social engagement. 
Mexicans had to make shift within the new agricultural economy as foremen, labor 
contractors, manual laborers, or sharecroppers. As the prices for land rose in the counties 
that had begun to introduce large-scale farming, Mexican landowners faced the pressure 
of having to cultivate agriculture for commercial production as well, or risk losing their 
land by being unable to pay their property taxes. The replacement of the cattle ranching 
economy by commercial agriculture undermined the bases of power on which the 
Mexican social structure rested. Mexicans soon occupied a social space in which their 
movements were limited by public, residential, and educational segregation, all of which 
combined to place them in a position at the bottom of the new society. 
Though typically viewed from a U.S. perspective, the painful social changes 
associated with the coming of the railroad in South Texas were mirrored in northern 
Mexico, initiated a generation before, in fact. The railroad connected Monterrey, in the 
northern Mexican state of Nuevo León, to the United States in 1882, spurred by Porfirio 
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Diaz’s modernization program for Mexico, and financed largely by American capital.41 
The coming of the railroad signaled massive changes to the Northern Mexican 
countryside, formerly dotted by large cattle ranches and small landholdings owned by 
subsistence farmers. Helped along by Porfirian-era policies allowing for the 
dispossession of those who could not produce legal titles to their land, as well as rising 
land prices, large landowners increased their acreage at the expense of small rancheros 
and ejiditarios. Now landless, many former small landholders were forced to labor on 
large haciendas, producing cash crops for extremely low wages.42 
Far from the dormant region that Anglo land developers represented, northeastern 
Mexico had been undergoing significant changes to its economy and population since the 
last decade of the nineteenth century in industry as well. The two border states abutting 
the Rio Grande Valley, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, were large and highly populated. In 
1900, Nuevo León counted 327,937 residents in its state while Tamaulipas had 218,948 
people.43 By the turn of the twentieth century, the city of Monterrey in Nuevo León had 
emerged as a growing industrial center and soon became the foremost industrial city in 
Mexico, mostly through foreign investment in ore smelters.44 As industry took hold in 
the city, wages in Monterrey rapidly increased, paying among the highest levels in the 
                                                 
41 José Antonio Olvera, Monterrey y sus caminos de hierro (Monterrey, Nuevo León: Consejo 
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42 Paul Hart, Bitter Harvest: The Social Transformation of Morelos, Mexico, and the Origins of 
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43Secretaría de Fomento, Colonización e Industria, Censo General de la República Mexicana, 
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44 Mora-Torres, 85-103. 
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country.45The industrialization of Monterrey spurred migration to the growing city as 
people sought those higher-paying positions in factories and other industrial jobs. Thus, 
during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, the population in the two northeastern Mexican border states was 
highly mobile. A substantial portion of the population in Nuevo León and Tamaulipas 
were migrants from other nearby Mexican states. For Nuevo León, between the years 
1895 and 1930, an average of 14 percent of the people were born in other Mexican 
states.46 In Tamaulipas, the numbers of migrants in the state was even higher, averaging 
19.6 percent during the same time period.47  
Despite the traumatic transformation of the Rio Grande Valley and South Texas 
Mexicans’ physical and social dislocation after the introduction of the railroad in 1904, it 
would be mistake to believe that the region was generally placid until that time. 
Considering the area both the north and south side of the border as a whole, regional 
migration had already been underway in northern Mexico since the late nineteenth 
century. That regional mobility laid the platform for migration into South Texas to form 
the labor force central to the agricultural development in the early twentieth century. 
Significantly, it was through and within that migration among the working classes of 
Mexican agricultural laborers that cross-border regional ties continued to exist. Migrating 
families lived and labored in a transnational context as they maintained households on 
both sides of the border. Though social stratification worked to separate Mexican 
migrants and Mexican Americans, they invariably created new relationships and 
communities with each other as they shared laboring and social spaces.  
                                                 
45 Ibid., 137. 
46 Information taken from Mexican General Census, 1895, 1900, 1921, 1930. 
47 Ibid. In Tamaulipas the numbers for people born in other states rose dramatically in the 1921 
and 1930 census, forming 29.4% and 24.3% of the entire population, respectively. 
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Other scholars have demonstrated South Texas’s continuous linkages to 
communities in northern Mexico, casting the area directly adjacent on both sides of the 
border as one social space. Historians have shown that throughout the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, border residents responded to changing political 
dynamics on both sides of the border. For example, anti-Porfirio Diaz organizing was as 
likely to occur on the U.S. side of the border as in Mexico as demonstrated by Catarino 
Garza’s efforts during the 1890s, and Mexicans provided significant material support for 
Mexican-American armed resistance to Anglo violence in 1915.48  Also, during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century, many Mexicans negotiated their depressed labor 
and social conditions in the United States by organizing themselves into mutual aid 
societies inspired by Mexican politics and Mexican political heroes.49 Through the 
preservation of family ties, through transborder political organizing, and through the very 
process of migration, Mexicans continued to live in transnational communities, whose 
lives and concerns both influenced and were influenced by events and social processes 
occurring on both sides of the border. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Elliott Young, Catarino Garza’s Revolution on the Texas-Mexico Border (Durham: Duke 
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NARRATIVES OF THE FRONTIER AND PROGRESS IN LAND PROMOTIONAL BROCHURES 
As more and more land changed hands in South Texas, and land investors began 
exploring the agricultural possibilities of the region, dozens of newly formed land 
companies began advertising their new creation. In conjunction with the two railroad 
companies serving the region, the Southern Pacific and Missouri Pacific Lines, the land 
companies published innumerable brochures and broadcasted radio segments aimed at 
persuading Midwesterners to take the excursions down to South Texas. While there, sales 
agents tried to persuade visitors to purchase property either to resettle with their families 
in South Texas, or for absentee investment purposes. In describing the different 
characteristics of the area, the brochures did not merely introduce an unknown land, but 
actively worked to define the land as a commodity to be purchased, a landscape which 
included within it a native Mexican labor force, also a valuable commodity. The 
exuberant paeans to the economic possibilities available in the Rio Grande Valley evoked 
nineteenth century images of the American western frontier, thus creating an easily 
digestible mental picture of life in South Texas using familiar associations.50 The 
narratives of an idealized past (the frontier) and Progressive-era discourses of a 
modernizing future wove together to create, in South Texas, a constructed place out of 
time in the modern twentieth century. Furthermore, because several of these brochures 
were produced in the early 1930s, this narrative nexus was also enacted within the 
                                                 
50 These methods of definition and characterization of Mexicans fit within a long and enduring 
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shadow of the anxiety-ridden Great Depression. Thus the Valley became, in the 
pamphleteers’ imagination, a place to recapture the triumphant narratives of white 
progress and opportunity, notions that had become open to critique through the failures of 
the Great Depression. The printed propaganda associated with a burgeoning agricultural 
industry during the first half of the twentieth century exemplifies the discourse 
constructed about the region and its inhabitants. This advertising worked with the 
region’s physical re-formation to claim the social and ideological space of the South 
Texas border. 
As noted, brochure makers mobilized the important iconography of the frontier, 
bringing its associated images of mastery to the geography of South Texas. By invoking 
the frontier, brochures also reminded readers of the reasoning that originally supported 
the nineteenth century ideology of Manifest Destiny, a divinely granted and masculine 
authority over a putatively empty wilderness. As one of the most common tropes 
narrating the American West, boosters in the region were quick to employ the imagery 
and descriptions that would place the Rio Grande Valley within its triumphalist history. 
In one especially melodramatic tract, the author judged the Rio Grande Valley to be the 
“Masterpiece” of the “Commanding General of the Universe” who had created a “fit 
dwelling place for the favored sons of men.”51 According to the logic of Manifest 
Destiny, God’s approval of any means used, including violence, to dispossess “weaker” 
peoples, who were judged not to have been exploiting the land to its highest possible 
degree, became apparent through the aggressor’s very ability to act. That is, God gave the 
aggressors the strength to conquer because God approved of the conquest, as read 
                                                 
51 Promotional Brochure, “The Land of Continuous Crops: The Lower Rio Grande Valley,” 
produced for O. H. Stugard and Sons; Publications, Box 1, Folders 1-63, John H. Shary 
Collection, Library Archives and Special Collection, University of Texas Pan American. 
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through the Biblical decree that humans dominate the land. Such reasoning lay behind 
much of the justifications for violent U.S. westward expansion against Native Americans 
and Mexicans. The portrayal of a martial God in the brochure invoked the history of 
nineteenth century Manifest Destiny and revived it for the twentieth century. 
For the most part, however, boosters preferred to downplay overt violence and 
employed the other dominant myth of frontier expansion—that of a virgin land waiting to 
be inhabited, giving passive consent to its use by white men. The land itself was gendered 
feminine, and descriptions of the processes by which agricultural development altered the 
landscape often shaded into sexualized language. One description noted, for instance: 
The Rio Grande Valley is the Delta of the Rio Grande River, a land which, in 
centuries of repose gathered its latent wealth from the richly laden waters of the 
Rio Grande River and now awakens to the magic touch of man’s efforts, giving 
foods and comforts to all peoples.52  
 
This narrative portrayed the river delta of the Rio Grande as a female reproductive 
organ that had lain chastely untouched until white colonization had opened up the land 
for agricultural production. As Anne McClintock has pointed out in her analysis of 
British imperialism, “within patriarchal narratives, to be virgin is to be empty of desire 
and void of sexual agency, passively awaiting the thrusting, male insemination of history, 
language, and reason.”53 In this case, because the brochure was dealing specifically with 
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agricultural development, the masculinist imagery of planting seeds was especially apt. 
The sexual mastery depicted in this narrative helped contextualize the political and 
economic domination of the region by the newly arrived Americans. 
Other brochures produced during the 1920s and 1930s used less direct language in 
making their case regarding the transformation of the landscape, but, nonetheless, asked 
the reader to draw similar conclusions. Most tracts marveled at the “impenetrable 
wilderness,” the “vast, almost uninhabited wilderness of mesquite and cactus,” that 
existed before 1904 and the changes wrought by the coming of the railroad.54 Mirroring 
the standard narratives about U.S. westward expansion, the land was depicted as wild, 
untouched, and empty of civilization, save a “few thousand people, mostly Mexicans, 
living in clusters of “jacals” [sic].55 The seeming contradiction between claiming that the 
area was an empty wilderness and the evidence that there were indeed Mexicans already 
living there was not a contradiction for proponents of this frontier ideology. Americans 
often justified the forced dispossession of Native Americans by claiming that native 
populations were not properly using the land, leaving it a wilderness. These 
characterizations can be read as part of that common strategy undertaken throughout the 
nineteenth century. More importantly, however, by describing the region as a wilderness 
and lumping Mexicans into a condition of a state of wilderness as well, the brochures 
discursively reduced Mexicans to being part of the landscape. Furthermore, because the 
brochures and pamphlets were created to attract buyers for the land, as just another 
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quality of the landscape, Mexicans became a natural resource comparable to the quality 
of the soil, and a commodity just like acreage. 
Pamphleteers conflated Mexicans with wilderness landscape by emphasizing their 
“primitiveness,” often represented through photographs and descriptions of their houses. 
Many brochures included photographs of jacales, small houses made of wattle and daub 
construction with thatched roofs, sometimes with a Mexican young woman, or family, 
presumably to provide a sense of visual perspective of the size of the dwelling for the 
viewer (see fig. 1.2).56 
                                                 
56 According to cultural geographer Daniel Arreola’s study, photographs of rural Mexican 
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Fig.1.2.  Note the young girl standing in front of house on left and group of 
people in background. Detail from “In Rio Grande Valley, Paradise, 
Sharyland: Where Nature Produces the World’s Sweetest Fruit.”  
 
The accompanying descriptions to these photos reinforced the notion of 
primitiveness, of belonging to the pre-modern, undeveloped landscape that agricultural 
entrepreneurs had discovered in the Rio Grande Valley, and as Carey McWilliams 
 36 
observed, “exposed as a special item or artifact for study.”57 Described as either 
“Mexican villages,” or “clusters” of Mexican jacales, brochure authors denied the 
Mexican Valley population any kind of social or political organization that would fit 
within the context of the twentieth-century United States. 
While fixing an image of the Mexican home and family as curiosities and artifacts 
belonging to a primitive past, the photographs with people standing in front of their 
homes also served to remind the consumer of the brochures of the presence of workers in 
the landscape in the present. Thus, the tag on the photograph pointed out that they were 
villages of Mexican laborers. The jacales were not empty artifacts, therefore, and their 
inhabitants could be useful to prospective agriculturalists. As part of the usable 
landscape, Mexicans were also embedded in the conquest of the land suggested by 
appeals to the frontier and Manifest Destiny found in the literature. The image above, 
however, avoided any direct allusion to violence; any prior violence was erased, and what 
remained was the image of the young girl. Like many narratives of conquest, the 
conquered were rendered feminine and docile, and any evidence of traditional sources of 
male power and authority, were in this case, completely absent. In this brochure, the 
photo became a stand-in for the entire Mexican laboring population.   
To demonstrate a sharp contrast to the primitive wilderness, and demonstrate the 
power of new colonists to dramatically alter their surroundings, many brochures 
juxtaposed images, before and after, of the transformed landscape. These images echoed 
Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous 1893 frontier thesis, extending a narrative of the 
gradual transformation of the landscape, by degrees, from wilderness to civilization, in a 
predictable succession.  
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Fig. 1.3.  Juxtaposed images of landscape transformed through commercial agriculture. 
On the left a photo, with an inscription, “raw cactus land”. In stark contrast 
to the wildness and disorder of the image on the left, the photograph on the 
right depicted an aerial view of a citrus orchard, each tree placed within a 
tight geometrical grid. From promotional brochure, “McAllen, TX, The City 
of Palms,” c. 1927, Publications, Box 1, Folders 1-63, Shary Collection, 
LASC, UTPA. 
 
In employing these visual strategies, as well as making direct allusions to the 
frontier, area land speculators wished to call attention to the Rio Grande Valley’s both 
familiarity and strangeness, or singularity. By encompassing the region within the 
familiar discourse of the frontier, the brochures bounded the land within a particularly 
American narrative of development, and thus discursively including the Valley within the 
boundaries of the U.S. According to these tracts, however, the Rio Grande Valley 
differed from every other geographic location in the U.S. in that it had retained its wild, 
underdeveloped state well into the twentieth century, and well after Frederick Jackson 
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Turner had announced the closing of the frontier in 1893.58 This “Last Frontier” then, 
was strangely both in and out of time, a bridge between the nineteenth century and the 
modernity of the twentieth century.59 The brochures offered an opportunity for middling 
farmers and businessmen to experience a colonizing venture in an area that had somehow 
escaped the all-enveloping process of westward expansion, to reprise the role of settling 
the frontier. 
In compressing this story, by selling the “Magic Valley” as a previously 
untouched, frontier area, land speculators and boosters in 1920s and 1930s elided the 
history of the violent subjugation of the region during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Less than a generation before the publication of the brochures, for instance, 
South Texas had been in the midst of an uprising organized by Mexicans on both sides of 
the border over the extensive land loss and social upheaval wrought by incoming Anglo 
Americans. In 1915, during what became known as the San Diego Revolt, the Mexican 
combatants’ violence against Anglo person and property, which included derailing a train 
on the much-celebrated St. Louis, Brownsville, and Mexico line, was met by a brutal 
campaign of reprisal by the Texas Rangers and the local Anglo community. Rangers and 
hastily deputized local whites killed over a thousand Mexicans in 1915 and 1916, and 
forced thousands of Mexican families to flee from their homes.60 Despite the violence of 
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the recent past, only one brochure indirectly referenced this history. The author sought to 
explain why such an amazingly fertile, potentially productive region had thus far escaped 
the reach of American developers by describing the Valley as “far removed from the 
centers of commerce, isolated as a result of continual Border warfare and banditry 
extending over a period of years.”61 That short statement quickly glossed over more than 
seventy years of violence between Mexicans and Texas Rangers, as well as the Mexican 
Revolution. Of course doing otherwise might have suggested a region still politically 
unstable, and would have been a very poor advertising strategy.  
The pamphleteers’ practice of overlooking that turbulent history achieved an 
effect that had more to do with the 1920s and 1930s than the 1800s. They offered the 
frontier without the accompanying violence of “pacification.” By masking the violence 
that had constructed a racial social system in which Mexicans occupied the bottom sector, 
Mexicans’ social position could then be construed as natural and unquestionable. In these 
brochures, Mexicans became a people without history. In this way, Mexicans were 
presented as already occupying the landscape as submissive laborers, and not native 
landowners who still had yet to be dispossessed. Thus in the same brochure, the author 
could offer another benefit of the region to the women whose families might be 
considering a move to South Texas:  
The servant problem is solved by Mexican labor, largely. A well-trained Mexican 
servant gives good satisfaction under firm, kindly treatment. A fair and friendly 
                                                                                                                                                 
Johnson estimates that probably several thousand ethnic Mexicans were killed in this two-year 
period. 119-120. 
61 Julia Cameron Montgomery, “A Little Journey Through the Lower Valley of the Rio Grande, 
The Magic Valley of Texas,” 24; produced for the Southern Pacific Railroad Lines, 1928; 
Publications, Box 1, Folders 1-63, Shary Collection, LASC, UTPA. 
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dealing with a Mexican usually begets loyalty and dependability, a response to 
whatever is received.62 
 
In this small piece of friendly advice to a potential newcomer, the author both hid 
and revealed a great deal. The source and origins of the laborers was unaddressed, in that 
they seemed to already be there, existing solely to serve white families. Readers became 
aware of an existing source of racialized labor to form a servant class. Furthermore, the 
idea that did come across clearly was the notion that a system of racial subjugation was 
firmly in place, because Mexicans, she suggested, were either already well trained to 
provide unwavering obedience, or could be easily trained by the woman of the house. 
In stark contrast to the jacales and native Mexican population, a contrast created 
for deliberate effect, brochures sketched descriptions of new Anglo towns and 
communities in South Texas, touting their progressiveness. Brochures defined 
Progressivism in two ways: by the material infrastructure now changing the South Texas 
landscape and by a sense of civic spirit and reciprocity that pointed to advanced human 
relations.63 First, instead of unorganized Mexican housing clusters and villages, 
brochures boasted of twentieth-century towns built along the newly-constructed paved 
highway connecting the Rio Grande Valley in a vast transportation network of roads, 
highways, and a second railroad line.64 According to the brochures, fine houses, 
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churches, and schools now crowded the towns lining the east-west highway. Even more 
importantly, an equally large network of canals and irrigation ditches dug into the Valley 
landscape, that pumped water daily from the Rio Grande had really provided the 
necessary infrastructure to introduce large scale agricultural development and transform 
the region from an empty tangle of wilderness into the “Nation’s Market Basket.”65 
In addition to the physical markers of change attributed to modernity and 
progress, however, boosters wanted to communicate an even more complete 
transformation of the region, which they described as “Valley Spirit.” This feeling of 
civic duty manifested itself in a surfeit of clubs and organizations, which were listed ad 
infinitum in the pages of the brochure. Examples include the Valley Federation of 
Women’s Clubs, Rotary Clubs, Masonic orders, Knights of Columbus, Elks, etc. 
Members of these organizations worked to carve up and claim social and public space 
according to middle-class notions of order and sex-segregated civic engagement. For 
example, members scurried about planting palm trees to beautify the Valley, holding 
meetings, organizing balls and parades. As one brochure put it, “coming from all over the 
United States these people are welding themselves into a civilization all their own, a 
civilization marked by its progressiveness.”66 In creating a unified sense of community 
among a collection of migrants from diverse areas of the country, these organizations also 
claimed public social, cultural, and political spaces that were explicitly, self-consciously, 
and aggressively American. Thus, more than one brochure could claim that the highway 
                                                                                                                                                 
Valley to places further north and also containing lines heading east and west, thus providing 
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65 Promotional Brochure, “Valle Rico del Rio Grande,” Publications, Box 1, Folders 1-63, Shary 
Collection, LASC, UTPA. 
66 Promotional Brochure, “The Gulf Coast Country, the Rio Grande Valley: Happiness is the 
Reward of Hard Work,” 25, Publications, Box 1, Shary Collection, LASC, UTPA. 
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connecting the Rio Grande Valley, east to west, was “The Longest Main Street in 
America.”67 
By claiming the road that snaked along the contours of the Rio Grande, at a 
distance never more than five miles form the international boundary, agricultural boosters 
pushed the cultural boundaries of the United States to its extreme outer territorial 
margins. Thus the metonym of “Main Street,” with its associations of traditional 
American values, the symbolic center of America, and whiteness, crowded out other 
cultural markings of the region which had been previously Mexican. The Spanish-
language community schools, the Mexican mutual aid societies, and even the social space 
of the rancho were relegated to the social and cultural margins, or to a distant past. They 
had to make way for the segregated public schools, the Rotary club, and Main Street. 
Employing advertising strategies developed during the boom of advertising 
production in the 1920s and 1930s, pamphleteers sought to create a social tableau to 
present the Rio Grande Valley in a most attractive light.68 These scenes depicted social 
relations by positioning people interacting with each other in the same frame, or by 
placing a single person within a setting that also suggested a specific social status 
location, therefore still communicating a message of social interaction.69  
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Fig. 1.4.  Detail from the back cover of promotional brochure, “In Rio 
Grande Valley, Paradise, Sharyland: Where Nature Produces the World’s 
Sweetest Fruits.” The dark ring even more emphatically encloses the scene 
as a tableau, visually connecting the young woman in the foreground and the 
Mexican worker in the background.  
 
The illustration above (fig. 1.4) formed the back cover for the sales brochure 
carried by agents representing the Southwestern Land Company, from Mission, Texas. 
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This particular advertisement was selling at least two commodities. The first commodity 
for sale was the land, represented by the cluster of grapefruit positioned in the foreground 
of the picture, and the actual product offered by a growing agricultural industry in South 
Texas. The citrus industry aggressively marketed the grapefruit to grocery stores and 
supermarkets in cities across the U.S. and Europe, seeing in that fruit a way to find a 
niche against the more productive citrus regions of southern California and Florida. 
However crucial to the vision for the region’s economic future, the grapefruit-producing 
land was not the central image of the scene. 
Instead, the main commodity agents were selling was a lifestyle possible by the 
representation of a landscape produced by capitalist agriculture. The young woman in the 
center of the composition represented this prosperous lifestyle, as well as the land itself. 
Yet, the woman could only be understood in conjunction with the entire setting, including 
the background. Though the orchard in the background denoted a rural and agrarian 
setting, the young woman herself did not outwardly appear rural. Dressed in attractive, 
contemporary attire, she could have been a city girl dressed for a picnic. Not strongly 
marked as agrarian, her social location kept a bit ambiguous, the young woman’s 
prosperity and her modernity was predicated upon the action taking place in the 
background.70 Perched on a stepladder, his ethnicity evident by his towering sombrero, 
the Mexican laborer stretched out his arm to pick fruit from the generously laden tree. 
This figure was unambiguously rooted to the agrarian scene by his work clothes and his 
movements—he could not have been anywhere else. His fixed social position as an 
agricultural laborer provided the freedom for the young woman’s more fluid social status. 
Furthermore, the Mexican figure’s fixed identity as an agricultural worker allowed for the 
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representation of the landscape, captured by the woman’s image, to also appear young, 
healthy, and modern. Relegated to the background, the worker’s social importance was 
further diminished by his sideways body position, which obscured his face, and thus 
constructed him as a generic, undifferentiated figure. Captured in one tableau, the 
Mexican’s presence at work in the landscape developed by Anglo capital situated the 
class and race relations at play in South Texas agricultural social structure, and gave 
meaning to the girl’s position. This picture offered a narrative of South Texas as an 
idyllic and productive space, in which both the land and the people had been transformed 
and tamed to supply the consuming public with agricultural products and fully enter into 
a complex, interconnected modern economy and society, with Mexicans clearly marked 
as the laboring class. 
  
SOUTH TEXAS EXCURSIONS:  BUYING AND SELLING LAND AND IMAGES OF THE 
BORDER 
Like many other similar land development companies operating in South Texas 
between 1910 and 1930, the Southwestern Land Company used excursion trips as its 
primary mode for selling land. Armed with colorful brochures and scripted sales pitches, 
sales agents working for the Southwestern Land Company scoured the country for likely 
prospects, people willing to travel to the Valley to look it over, and who might be 
persuaded to buy an agricultural tract at the end of the visit. Packaged as a combination 
vacation and speculative expedition, land companies brought down groups of prospective 
buyers by rail, and treated them to a three-day program of entertainment and instruction. 
The trip was tightly controlled in every way—from the information discussed to the 
places visited. The companies even predetermined the mode of travel in order to facilitate 
the extended sales pitch. Companies designed the entire experience to hew as closely as 
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possible to the images and narratives of progress, development, opportunity, and ease 
outlined in sales brochures. Despite the pamphleteers’ romanticized portrayals of South 
Texas as the last frontier, sales agents and land companies did not want their prospects to 
actually see very much wilderness after all in the way of inadequate infrastructure, and 
kept them close to the very narrow corridors of irrigated orchards and paved roads that 
corresponded to sales agents’ progressive narratives. Prospective buyers’ glimpses of 
South Texas were as constructed and carefully cultivated as the glossy brochures 
themselves. 
Excursionists came from a variety of backgrounds from the Great Plains states, 
the Midwest, and South. Some had professional jobs and lived in cities, but most were 
farmers from rural areas. Some men traveled by themselves to South Texas, but many 
couples also took the trip, some even bringing their children along. The land companies 
planned their excursions with couples in mind, including dining, musical entertainment, 
and dancing in their programs. 
Though only a small portion of those who traveled to South Texas on excursions 
made a land purchase and resettled their families on the border, the trips had an impact 
that went beyond that highly valuable category of travelers. Land companies undeniably 
prized those migrants, viewing them as the essential components to realizing the regional 
development they envisioned and projected in their sales brochures. Land developers 
such as John H. Shary, who owned the Southwestern Land Company, invested much of 
their personal identity as colonizers of the region, beyond their investments in the 
material infrastructure of agriculture. However, absentee landowners outnumbered the 
families willing to resettle in South Texas, considering their purchased acreage in the 
Valley an investment to support their urban or suburban lifestyle in various areas of the 
United States. Far outnumbering the former two, however, were those travelers who 
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made the excursion to South Texas and returned to their homes without making a land 
purchase. In essence, they functioned as tourists—temporarily, though significantly 
participating in the land companies’ colonizing ventures. Through the mechanisms of the 
excursion trips, and with the participation of the travelers, who, with varying degrees of 
commitment, consumed agents’ sales pitches, land companies fueled the social, cultural, 
and physical transformation of the region. 
After land developers such as Southwestern Land Company carved up the Rio 
Grande Valley into large chunks, they proceeded to subdivide the land again and again, 
into acres within lots within tracts, to parcel out to individual buyers interested in 
intensive agricultural development for market production.  John H. Shary founded the 
company in 1913, after previously engaging in land development in Nueces County, near 
Corpus Christi.71 Between 1913 and 1922, John Shary purchased over 49,000 acres of 
land in western Hidalgo County, which he named Sharyland.72 Envisioning that the land 
could be used for citrus production, which, being a specialty crop, could bring in more 
money per acre than a staple crop like cotton, Shary had to simultaneously invest in 
irrigation infrastructure, to feed an irrigation-dependant citrus crop. In 1915, he 
purchased Mission Canal Company, expanded its reach and capability, and renamed it 
United Irrigation Company.73 In order to provide customers for his new water company 
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and to pay off his considerable capital outlay for his land purchases as well, John Shary 
began organizing excursions to South Texas to try and engage people in citrus production 
and sell them as many acres as they were willing to buy.74  
By 1930, the Southwestern Land Company had been hosting excursion parties for 
over fifteen years, had the process honed and carefully calibrated, yet making the sale 
was still a heavy and labor-intensive endeavor. Sales agents hailed from states such as 
Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Tennessee, and mostly traveled 
within their home regions in search of customers. Agents used various methods to meet 
and draw customers in to hear about the excursions, which they offered at reduced rates 
of twenty-five dollars, substantially below the actual cost of the trip.75 According to one 
former sales agent for the Stewart Land Company the arduous process involved in going 
into a new community in search of “prospects,” which sometimes involved paying off 
suspicious local real estate agents into letting them work the area.76 The time and trouble 
of finding willing prospects, especially after the onset of the Depression, often ate into 
sales agents’ finances, requiring them to ask their employers for advances against future 
sales. H. L. Finley of Alliance, Nebraska wired the Southwestern Land Company in April 
1931 about missing the next excursion because inclement weather had hampered his 
efforts. In the meantime, however, he requested a check for seventy-five dollars to hold 
him over, because he had been unable to sell some of his stocks.77  
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Sales agents had to divide their time between searching for new customers and 
following up with undecided former customers, demonstrating the difficulties in carrying 
a sale to completion. Once a sales agent rounded up several prospective customers, he or 
she communicated via telegram with the main offices for the Southwestern Land 
Company to inform them they were joining one of the twice-monthly excursions and how 
many prospects they were expecting to bring. Elizabeth Bradley, sales agent from Fort 
Smith, in northwestern Arkansas, wrote to the main offices in Dallas in January 1931, 
letting them know that she expected to be on the next trip to South Texas with some 
strong prospects. Her letter revealed the amount of legwork sales agents had to do to 
bring people on the excursions. Bradley reported meeting with several others, but did not 
expect that those would be ready to make the trip yet, and also planned to work the area 
of Boonsville, located in the nearby environs of Fort Smith, in search of more customers. 
She also provided an update on Skow, a prospect that had already made the trip: “Have’nt 
[sic] been able to close on Skow. Cant find out just what he is going to do. Only I do 
know they are interested.”78  
Once those in the main office heard from all sales agents making plans to make 
the scheduled excursion trip, employees of the Southwestern Land Company initiated the 
well-oiled machine of preparation for the incoming group. The office contacted the 
Missouri Pacific railroad lines, and ordered them to prepare two railroad cars, Sharyland 
and a standard Pullman car, for the party planning to depart from Dallas at noon on 
January 25, 1931.79 They placed the order to their usual purveyors, such as the Packing 
House Market on South Harwood Street and Metzger Dairies, for the veal chops, beef 
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short ribs, and other foodstuffs to feed the group during the train ride, and throughout the 
three days.80 They booked their usual porters, Ples Fussel, C. Jackson, Fred Henderson, 
and James Ballard to handle passengers’ luggage, turn down their blankets, and help 
create the atmosphere of luxury and privilege that the Southwestern Land Company was 
so anxious to convey.81 On that excursion, most of the travelers came from Oklahoma, 
and several from Kansas and Colorado.82 
The travelers departed from Dallas at noon, January 25, 1931, on the Sharyland 
car by the Missouri Pacific line. No part of the trip was wasted—the time on the train was 
the first opportunity to forge a sense of common endeavor among prospects and 
strengthen bonds between prospects and sales agents. Passengers each received a copy 
the Sharyland Songbook and spent part of the time singing well-known tunes popularized 
during the nineteenth century, such as Carry Me Back to Ole Virginny and the Battle 
Hymn of the Republic. The Songbook also included new songs written specifically about 
South Texas, such as The Rio Grande Valley, sung to the tune Marching Through 
Georgia.83 By including new songs about the Valley adapted from popular tunes, as well 
as old favorites, boosters hoped to include South Texas within an American cultural 
genealogy.  
In a promotional article about the South Texas agricultural industry written by 
Theodore Price, editor of Commerce and Finance, he described the spirit of camaraderie 
built on these train trips. “They travel in special trains, become acquainted with each 
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other, and a feeling of communal interest springs up that has sometimes, so I am told, led 
the entire train-load to settle in one locality.”84 The “feeling of communal interest” to 
which Theodore Price referred was equally predicated on the race segregation of the 
special trains, as on the additional measures the Southwestern Land Company took to 
foster such close interactions. As travel scholar Hal Rothman has described, the railroad 
generations were accustomed to sharing space with strangers, and knew how to negotiate 
the forced intimacies of the dining and club cars.85  Their ability to share cramped 
quarters, however, was based on the expectation of racial exclusivity fostered by the 
separate train cars chartered by the company, and created an atmosphere that perfectly 
suited the kind of facile sense of community the land companies wished to promote.86  
The special Sharyland railroad car, the singing of the songs, as well as the 
Missouri Pacific’s policy of race segregation, created a cultural space that also recalled 
the nineteenth-century history of American westward expansion. Theodore Price pointed 
to this process when he observed that “the spirit that led the earlier pioneers of the 40’s 
and the 50’s to cross the continent in prairie schooners and face the peril of an attack by 
Indians is the one by which the Pullman pioneers of to-day are inspired, although they 
                                                 
84 Theodore Price, “Where Water is Made to Run Up-Hill,” The Outlook, Nov. 30,1931. 
Although it looked like a regular journalistic magazine article, it contained the very specific 
buzzwords and promotional pieces of information that indicate this piece might have been written 
for hire. In 1926 John H. Shary, along with several other land developers, hired Associated Press 
reporter W.C. Grant to write stories publicizing the Rio Grande Valley. Silva-Bewly, 75.  
85 Hal K. Rothman, “Introduction: Tourism and the Future,” in Hal K. Rothman, ed. The Culture 
of Tourism, The Tourism of Culture (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003), 
pages. 
86 For more on segregation on railway transportation, see Grace Elizabeth Hale, “ ‘For Colored’ 
and ‘For White’: Segregating Consumption in the South,” in Jane Daily, Glenda Gilmore, and 
Bryant Simon, eds. Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Southern Politics from Civil War to Civil Rights 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 162-182. For more about railroad workers and race 
in South Texas, see Jennifer Borrer, “The Colored Trainmen of America: Kingsville Black Labor 
and the Railroads,” in African Americans in South Texas History, ed. Bruce A. Glasrud (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 151-176. 
 52 
travel in greater comfort and have fewer hardships to face.”87 As many scholars have 
argued, the nineteenth century U.S. West was a space in which many European 
immigrants and American whites could intermingle. European immigrants, whose 
cultural and racial pedigrees were often viewed with suspicion by American whites, 
could assert identities of whiteness through the upward social mobility afforded them in 
the pioneer venture. This venture included extensive land ownership, often acquired 
through violence against Native Americans and Mexicans, and the domination of regional 
labor structures, again often achieved through violence, and those dynamics formed the 
bases of white supremacy in the nineteenth-century western United States.  
Although traditionally thought to be bracketed by the nineteenth century, the 
epistemology of the frontier, with its narrative of white egalitarianism, was alive and well 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century in South Texas. Many of the 
passengers traveling to South Texas on the excursion trips were themselves immigrants 
or sons and daughters of European immigrants. Although rare, some migrants sought to 
preserve their European ethnic identity by settling in culturally homogenous communities 
in South Texas. For example, a group of investors from Canada and Minnesota 
established an exclusively Swedish community in northeastern Hidalgo County in 19--, 
mainly by advertising in Swedish language newspapers in the Midwest and Texas.88 Yet 
a mere twenty-five years after its establishment, Stockholm, Texas was no longer a viable 
community, due in part to out-migration from the region entirely, but more importantly, 
to out-marriage and the movement to nearby towns and communities in South Texas.89 
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Historian David Vassberg hailed the rapid demise of Stockholm, Texas as a triumph of 
assimilation.90 Though Vassberg did not acknowledge the process, the inverse 
relationship between the failure of the ethnically identified Stockholm and the rapid 
assimilation of its residents to the larger Anglo community in South Texas was partly 
based on the presence of ethnic Mexicans, deemed permanently foreign and 
inassimilable. 
The moment that passengers pulled up to the train depot in Mission, drivers in 
automobiles met them to take them to the Shary Clubhouse where they would be lodging 
during their stay. Many of the larger land development companies constructed similar 
clubhouses for their guests, and such spaces served various functions. These structures 
communicated a message of the companies’ prosperity and financial stability, generally 
supporting the legitimacy of the companies’ land selling campaigns. The Shary 
Clubhouse, situated at the edge of an artificial lake whose water was pumped in from the 
Rio Grande by the Shary Irrigation Company, was built in 1916 specifically to house 
excursion guests.91 The large lower rooms of the clubhouse were reserved for dining and 
entertaining excursion groups, with tables decked with fresh bouquets of bluebonnets, 
and the second floor housed the visitors’ sleeping quarters. The land companies designed 
their practice of always keeping visitors together to continue the feeling of camaraderie 
begun on the trains, hoping to persuade several people to buy adjoining lots.  
Not only did sales agents and other employees of the Southwestern Land 
Company always keep visitors together, they also chaperoned them for almost every 
moment of their trip. Every moment of the trip acted as a tightly organized extension of 
the sales pitch. This constant chaperonage served another function as well: it severely 
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limited prospects from outside sources of information. At the beginning of each day, 
sales agents climbed into the hired cars with the prospects they had personally recruited, 
and often with the drivers they had specifically requested. Knowing the importance of a 
good rapport between the sales agent and driver to making a sale, Sherman Fox wrote 
requesting Straw as a driver for his group of prospects coming from Mississippi for an 
excursion in January 1930.92 In November 1931, Frank Wood communicated via 
telegram to the Southwestern Land Company that he intended to make the next trip with 
several “good prospects” and requested “a good driver this time.”93 Since most land 
companies conducted their sales tours in the same way, they often had to compete with 
each other for drivers. Anticipating a large group of prospects visiting South Texas in 
February, 1931, the main Dallas office of the Southwestern Land Company wired the 
Sharyland office to “engage Leach for drive before other companies get him.”94 
Throughout the 1910s and 1920s a number of land companies were operating in South 
Texas, and they all roughly followed the same methods for selling acreage. The business 
of selling the Valley was a thriving industry, directly and indirectly employing a large 
number of people on its prospective future as a regional agricultural powerhouse.   
Once the prospects had arranged themselves according to sales agent and assigned 
car, the whole group set off for their tour of the countryside, stopping at prearranged 
locations to learn the details of citrus agriculture. One of the first stops would have been 
near the irrigation works, either the pump house on the river, or the networks of canals 
dug to provide the citrus trees the necessary water for production. Beyond assuring 
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prospective buyers of access to a constant source of water in the arid region, sales agents 
also had to justify the expensive infrastructure reflected in the price of the land. 
Furthermore, these pumps, levers, and canals represented the most dramatic physical 
manifestations of the way in which these developers had physically altered the landscape, 
siphoning from the waters of the Rio Grande into narrow, concrete lined channels. This 
example of manipulating nature to serve human needs further supported a romantic 
narrative of a modernizing frontier venture. 
First-hand accounts from working farmers represented one of the most effective 
selling techniques sales agents had at their disposal. Prospective buyers were eager to 
visit a productive working orchard, and the stop at Volz’ farm fulfilled this important 
function. Mr. Volz spoke to the group about producing the crop: from irrigation 
schedules, to chemical applications of pesticides, and labor costs. He detailed to an intent 
audience his yield per tree and per crop, the profits he had brought in the year before, and 
his expected profits for the upcoming year. After the group posed for a photograph in 
front of his attractive and substantial farmhouse, more evidence of the profit potential of 
the crop, visitors sampled oranges directly from Volz’s orchards.95  
The Southwestern Land Company strived to make these stops seem as authentic 
and spontaneous as possible, to hide any impression of information control and 
manipulation, yet Volz himself was a practiced performer. Normally on the itinerary, 
Volz gave these talks twice a month, and received ten dollars per talk.96 The 
Southwestern Land company discouraged other non-approved landowners from talking to 
the visiting groups, and if any approached prospective buyers with discouraging reports 
                                                 




of diminished returns, offers to sell their land, or any information that deviated even 
slightly from sales agents’ effusive optimism, disaffected landowners could expect an 
angry letter from John Shary threatening legal action.97 
This strict adherence to a land company-approved program in the latter 1920s and 
early 1930s differed only in intensity to the explicit, and sometimes violent, methods of 
message control employed by land companies and area boosters in the preceding two 
decades. According to one former sales agent, in the early stages of the South Texas land-
selling campaigns, one land company employed burly men to guard land seekers from 
men he called “knockers”.98 These knockers might approach the group with stories of 
their own misfortunes at the hands of duplicitous sales agents, fraudulent land companies, 
or even just due to the unforgiving climate. Land companies deployed the guards at the 
first signs of trouble, physically repulsing individuals who would disillusion any of their 
prospects from making a purchase.99 By 1930, such rough methods of control became 
unnecessary. It is doubtful that utilizing such techniques as employing bodyguards 
proved effective in any case, since their very presence must have raised uncomfortable 
questions in prospects’ minds. 
The change in methods notwithstanding, the land selling industry carefully 
manipulated excursion trips so that prospective buyers would be induced to see South 
Texas through the seller’s vision. The vista they were shown was deceptively vast, a gaze 
that calculated the value of all aspects of the countryside and its resources, including 
Mexican laborers. When sales agents for Engelman Gardens, another large agricultural 
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operation encompassing over ten thousand acres in northern Hidalgo County, took their 
prospects on their tour, one of its highlights was the bird’s eye view from the observation 
platform atop the six-story administration building in the middle of the Engelman 
compound. As the visitors admired the verdant rows of citrus trees below, they could not 
fail to see the large labor camp located nearby, which housed the permanent year-round 
agricultural workers and their families. It would make sense that sales agents direct their 
visitors attention to the small cottages grouped down below, and use the opportunity to 
speak to them about the easy availability of Mexicans as an inexpensive labor force. Thus 
visitors could speculate about the expected labor costs of Mexican workers while looking 
down at workers’ homes; their domestic spaces were laid bare to gazes sharpened by 
potential ownership.  
As important to excursion trips as inspecting the farmland, and discussing water 
and labor sources, land companies sought to create experiences of leisure and pleasure for 
prospective buyers. Although the pleasure jaunts formed stark contrasts with notions of 
the work necessary to produce a profit from the land, that juxtaposition was very 
important. Sales agents wanted potential buyers to clearly see that their pleasure and 
leisure could be gained from the agricultural labor performed by Mexican workers. 
Through these side trips, prospective landowners could rehearse the leisure time and 
activities that would be available to them because of the presence of Mexican workers to 
labor in the orchards, instead. More than mere “wining and dining,” jaunts to the beach at 
South Padre Island and trips across the border to Matamoros or Reynosa for dinner, 
drinks, and dancing, also claimed the space not reserved for commercial agricultural 
production, which included the uncleared wilderness and even the nearby Mexican border 
towns, for their use and pleasure. 
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Taking excursion groups across the river into Mexico for dining formed a regular 
part of the excursion weekend, so that prospects could experience a visit to a foreign 
country as tourists. On the excursion trip in late January 1931, the Southwestern Land 
Company spent seventy-two dollars on dinner in Matamoros, including music and 
tips.100 Because the United States was still in the midst of Prohibition, dining and 
drinking in Mexico would have been an especially appealing draw, also demonstrating a 
contrast in laws between the two countries. One brochure announced that a “dinner across 
the river is the most favorite feature of entertainment of all Valley guests” and assured 
readers that everyone would enjoy the meals and not just those who “wash it down.”101 
The brochure went on to recommend Mexico, claiming “the novelty of mailing a few 
post cards “from abroad” and feeling law-loose holds charm for any stranger,” in a veiled 
reference to temporarily easing the privations of Prohibition.102 By sending post cards 
from a foreign country, visitors could indulge in the privilege of traveling as tourists, as 
well as share their impressions of Mexico with their friends and family, both by the 
choice they made in postcard image, as well as the text they included on the reverse side. 
Thus, prospects experienced excursion sales trips, translated those experiences to their 
families and friends, thereby producing a multiplying effect beyond the scope of the 
prospects themselves.  
Pamphlets and brochures pointed to Mexico as an attractive destination to capture 
the sensation of stepping back into time into a space of decayed grandeur whose better 
days were long past. Referring to Mexican border towns as quaint and ancient only 
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served to highlight the dichotomy between American progress and Mexican stasis, with 
the larger story of the relationship between the two nations captured in the U.S.-Mexico 
border region. As one brochure pointed out, “to Americans, who are accustomed to think 
in terms of the up-to-date, the strictly modern, there is ample room to turn around 
mentally review an apparent incredible record of ancient prosperity and grand living; to 
wonder why and whence its disappearance.”103 Specifically comparing the two 
countries, the author emphasized American movement and energy, while relegating any 
Mexican activity or accomplishment into an era in the distant past. It seems surprising 
that the brochure author could have so simply constructed this narrative considering the 
enormous amount of social, political, and economic change Mexico had recently faced 
through an intense and violent Revolution which had dramatically challenged traditional 
economic and social structures in the country. Instead of referencing a lengthy revolution 
largely initiated by dispossessed rural peoples reacting against Porfirio Diaz’s 
modernizing program, brochure authors preferred to ignore these events altogether. To do 
otherwise might suggest a restive rural labor force. Painting Mexico as a quaint, quiet 
backwater fit their narrative much better. 
 
RESULTS OF THE TRIP  
By the end of the excursion in late January 1931, visitors had been experiencing a 
hard sell for three days. Of the twenty-four prospective buyers who had made the trip, 
five individuals and couples decided to make the investment in the Southwestern Land 
Company’s Sharyland town. Of those five purchasers, two hailed from Stafford, Kansas, 
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and three from Oklahoma. With purchases ranging from about five acres and larger, the 
land tracts averaged out to 7.9 acres per purchase. In sum, the Southwestern Land 
Company sold 39.81 acres for a total of $16, 414.50. The cost per acre broke down to 
$412.32. The company expended $1,134.06 on the cost of the trip, and $2,462.21 on 
commissions to sales agents. The actual price of the land was valued at $8, 207.25, thus 
at the end of the trip, the Southwestern Land Company had made a profit of $4, 
610.98.104 This excursion trip at the very beginning of the year in 1931 turned out to be 
one of the most successful trips of the year, second only to the next trip taken that year in 
early February, when the company sold over 94 acres of land. Several trips in 1931 
resulted in sales in the single digits, or perhaps ten acres at the most. As the Great 
Depression deepened and took hold, sales agents working for the Southwestern Land 
Company found it more difficult to attract willing buyers. In fact, 1931 was the last year 
that the Southwestern Land Company undertook regular excursion trips. Both the 
numbers of visitors and the acreage sold had fallen dramatically from the year before. In 
1930, in the course of eleven recorded excursion trips, 396 prospective buyers had visited 
the region, and 83 had purchased land totaling 840.55 acres. By contrast, in 1931, in nine 
recorded excursions, the Southwestern Land Company had brought down 170 
prospective buyers, with about 27 purchasing 221.82 acres of land.105  
From the turn of the twentieth century until the time that excursion trips began to 
wane in the first few years of the 1930s, the Rio Grande Valley experienced a dramatic 
demographic shift in its population. Though, railroads and land companies had lost the 
ability to draw large numbers of people to South Texas during the Great Depression, the 
                                                 
104 Excursion Trip, Jan. 26-29, 1931; Folder 44, Box C7D4#1, Old Excursion Trips, John Shary 
Collection, LASC, UTPA. 
105 Boxes C7D4#1 and #2, Old Excursion Trips, John Shary Collection, LASC, UTPA. 
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effects of the two decade long campaign to sell the Magic Valley as a modern agricultural 
empire in the last frontier of the continental United States were more widespread than the 
demographic changes in South Texas. For every individual or family member who pulled 
up stakes from their homes in Kansas or Oklahoma to move down to the Rio Grande 
Valley, a greater number purchased land without the intention of ever leaving their 
present home. These absentee landowners always outnumbered those who decided to 
move to South Texas. Absentee landowners represented a group of people scattered 
throughout the Midwest, Middle Plains, and the South, who had vested interests in the 
economics and politics of the U.S.-Mexico border region. Furthermore, the vast majority 
of the people who took advantage of the special rates to travel to South Texas and witness 
the marvels of rapid agricultural transformation about which they had heard so much, 
never purchased a single acre. Yet, as consumers of the media produced by land and 
railroad companies and as travelers, they aided in the colonizing venture of the land and 
society in the south Texas border region. Referred to as prospects by land companies, 
their very presence as possible buyers of land fired the engines of the excursion trip 
promotional and representational machine. This interactive relationship of selling and 
buying, producing and consuming enveloped the region with its narrative of progress 
defined as uniquely American and modern, yet imbued with the aura of nineteenth 
century images of the frontier and Manifest Destiny. In the process of physical and 
economic transformation of the border, the promotional apparatus in charge of selling the 
region’s future also rewrote its past, erasing the actual history of nineteenth century 
conquest and capitalist incorporation of South Texas and Northeastern Mexico. By 
presenting the early twentieth century border as an untouched wilderness, yet 
conveniently populated by Mexican agricultural laborers, agricultural boosters re-created 
the conquest of the region once again.  
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Chapter Two: The Social Space of Agriculture 
Setting out at dusk one night in the early 1950s from his home in Rancho Grande, 
a community of a few hundred residents located along the southern banks of the Rio 
Grande in Tamaulipas, Noe Magallan crossed the river with a small group of relatives 
and neighbors on their way to Carrol Norquest’s farm about twenty miles north of the 
river.106 If they had the money and had so chosen, they could have paid for someone to 
take them in a truck from Granjeno, located just across the river on the northern side of 
the border, to Norquest’s farm. Because they did not have the money, they walked the 
entire way, a journey that lasted almost the entire night. Taking care to avoid any chance 
meeting with an immigration officer on patrol, the group skirted the roads, picking their 
way through the fields and crossing over irrigation canals. Though not afraid of physical 
violence from the Border Patrol officers—Noe Magallan claimed that they would not 
manhandle or otherwise treat one harshly if one behaved oneself—the travelers thought it 
prudent to take these precautions to avoid the possibility of being seen, stopped, 
questioned, detained, and then thrown back across the river.107  After a long night of 
walking, they arrived at the Norquest farm and into a space of relative safety, because 
“once we were there with him, it was not too easy for one to get caught.”108  
                                                 
106 Noe Magallan, interview by author, audio recording, Reynosa, Tamaulipas, June 2, 2010. 
107 Noe Magallan was referring to the method of deportation the Border Patrol often employed 
known as voluntary departure. Border Patrol officers preferred utilizing the voluntary departure 
mechanism with its minimal processing as an easier, cost-effective alternative to formal 
deportation procedures, which included a deportation trial before a judge and rights to legal 
representation for the accused (though not provided by the government), as well as possible 
prolonged detention. Though voluntary departure was most often used, formal deportation 
proceedings were common enough to be considered legitimate threats to undocumented migrants. 
U.S. Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1948, 
22.  See Immigration Act of 1917, sec. 20, further amended by Act of September 22, 1950, then 
replaced by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. (356) 




Fig. 2.1. Map of South Texas border region. 
  
 South Texas growers helped fashion an agricultural labor system based upon the 
foundation of illegal workers and rooted within the powerful social, cultural, and political 
logic of the farm, with its combined living and laboring space. The Norquest farm 
exemplifies the daily social interactions between a farmer and agricultural workers, 
relationships shaped by the police presence of the Border Patrol in the region. Rather than 
stop the access to low-waged Mexican laborers that had so attracted farmers to the 
region, the growth of the Border Patrol during the mid-twentieth century helped create 
the conditions for workers’ low wages through the selective restriction of undocumented 
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workers’ mobility. That social space allowed growers to construct paternalistic images of 
themselves as protectors of undocumented workers from the Border Patrol. Recognizing 
the ways that growers and workers used different notions of family in describing and 
defining agricultural relations also disrupts a narrative of twentieth century agricultural 
labor relations as being predominantly impersonal wage transactions. 
The labor force in agricultural regions along the U.S.-Mexico border consisted of 
Mexican-Americans and Mexicans, permanent legal residents and undocumented 
immigrants. Undocumented workers formed the agricultural economy’s base, influencing 
wage rates for all farm workers. Because a significant portion of the seasonal agricultural 
labor force was undocumented, the Border Patrol played an essential role in allowing the 
border labor system to function. South Texas growers consistently employed 
undocumented workers year after year, suggesting a culture of collusion between Border 
Patrol officers and growers. The collusion, though widespread, was masked as unofficial, 
idiosyncratic, and based on relationships formed within daily social interactions. Workers 
noted growers’ collusive relationships with Border Patrol officers, but perceived them as 
based on personal ties and providing some modicum of protection against deportation. 
The personal and idiosyncratic image of Border Patrol-grower relationships helped 
support growers’ paternalistic pretensions. The dynamic of personal relationships helped 
locate growers’ authority within the individual personal politics inherent in patriarchy 
and paternalism. 
In their seasonal migrations, agricultural workers attempted to keep their families 
intact by migrating in loose family groups. They found that by taking advantage of 
growers’ paternalist self-constructions, they could continue to live and work among these 
large kinship networks even in another country, and even within a context of illegality. In 
addition, through these seasonal migrations, workers were able to supplement their small 
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farming operations in their homes in northern Mexico. Through their seasonal migrations, 
Mexican workers maintained and nurtured extensive and transnational family 
relationships that endured beyond the time they spent on the farms.  
Examining daily social interactions in South Texas agriculture during the 1940s 
and early 1950s is important in understanding the competing sources of authority shaping 
the organization of Mexican agricultural workers’ migrations. During most of the 1940s, 
Texas growers did not use braceros for their labor force, first because of the Mexican 
government’s ban on Texas. Even after Mexico permitted Texas to contract braceros in 
1947, Texas growers’ participation in the program was intermittent for the next few 
years, frequently interrupted by subsequent blacklists from the Mexican government as 
well as growers’ own refusals to hire legally contracted braceros. The system of 
undocumented agricultural labor employed in South Texas during this period was not just 
a precursor to the state-sponsored bracero program. This labor system, organized upon 
axes of family and kinship, competed against and placed pressure upon the two 
governments’ attempts to organize and control Mexicans’ migrations. 
 
A PEAK PERIOD IN SOUTH TEXAS AGRICULTURE 
Although land developers drew farmers to South Texas in the 1920s on the 
promise and glamour of the luxury citrus crops, growers in the Rio Grande Valley raised 
a variety of crops almost the year round. Citrus remained important, both financially and 
also in visually defining the Valley. In 1946, for example, the twenty-four million boxes 
of grapefruit Texas growers shipped made that year’s production second only to 
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Florida.109 Because of its warm weather, investments in irrigation infrastructure, long 
planting season, as well as abundant labor, the Rio Grande Valley became one of the 
most important agricultural regions in Texas. Throughout the 1940s, growers in the Rio 
Grande Valley shipped out more than fifty percent of Texas’ vegetable crops, producing a 
majority of the state’s tomatoes, cabbage, carrots, potatoes, beets, corn, green beans, and 
onion crops.110 Thus, the Rio Grande Valley was a major agricultural region in a state 
that ranked behind only California and Iowa in income from crops between 1944 and 
1950.111 
Despite the variety of fruits and vegetables grown in South Texas that required 
the presence of agricultural workers through much of the year, the heaviest demand for 
labor occurred during the cotton harvest season in late June and early July. In 1948, 
Hidalgo and Cameron Counties followed only Lubbock County in the number of cotton 
bales ginned, making the region a significant cotton producer in the state that produced 
the most cotton in the United States that year.112 In June and July, thousands of seasonal 
workers crossed the border from Mexico to work in the cotton harvest.  In a study 
examining South Texas agricultural labor during the latter half of the 1940s, the 
economists Nelson and Meyer estimated the Rio Grande Valley’s overall labor needs 
during the peak months of July and August 1948 at 132,000 and 135,000 workers, 
respectively.113 While impossible to determine a precise number, a different study 
                                                 
109 Texas Almanac (Dallas: A.H. Belo Corporation, 1947-1948), 212-213. Grapefruit was the 
Valley’s most successful citrus crop. The citrus industry in South Texas ranked behind both 
California and Florida. 
110 Texas Almanac (1945-1950). 
111 Texas Almanac (1945-1946; 1947-1948; 1949-1950).  
112 Texas Almanac (1949-1950), 215-220. 
113 Eastin Nelson and Frederic Meyers, Labor Requirements and Labor Resources in the Lower 
Rio Grande Valley of Texas, Inter-American Education Occasional Papers 6 (Austin: University 
of Texas at Austin, 1950), 9-11. Estimates of labor requirements were based on the almost 
600,000 acres of cotton and thousands of acres of summer truck crops. 
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placed the seasonal numbers of undocumented workers in the Rio Grande Valley at 
100,000.114 This number corresponds to Nelson and Meyers’ calculations of the 
permanent residential agricultural labor force at nearly 40,000 workers.115 Thus, rapid 
growth and dynamic movement characterized some aspects of the agricultural industry 
along the South Texas-Mexico border. 
The farming operation owned by Carrol Norquest, grower and author, located in 
the border region of South Texas illustrates the daily social interactions between growers 
and workers. Forming part of the Midwestern and Plains states migration flow to the Rio 
Grande Valley in the early 1920s, the Norquest family moved from Kansas and settled 
near Edinburg, Texas in Hidalgo County.116 The Norquests purchased a farm and forty 
acres, containing a large farmhouse, a barn, and several other outbuildings and small 
houses.117 Over the years, Norquest owned and rented up to four hundred acres, 
representing a mid-sized farming operation raising a diverse range of cash crops, from 
cotton and citrus production, to other vegetable crops. The most acreage he personally 
owned was 120 acres, broken up into several tracts of lands in different areas near 
town.118 By comparison, the average farm size in Hidalgo County in 1945 was 119.3 
acres.119  Of the four counties in the Rio Grande Valley, Hidalgo County was the 
                                                 
114 David E. Vassberg, “The Use of Mexicans and Mexican Americans as an Agricultural Work 
Force in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas,” (master’s thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 
1966), 46. 
115 Nelson and Meyers, Labor Requirements and Labor Resources, 16. These numbers, however, 
did not include the older school aged children in the Rio Grande Valley, many of whom also 
worked in agricultural fields on a seasonal basis.  
116 Carrol Norquest, Rio Grande Wetbacks: Mexican Migrant Workers (Albuquerque: University 
of New Mexico Press, 1972), ix. 
117 Kelly Norquest, interview by author, audio recording, Edinburg, TX, June 4, 2010. Kelly is 
Carrol Norquest’s eldest son. 
118 Norquest, Rio Grande Wetbacks, xi. 
119 Texas Almanac, 1949-1950;  http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:67531/metapth117165 (accessed 
October 02, 2011), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, Texas State 
Historical Association, Denton, TX. 
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largest, contained the most cultivated farmland, and the largest number of farms. In 
demographic terms, Carrol Norquest represented an average farmer in South Texas. 
In other respects, Norquest was far from average, nurturing a talent for prose and 
the ability to capture small vignettes of daily agricultural life written in a vibrant and 
engaging style. After suffering a stroke later in life, Norquest began writing as a form of 
therapy. He took a creative writing course by correspondence, and then began seeking a 
publisher for his short stories about agricultural life in South Texas.120 Though the 
University of New Mexico Press usually published academic books for a college market, 
the Southwestern Books editor Jack Rittenhouse responded favorably to Norquest’s 
stories, commenting that the work was “more than just mere entertainment, it is what the 
academics call a “socially useful document.”121 The press eventually published his 
collection of anecdotes about the workers on his farm under the title Rio Grande 
Wetbacks. Though he had to assign pseudonyms to the people in his stories, Carrol 
Norquest claimed that the people were real and the stories were “true, as far I was given 
the ability to write the truth.”122 Norquest crafted his stories from materials culled from 
his own experiences and those of his friends, neighbors, and acquaintances, providing a 
picture that went beyond his farm.123 The book and his unpublished manuscript, “The 
Swarming of the Wetbacks,” open an important window into daily interactions between 
white growers and Mexican workers, from a grower’s perspective.124 
                                                 
120 Kelly Norquest interview. 
121 Jack Rittenhouse to Carrol Norquest, July 9, 1970; and Oct. 26, 1970. In the correspondence 
between Carrol Norquest and Jack Rittenhouse, it became evident that Norquest considered his 
work, in part, to be a response against the political activity of the Chicano Movement emerging in 
South Texas. I thank John W. Byram, Director of the University of New Mexico Press for sharing 
this correspondence with me.  
122 Carrol Norquest, Rio Grande Wetbacks, xii. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Norquest’s original name for the book manuscript was “The Swarming of the Wetbacks.” He 
organized the anecdotes that were not used in Rio Grande Wetbacks, as well as ones newly 
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Carrol Norquest presented a complex and contradictory of himself in relation to 
his workers, implying the possibility of equality at some moments and profound 
asymmetry at others. In the “The Swarming of the Wetbacks,” Norquest drew 
comparisons between his family’s Swedish immigrant background and the immigrant 
Mexican workers he employed. By doing so Norquest invoked the assimilationist 
narrative of immigration offering Mexican migrants the possibility of full integration in 
U.S. society in the future. In this way, he also placed himself and his workers within a 
common narrative of egalitarian citizenship.125 On the other hand, Norquest also 
represented his relations with workers in paternalistic terms, based on the permanently 
unequal dynamics of a father and child. In the introduction to Rio Grande Wetbacks, 
Norquest described grower-worker relationships during the 1940s and early 1950s in the 
following terms: 
His [the worker’s] trust in el patrón, if his patron was good to him, was complete. 
Life, liberty, health, welfare, money—he put them all in the hands of el patrón. 
He gave in return the very best that was in him: good wishes, regard, loyalty, and 
labor.126  
 
Though describing relations of reciprocity, the tenuousness of such a relationship 
was clarified in another story included in Rio Grande Wetbacks, as well as its basis on 
undocumented workers’ compromised mobility due to their illegal status. In “From 
Wetbacks to Migrants,” and in other spaces, Norquest revealed the limits to grower 
authority, as he recounted his and other growers’ ambivalence regarding workers’ 
acquisition of legal status in the United States. In that story, his acquaintance Jack helped 
                                                                                                                                                 
written, and retained the title “the Swarming of the Wetbacks,” for the unpublished story 
collection.  
125 Norquest, “Exploited,” in “The Swarming of the Wetbacks.” 
126 Norquest, Rio Grande Wetbacks, 4. 
 70 
several of his workers acquire citizenship papers, in order to “make it easy, for them and 
for himself, to have them work here.” To his dismay, Jack found that once workers 
obtained legal status in the United States, they left his farm, either to migrate north in 
search of higher wages, or for better jobs in town. After several such incidents, Jack 
vowed not to help anymore. “But I think I’ve helped my last Mexican with his papers,” 
he declared. “Most of them never even thanked me.”127 The realization that once 
workers gained the ease of open mobility and dropped their attitude of loyalty challenged 
the paternalist self-image that some growers promoted. 
In order to get a sense of farm life from workers’ perspectives, I sought the same 
workers that Carrol Norquest described in his writings. By interviewing Carrol 
Norquest’s son Kelly, I learned the last name of the extended family the Norquests dealt 
with most closely, and the town they were from in Tamaulipas, Mexico. Though most of 
the workers who had worked for Carrol Norquest had already died, I tracked down 
several family members with first-hand, or second-hand experience on the Norquest 
farm, and obtained from them their view of relations with the Norquest family, their 
border crossings, and negotiations of the social space of agriculture in South Texas. 
 
COMPROMISED MOBILITY AND THE ROLE OF PROTECTION IN GROWER-WORKER 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
The familial terms that Norquest invoked when describing his relations with 
Mexican workers were not particular to him, but have long shaped notions of agriculture. 
Although the farm evokes a pastoral, modest, and inoffensive image, the ideological 
                                                 
127 Ibid., 146-147. 
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foundations of agriculture have rested upon hundreds of years of power over workers.128  
Geographically fixing a labor force, defined as inherently domestic and belonging wholly 
within a familial sphere, was a central characteristic of power dynamics in European and 
early American agriculture.129 The domestic associations of agricultural labor continued 
long beyond the time that wage labor, democratic institutions, and political struggle 
transformed economic, social, and cultural relations in other facets of society.130 Well 
into the twentieth century, agricultural workers had difficulty disentangling themselves 
from the realms of the domestic. 
 Despite claims from labor activists that large-scale agriculture in California 
constituted what Carey McWilliams called “factories in the field” the federal government 
consistently distinguished between agricultural and domestic laborers on the one hand, 
and other workers. New Deal protections, such as those afforded by the National Labor 
Relations Act and the Social Security Act, for example, excluded agricultural and 
domestic workers.131  Historians have attributed the exclusions to political expediency 
                                                 
128 In the United States, the logic of binding agricultural workers within the domestic boundaries 
of the household was carried out to its extreme in plantation-based chattel slavery. Within this 
system, African American slaves had no legal identities separate from their owners, their labor 
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on the part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who left out those categories of workers 
in order to secure support from Southern Democrats.132 These concessions demonstrated 
Southern whites’ continued desire to control the lives of mostly black agricultural 
workers. The concessions, and their effects, also continued to define agricultural workers 
as a racialized labor force. Thus while scholars such as Carey McWilliams and David 
Montejano have described twentieth century Mexican migrant farm laborers as 
resembling industrial workers in their wage relationships with growers, neither the 
politics nor culture of the time recognized this to be the case. 
Growers exploited the doubly paradoxical nature of undocumented labor: working 
in farms that were at once domestic and laboring spaces, and simultaneously 
characterized by mobility and immobility, to shape a seasonal migration that supplied an 
abundance of labor at very low wages. The great supply of laborers allowed growers to 
pay workers less, but it was not the only reason. As David Montejano has described for 
Mexican American farm workers, local growers supported by local government and with 
the collusion of state officials manipulated the movements of workers. In the case of 
undocumented Mexican farm workers, the Border Patrol also manipulated the movement 
of workers.  These factors begin to explain how South Texas farmers were able to create 
a defined space in which they paid the lowest wages for agricultural work in the country. 
The proximity of Mexico and consequent “oversupply” of impoverished potential 
laborers characterized the Rio Grande Valley economy, but not exclusively the Valley. 
Growers in agricultural regions that also neighbored Mexico—El Paso and the Pecos 
area, southern New Mexico, and the Imperial Valley in California—all paid wages higher 
than did South Texas growers. 
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1984), 257. See also Vargas, 65. 
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At a time in 1947 when California growers were contracting imported Mexican 
workers for 60 cents an hour, New Mexican farmers were paying 50 cents, and Arizona 
growers 40 cents per hour, South Texas growers were proposing to pay Mexican laborers 
under contract 25 cents per hour.133 Even in California, a state not known for its high 
wages and attractive working conditions, workers could expect to earn more than twice 
the rate paid agricultural workers in South Texas. Scholars writing about conditions in 
California have traced the history of artificially depressed agricultural wages to growers’ 
employment of a succession of racialized immigrants to work in the fields, and the use of 
vigilante violence against agricultural workers once they began to organize themselves to 
demand higher wages.134   
In Factories in the Field, Carey McWilliams first advanced his now-famous thesis 
regarding California agribusiness, describing the labor force as a rural proletariat: a 
“huge, rootless, ambulatory alien army moving about, living in shacks and sheds, without 
homes, without roots of any kind in the community.”135 Carey McWilliams saw similar 
processes of industrial-capitalist agricultural relations taking place in Texas, in the 
transition of the cotton industry from a labor system based on tenancy to seasonal migrant 
                                                 
133 Report, “Labor Conference, 29 April 1947,” Engelman Gardens Enterprises, Museum of 
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farm work in the 1920s. He feared similar “armies” of seasonal migrant farm workers 
were “tearing at the social fabric of rural life and rural towns.”136 Looking specifically 
at South Texas, and the transformation of its economy from cattle ranching, with its static 
debt peonage labor system to crop farming based on waged labor, David Montejano also 
narrated a destruction of the rancho communities.137 For both McWilliams and 
Montejano a significant transformation was located in the shift from permanence and 
community, to impermanence and migrancy, resulting in easily replaceable “units” in a 
low-waged labor market constituted a significant transformation.138  According to both 
Montejano and McWilliams the apparent rootlessness and lack of community and kinship 
relationships facilitated racialization of agricultural workers, although these scholars 
might differ as to the degree to which rootlessness contributed to racialization or vice 
versa. They agree that mobility tended to impair or rupture familial and community ties 
that might otherwise have mitigated, or helped mask the inequality within the labor 
structure. There is evidence, however, to support an alternative interpretation, that is, that 
growers used familial rhetoric in order to rationalize exploitation of “their” workers. 
Racialization did not crowd out family rhetoric, rather, family rhetoric facilitated 
racialization. 
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In South Texas, growers primarily employed undocumented Mexican workers, a 
group who could not more perfectly embody the class of persons both McWilliams and 
Montejano described. Growers’ representations of labor relations with workers, however, 
differed markedly from the impersonal wage relationships McWilliams and Montejano 
detailed. Far from a progression of a faceless army of seasonal migrants, many of them 
who worked at the same farms year after year interacted on the intimate planes of 
familiarity with growers.139 Such familiarity, linked with an agricultural industry 
imbued with the trappings of pastoralism, allowed for expressions of paternalism, with its 
relationships of protection and dependence, processes which growers tried to keep in 
place.140 
The control growers claimed they maintained over their workers was not based on 
the impersonality of armies of faceless, interchangeable workers, but on the intimacy of 
familiarity and an established history of social relations. In a 1920 U.S. Senate hearing 
debating a bill to exempt Mexican agricultural workers from the eight dollar head tax and 
literacy test imposed by the 1917 Immigration Act, Fred Roberts, a grower and the 
president of the South Texas Cotton Growers Association spoke about his familiarity 
with Mexican workers as a group and as individuals in order to emphasize their reliance 
on Mexicans in particular. That part of Texas, he claimed, “has always been and is to-day 
dependent upon Mexican labor. We have always had free access to the Mexicans on the 
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other side of the border, and we have always been going there…”141 Claiming access to 
Mexican workers as almost being a right of South Texas growers, he further elaborated 
his sense of “knowing” Mexican workers as a group: “And we want the Mexican laborer, 
because we are used to him. We know the Mexican and he knows us. We are not afraid of 
him. There never was a more docile animal in the world than the Mexican.”142 While 
indulging in the kind of stereotyping of Mexican agricultural workers covered elsewhere, 
Roberts also emphasized the relationship between growers and workers by insisting that 
each knew the other.143 Going further, Roberts not only claimed to know Mexicans as a 
class, but also as individuals, asserting that a “particular Mexican has been coming to my 
place now for 10 years,” thus highlighting the personal nature of the of the working 
relationship. 
Growers rhetorically positioned themselves as the protectors of undocumented 
workers from various forces: the Border Patrol, jealous Mexican American workers, and 
exploitative labor contractors. How were growers able to construct their identities in this 
way? Eugene Genovese’s study of social relations between slaveholders and slaves in the 
antebellum South details a dyadic system of paternalism within coercion that is also 
useful for understanding racialized labor relations in South Texas.144 Based on a 
foundation of underlying violence and coercion, slaveholders provided food, shelter, and 
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care in old age in return for a lifetime of arduous, unpaid labor. In order to justify 
themselves in such a coercive system, slaveholders constructed themselves as 
paternalistic protectors of childlike dependents. According to Genovese, slaves often 
worked within that limited space of familial social relations to establish and expand rights 
over time—transforming privileges into rights. Genovese’s analysis helps explain and 
explore complexity within a highly repressive system of relations that could account for 
the vast majority of social interactions that were not outright resistance by slaves or 
explicit violence by owners. 
In the context of plantation slavery, the power to immobilize slaves, to mete out 
punishment for violations of the prescribed boundaries and duties of slavery, and to 
provide for slaves’ physical needs inhered in the same person: the slave owner. The 
household, especially the plantation household served as the seat of social cultural and 
political power.145 By locating the productive process of labor within the parameters of 
the household, planters contained the most important economic functions of the 
agricultural South within their private demesnes. “Slavery, they argued, was a domestic 
relation” and not a labor relation.146  External social mechanisms, such as the institution 
of the slave patrol, as well as the legal and judiciary system, supported the authority of 
the slaveholder to keep those power dynamics in place. Violence and coercion held black 
laborers immobile and dependent in a slave system, but slaves contested and negotiated 
the boundaries of obligations and responsibilities exchanged by growers and slaves, and 
enacted within the logic of the family, father and children.  
                                                 
145 Nancy Bercaw, Gendered Freedoms: Race, Rights, and the Politics of Household in the Delta, 
1861-1875 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003). 
146 Bercaw, Gendered Freedoms, 3. 
 78 
While not trying to claim a direct comparison between plantation slavery and the 
agricultural labor system in twentieth century South Texas, I argue that South Texas 
growers, in describing their own position in relation to workers, invoked a tradition of 
plantation-based paternalism.  Furthermore, the labor system at work in South Texas did 
have an element of coercion involved, which allowed South Texas growers to perform 
roles of paternalism.147  
Instead of inhering in one person, however, the coercive and “benevolent” aspects 
defining paternalism divided into two separate, but connecting entities: the Border Patrol 
and growers, respectively. Because the agricultural labor system was fundamentally 
based on the labor of undocumented workers, the Border Patrol played an important role 
in shaping the contours of labor relations between growers and workers. The mobility of 
undocumented workers was undeniably circumscribed. Because of their illegal status, a 
crime carried on their person, undocumented workers could not move about freely. 
Growers benefited from workers’ compromised mobility and their illicit legal status in 
various ways, but growers were not individually responsible for creating their legal social 
condition. In other words, the authority that created undocumented workers’ condition 
did not officially rest with growers, but with federal immigration laws, and more 
importantly, with the policy body tasked with enforcing immigration laws, the Border 
Patrol. 
In an important respect, growers could position themselves discursively on the 
same side as undocumented workers, as adversaries to the Border Patrol, also with much 
to lose from Border Patrol raids and deportations. (Of course, workers had much more at 
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stake and much more to lose.) Instead of viewing growers as repressive employers 
willing to exploit workers’ illicit status to pay extremely low wages, growers created the 
contexts for sympathetic, though asymmetrical, bonds between themselves and workers. 
Workers must have been aware of growers’ collusive relationships with the Border 
Patrol. That awareness, and the perception that growers could provide an element of 
protection from the Border Patrol, in fact, formed the basis for any sense of reciprocity 
that might existed between growers and workers. Noe Magallan claimed, for example, 
that Carrol Norquest personally knew the Border Patrol officers, and was friends with 
them.148 In this way, workers considered any apparent grower collusion with Border 
Patrolmen as personal and idiosyncratic, an example of Norquest cleverly getting around 
the system, instead of systemic and consistent. Judging from the preponderance of 
undocumented workers in South Texas during the summer peak of cotton harvesting, and 
how fundamental these workers were to the base of agricultural labor in South Texas, 
these idiosyncratic personal relationships between growers and Border Patrolmen, was 
the system. 
In his unpublished manuscript, “The Swarming of the Wetbacks,” Carrol 
Norquest explored the collusion between Border Patrol officers and growers developed 
through personal relationships between the two, feeling they belonged to the same social 
world in which cooperation was expected. In “Lemonade Parties,” Norquest described an 
account of a conversation he overheard between two farmers while waiting at the cotton 
gin at the end of one harvest season.149 One summer, in the early 1950s, as a grower and 
his work crew were picking cotton, a Border Patrol officer raided the field one Tuesday, 
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rounding up the crew for questioning. The grower and Border Patrol officer, having never 
previously met, somehow recognized each other.  After a bit of conversation, they 
realized they had served in the same Air Force unit during World War II. As the two 
caught up on old times, “the people watched and waited. “What was up? Son amigos! 
Que curioso—How strange.””150  Workers noticed the interplay between the grower and 
the Border Patrol officer, their personal connections formed somewhere outside the 
formal relationship of law enforcement and citizen. According to the story, the Border 
Patrol agent rued that he had to remove the workers from the field, and as he was 
explaining the need, he came across a solution to his social difficulty. He offered to wait 
and come back to the field on Friday, after the work was completed, if the workers 
promised to be there. He returned on Friday with a paddy wagon to haul the workers to 
the border and initiate the process known as voluntary departure, in which workers were 
dropped off at the border without going through formal deportation procedures. While 
everyone waited, the grower mixed up batches of lemonade, which everyone, including 
the Border Patrol officers, enjoyed. The workers returned to work on Monday morning, 
and this process was repeated every week during the harvest. As Norquest sardonically 
commented, “the people got a free ride home,” and the Border Patrol officer got a “bunch 
of sure entries in his book—not loafing on the job!”151 
The collusion that patterned the interactions in “Lemonade Parties” benefited the 
grower, since his harvesting was in no way interrupted. The Border Patrol agent also 
benefited, logging a large number of apprehensions each week with very little trouble, 
and may have influenced his overall strategy of enforcement. That is, the patrolman may 
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not have troubled with patrolling the rest of the week if he could count on a certain 
number of workers through their arrangement. The workers “got a free ride home,” 
whether they wanted one or not. On the other hand, their wages were protected, to a 
certain extent, by being able to work uninterrupted during the week. Those workers 
determined to avoid apprehension could refrain from going to work on Friday, but 
enough workers had to be there, awaiting the Border Patrol officer, in order for the 
arrangement to function. 
  
CAMPING OUT IN THE BRUSH 
Because growers did not have official authority over workers’ legal status, a 
status which placed them in a position of social vulnerability, then they also had no 
clearly defined social obligations to look after a worker’s well being. Since workers bore 
the fault for their own social vulnerability, through violating immigration laws, did 
growers feel obliged to provide a certain basic standard of living for workers laboring and 
living on their farms? Any act farmers performed that mitigated workers’ difficulties, by 
providing camp stoves for cooking, tarps for makeshift tents, and the like, might have 
been interpreted by workers as extraordinary instances of kindness and generosity. 
The summer cotton season was the busiest time of year on the Norquest farm, 
when Carrol Norquest had to accommodate between thirty and fifty additional people on 
his forty-acre homestead for a period of several months. The issue of housing—where the 
workers would live—highlighted both the question of farmers’ obligations to their 
workers, as well as the wide social distance between farmers and workers inhabiting the 
same domestic space. When Carrol’s parents made the decision to make the move to 
South Texas, they traded their farmland and the nineteenth-century era house in Kansas, 
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for forty acres with a large house on it and other edifices and outbuildings, including a 
barn. Though the main house was in some disrepair when they acquired it in the 1920s, it 
had once served as a showplace for one of the numerous land development companies, a 
destination point during the sales pitch to convince prospective landowners from the 
Midwest about the potential prosperity of South Texas’s nascent agricultural industry.152 
The substantial two-story house comfortably accommodated Carrol Norquest and his 
wife’s large family of seven children.  
The property also contained a couple of other houses, which Norquest used for 
both his year-round and seasonal workers, though his entire workforce could not be 
accommodated in them. Although most of the workers were men, some women also 
worked in the fields alongside the men. In addition, several women came with the group, 
and although they did not work in the fields, they cooked meals for the workers and 
washed their clothes, charging a small fee to each worker for their services. The larger of 
the houses could hold between twenty to thirty workers according to Noe Magallan. This 
is where the women of the group slept, along with some of the men, all sleeping on the 
floor on the cotton sacks they used for the daily picking since Norquest provided no beds 
for them. The rest of the men slept outside with their cotton sacks spread out “among the 
weeds” and under the open sky near the house.153 Carrol Norquest sometimes provided 
canvas tarps that workers set up to provide some protection from the elements. Workers 
set up the camps within the rows of the citrus orchards or in the ten acres of brushland 
across the road from Norquest’s home, far away from the road and covered by enough 
dense foliage to shield themselves from any passing Border Patrol vehicle.  
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Living in this kind of housing, which ranged from rudimentary to non-existent, 
elicited some envy among the young male members of the Norquest household, who 
often wished they could leave the comfort of their solid house to camp out in a manner 
similar to the workers.154 Living outside in the heat of the South Texas summer and 
among the elements held some romantic appeal of adventure for the youngsters, who had 
the luxury of choice the workers lacked. Sometimes after the sun had set on a long day in 
the cotton fields, Norquest’s teenage sons Kelly and Rikki would make their way to the 
workers’ camps to hang out and horse around. Kelly remembered the good times they 
had during these evenings. The workers demonstrated generous hospitality, offering them 
a share of whatever they had cooked, either over an open fire, or on the kerosene-fueled 
camp stoves that Norquest provided for his workers, and expressing disappointment if the 
boys refused the food.155 Though these evenings of “horsing around” and eating 
together may have strengthened the ties of intimacy between the Norquests and the 
workers, and perhaps demonstrated feelings of genuine liking on both sides, these 
instances of non-work social interaction did not necessarily denote a lessening of social 
distance between the two. What may have been permissible social interaction between 
the young Norquest boys, who viewed the exchange in a manner of a summertime 
adventure, and the Mexican men of various ages gathered by their evening campfire, may 
not have been considered proper between Carrol Norquest and the workers.156 In fact, of 
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all the descriptions of demonstrations of hospitality—Carrol visiting the Magallanes in 
their family home in Rancho Grande, some workers occasionally eating dinner in the 
Norquest home, and of course, the evenings of fun by the fire—there was never a 
mention of Carrol Norquest partaking of workers’ hospitality at their tarp-covered camps 
on his own land.157 Was this omission significant, or merely incidental? 
This method of housing seasonal undocumented workers under tarps as their sole 
source of shelter was far from uncommon and did not necessarily depend upon the size of 
the farm.  Engelman Gardens, a large farming operation encompassing over ten thousand 
acres of citrus orchards, cotton fields, and vegetable crops contained a large permanent 
labor camp of small houses for their year-round workers and their families. According to 
Ida Montalvo née Rivera, who worked in the payroll office of the massive agricultural 
operation, all of the people living in the permanent structures were either Mexican 
American or Mexican nationals legally residing in the United States.158 In her position 
cutting checks to all the agricultural workers at Engelman Gardens, she never remembers 
writing out a check to anyone who was not a legally sanctioned worker. Yet, judging 
from the many letters of complaint from Engelman Gardens’ General Manager, A.L. 
Cramer to his many friends and acquaintances within the U.S. Congress about the Border 
Patrol’s heavy-handed tactics in raiding his operation, clearly a portion of his workforce 
was undocumented. Furthermore, according to Ida’s husband Alex Montalvo, many of 
these workers lived at Engelman Gardens, staying under tarps deep within the citrus 
                                                                                                                                                 
always good-natured and jolly and care-free for a season at least.” McWilliams, Factories in the 
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orchards, away from the roads and the Border Patrol’s monitoring.159 Even on one of the 
largest agricultural operations in South Texas, undocumented agricultural workers had to 
live in the same kinds of spaces as workers on smaller sized farms, such as the Norquest 
farm. In these two cases, then, the differing size and prosperity of the agricultural 
operations did not materially affect undocumented workers’ living conditions. 
Workers and growers negotiated the complex and contradictory space of mutual 
expectation in South Texas agriculture. When asked if he minded sleeping outside using a 
sack for his only bedding during the cotton season on Carrol Norquest’s farm, Noe 
Magallan said that he did not mind, because it was during the summer, so the weather 
permitted such sleeping arrangements.160 Besides, Magallan added, Norquest was so 
good to them they did not like to ask him for anything. Because Norquest successfully 
kept the same workers returning to his farm year after year, with younger members of the 
same kinship network going to work there when the others had moved on, Noe’s view of 
his employer may have been the dominant one. Angelica Magallan née Castañeda, 
reflecting on her memories of going to the Norquest farm with her mother on weekends 
and on the experiences of her future husband, Tomás, as a laborer on the Norquest farm, 
described the entire experience as “beautiful.”161 She was convinced that Mr. Carrol 
Norquest was now “well-seated in heaven” beside her Christ because he was such a good 
boss.162 To support her contention that he was a good patrón, Angelica Magallan 
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provided examples that were not about wages or working conditions strictly within the 
workday. The workers never lacked for anything, she claimed. If a worker did not have 
food, Mr. Norquest would take them to the store, or he would give them a ride into town 
if they needed it. 
Norquest had at least some experience with workers who objected to their 
working conditions, but Norquest narrated even these instances of worker discontent 
within the relations of paternalism. In his prefatory material to chapter eight of his 
unpublished manuscript, Norquest noted the reactions of some workers to the signs of his 
wealth that seemed obvious to them. In the chapter entitled, “Mejicanos Inocentes,” 
(Naïve Mexicans), he described a scenario in which a Mexican worker, “a non-thinker” 
might be vulnerable to a “demagogue” who would “supply ready-made thoughts,” and 
make him feel unsatisfied with his lot in life.163 Once under the influence of such 
demagogues, according to Norquest, the worker: 
Glances around in disbelief at my car, my pickup, my tractor, my big house. He 
can’t picture me as not having money in my pocket—plenty of it. A man with 
many visible possessions must have plenty of money. Notes, debts, taxes. His 
experience does not cover the agony of debts. He thinks I’m lying to him. Later, 
the agitator will encourage this belief. “El Patron is lying. He is keeping you 
down on purpose.” It doesn’t occur to him or his friend the agitator—that all he 
has to do to relieve himself of the situation (exploiting to forever hold him down) 
is to go back to where he came from.164 
 
First, by deflecting the origins of such discontent onto an outside agitator or 
demagogue, Norquest preserved the image of a fully functioning ethic of paternalism at 
work on his farm, which necessitated the belief of perfectly content workers. Thus 
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according to Norquest, the worker could not have formulated the critique on his own, 
within the context of his own experiences working on the farm, it was his inability to 
think, his childlike simplicity that made him fall prey to those seeking to make trouble. 
Second, by positing that the worker’s mistaken assumption of Norquest’s wealth was 
based on the worker’s naïveté about the complex processes of debt, Norquest again 
discounted the worker’s intelligence and negated any past experience the worker may 
have had with debt, making him a blank slate to be instructed by others. Finally, in his 
dismissal of the worker’s critique by pointing out how easily he could “go back to where 
he came from,” Norquest clearly sketched out the social terrain as he saw it: workers 
could leave if they chose, but if they did not leave, they had to submit to the wages and 
conditions determined by growers. 
Though changeable, unpredictable, and erratic, the forces threatening 
undocumented workers kept many workers from venturing very far from the farm, further 
strengthening workers’ dependence on the farmer for their daily necessities of life. 
During the cotton season, some workers such as Noe Magallan rarely left the farm. He 
worked six days a week and did not go to town even on his day off. He explained his 
reluctance to go in to town by pointing out that they were there to make money, not spend 
it on entertainment on the weekends. That desire to save money, while perfectly 
understandable, does not fully explain why he would not even go to town to purchase 
food and other supplies. The Norquests believed it was out of fear of being caught by the 
Border Patrol on their journey to and from town, or while they were in town. Therefore, it 
became part of Carrol and his wife’s duties to purchase food for their workers. Workers 
wrote down their orders on pieces of paper—for coffee, flour, beans, etc.—and Carrol or 
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his wife would travel into town to fill the orders.165 Workers would then pick up their 
groceries from Norquest’s house, at which time they would pay their bill, or have it 
garnished from their wages on Saturday, their pay day. 
A deviation from this seemingly workable arrangement, unwelcome from Carrol 
Norquest’s perspective, opens a small window to reconsider the neat transaction 
recounted above. In “Arabe Peddlers,” Norquest described new strategies the town’s 
shopkeepers developed to reach out to his workers. Recognizing the difficulty for 
workers to get to town, some shopkeepers decided to come out to the workers directly, 
packing up an assortment of goods in their cars and driving out to the farms. Norquest 
disapproved of the poor quality and high prices of the items and tried to discourage his 
workers from purchasing from the traveling shopkeepers, offering to take them into town 
himself so they could get better deals: 
I made several attempts to chase these peddlers off—tried to keep my ‘Hands’ 
from buying. I couldn’t. I couldn’t patrol my people all the time! The peddlers 
would slip in anyway—and my people were happy to be found. After all it was 
their money after I’d handed it over to them.166 
 
Why might workers have been willing to pay higher prices to these door-to-door 
vendors? Was it as Norquest surmised, that they were unable to “withstand the pressure 
of these aggressive sales people,” and that they were “flattered” at receiving such 
personalized service?167 Or perhaps they just wanted to exert a bit of autonomy in 
making these purchases, outside of the reach, the eyes, and judgment of the patrón? 
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During 1947 the mid-Valley daily, the Valley Evening Monitor published a series 
of editorials discussing workers’ living conditions, as well as farmers’ responsibilities to 
them, within a larger discussion of the imminent introduction of the bracero program in 
the Rio Grande Valley. In considering the prospective changes the bracero program could 
bring to workers’ conditions, the author of the editorial opened up a view into the labor 
system status quo. In order to encourage South Texas growers to participate in the 
program the Border Patrol had recently announced a crackdown on illegal labor, a sharp 
turn from their normal operations. Their usual efforts, the author claimed, did not stop 
workers from coming to the region, “beyond the point which the Immigration Service felt 
was necessary to keep up appearances.”168  Despite growers’ resistance to the Mexican 
government’s stipulations, the author couldn’t blame the Mexican government for 
insisting that employers provide housing for their workers. According to the editorial, the 
Mexican government was well aware that “thousands of farm workers, if not provided 
housing, will be forced to live in makeshift camps in the brush and along canal 
banks.”169 This scenario, however, did not describe a prospective scene of increased 
numbers of Mexican migrants working in South Texas. Since the agricultural economy in 
South Texas was already heavily dependent on undocumented workers, the editorial 
claiming that “many of the Valley’s biggest farms are operating with wetback labor 
almost exclusively,” then it is clear that workers were already living in the conditions of 
makeshift camps along canal banks.170  
If many seasonal undocumented workers were forced to live in substandard 
housing, either on growers’ lands, or along public right-of-ways, what did this say about 
                                                 




growers’ sense of obligation to their workers? In another newspaper editorial, the writer 
posed questions about farmers’ obligations to do more for their workers, bringing the 
notion of paternalism into public debate.  While growers associations and government 
officials of both the United States and Mexico took up the issue of the low prevailing 
wages for agricultural work in the Valley (between twenty and twenty-five cents per 
hour), the author took time to consider the wage rate: 
A man working for 20 cents an hour will earn $2 in a 10-hour day. If he works six 
days per week, he will earn $12 per week.  If such a man is single, and doesn’t 
smoke or drink an occasional bottle of beer, and if he never has to visit a doctor or 
dentist, and buys only those clothes he needs to hide his nakedness, he can live on 
$12 a week. That is, he can buy enough food to keep alive, always providing of 
course that he abstains from such delicacies as beefsteak and butter. But suppose 
such a man has a wife. And maybe a couple of kids. Could he feed them well 
enough to ward off rickets on $12 per week? Could he send the kids to school, 
particularly on those cool days when us rich folks wear shoes?171 
 
The writer continued: 
It is not a farmer’s responsibility, of course, to worry about whether any of his 
workers can afford shoes for their children.172 
 
If, indeed, it was not the farmer’s responsibility that workers earn a wage that 
could support them and their families, then who held that responsibility? By rejecting the 
notion that growers were obliged, by an ethic of paternalism, to take care of their 
workers, the editorial author judged that the state had a responsibility to do so, a difficult 
and rather unprecedented proposition since the workers’ illegal status kept them outside 
of the state’s regulatory purview.173  
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Growers bitterly resented both governments’ attempts to intervene on the 
Mexican agricultural labor issue in South Texas. Growers used an argument about a 
natural law of supply and demand, workers needed jobs and they needed workers, to 
demonstrate the mutual benefit of the present arrangements for both parties. And while 
many growers felt and expressed a strong sense of paternalism, which they touted to 
idealize the workers’ conditions in South Texas, it was not a complete process of mutual 
and clearly defined sets of obligations. The mutual set of obligations and responsibilities 
which historically governed paternalistic agricultural relations based on coercion and 
immobility—food, shelter, and care in old age in return for a lifetime of labor—was 
complicated by the unique circumstances surrounding Mexican undocumented 
agricultural workers in South Texas. Undocumented workers’ illegal status was based on 
their irrepressible mobility, in that they crossed the border without official authorization 
from either government. While they resided in the U. S. border region, however, they 
lived their daily lives in a space of a kind of conditional immobility based on the ever-
present threat of capture and deportation. Therefore, the unequal relations of power that 
characterized paternalistic relationships based on workers’ immobility was compressed 
into the short period of growers and workers’ social and economic transactions—a couple 
of months or a period of years, and not an entire lifetime. That period, however short, was 
important, because it set the prevailing wages and physical and social conditions for an 
entire region. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
century. While the federal government recognized workers’ right to organize through the 
National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) and set up a social safety net for workers with the Social 
Security Act (1935), agricultural workers were consistently excluded from such protections. One 
important exception was the Farm Security Administration’s establishment of federal labor camps 
for agricultural workers. For more information regarding the FSA labor camps see, Verónica 
Martínez-Matsuda, “Making the Modern Migrant: Work, Community, and Struggle in the Federal 
Labor Camp Program, 1935-1947” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2009). 
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A TRANSBORDER FAMILY AND COMMUNITY  
Young Noe’s nighttime trek across the border to Carrol Norquest’s farm in the 
early 1950s as a teenager was not the first time he had crossed into the United States for 
seasonal agricultural employment. Rancho Grande’s location along the southern banks of 
the Rio Grande made crossing into South Texas a very accessible option. Furthermore, 
the many different experiences Noe had as a migrant laboring in agriculture—working 
with extended family crews under a Mexican crew leader, working as an undocumented 
migrant for Carrol Norquest, and as a bracero for Carrol Norquest and others, represents 
the complex patterns of seasonal migration that characterized the picture of Mexican 
labor migration to the United States during the mid-twentieth century. Noe’s varied 
experiences also represent the different options he had in employment, and the specific 
limitations he faced. Being part of a large, extended family that had straddled the U.S.-
Mexico border for generations, Noe Magallan accessed the vast transborder kinship 
network in order to maintain his life and his family relationships. Even while working on 
Carrol Norquest’s farm, with his freedom of movement circumscribed by the threat of 
deportation by the Border Patrol, and living in less than ideal conditions for very low pay, 
Noe and his family negotiated within the context and logic of Carrol Norquest’s 
paternalism to maintain their own wide kinship networks and family relationships. 
Noe first began crossing the river as a youth of eleven or twelve years in the late 
1940s to work in the fields, though keeping closer to home during the first few years. 
Staying with relatives in Granjeno, an equally small community located directly across 
Rancho Grande on the northern banks of the river, Noe worked in the nearby tomato 
fields during the summers. There he might have formed part of a larger agricultural crew 
made up of relatives and neighbors from both sides of the river, headed by a labor 
contractor also from the same community. During the short season he would stay with an 
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aunt, mixing among cousins and temporarily joining her family, but within easy reach of 
his own parents a short distance away.174 As a Magallan, Noe formed part of a large 
extended family with roots on both sides of the Rio Grande, in South Texas and Northern 
Mexico. The Magallanes had migrated to the northern frontier during the mid 1800s, 
from a small community further south, Concepción de Oro, in the state of Zacatecas.175 
Once they settled in Rancho Grande, then a small village situated on the southern banks 
of the Rio Grande near the larger town of Reynosa, they began to intermarry with the 
various families in Rancho Grande and the surrounding ranchos on both sides of the 
border.  
In the early 1950s, by the time Noe Magallan was a young man, the extended 
Magallan family network had already established a consistent seasonal migration to work 
for Carrol Norquest near Edinburg, Texas. Established through a family connection, 
Noe’s older cousins and neighbors had begun to form the bulk of Norquest’s work crews. 
Carrol Norquest typically hired a few workers to work on his farm year-round, then hired 
seasonal crews of workers during peak harvest periods. One of his year-round employees 
was Senaido Olguin, who lived in a house on the Norquest property, with his wife, 
Tomasa Macedo de Olguin, and their children.176 Tomasa’s sister was a Magallan by 
marriage, and thus formed part of the large Magallan kinship network. Once the initial 
contact was established, various members of the Magallan family, as well as other 
families from Rancho Grande, traveled to Edinburg on a consistent basis, forming Carrrol 
Norquest’s work crews and working for Carrol Norquest’s brother-in-law as well, Eddy 
Nordmeyer, who also farmed nearby.  
                                                 
174 Noe Magallan interview by author. 
175 Alberto Magallan, interview by author, audio recording, Granjeno, Texas, December 29, 2009. 
176 Angelica Magallan, interview by author, December 14, 2009. 
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Though Carrol Norquest sometimes described his workers as unintelligent and 
childlike, and even directionless, the complex and overlapping transnational migrations 
the members of the Rancho Grande community undertook to maintain their seasonal 
work required a large amount of planning and cooperation. The planning that went into 
the decision-making process to migrate involved the participation of several members of 
a family, including the mother, father, and adult children. Furthermore, the ways in which 
the Rancho Grande families maximized their earnings by keeping as much of their money 
within the family network, demonstrated a great deal of resourcefulness. In relating the 
story of her husband Tomás Magallan’s seasonal migrations from Rancho Grande to the 
Norquest farm as a young man, Angelica Magallan explained that Tomás and his two 
brothers Marcelino and Carlos all did stints with the Norquests even though they each 
owned their own piece of farmland in Rancho Grande. Because their father was still alive 
and still strong, however, he was capable of tending their lands as well as his own while 
his sons spent the harvest season on the Norquest farm. After the end of the season, they 
returned to Rancho Grande with their earnings, and again took up the reins of their own 
land.177 Tomás Magallan’s father agreed to look after his sons’ plots and his sons 
contributed their earnings to a family who otherwise relied on subsistence farming for 
survival.   
Rancho Grande migrants also found other ways to maximize their earnings and 
keep them within their families as much as possible. Angelica Magallan remembers being 
young girl of eight and traveling with her mother from their home in Rancho Grande to 
the Norquest farm every weekend. Her two brothers, Antonio and Mauro Castañeda, 
were working with the Norquests that season in the late 1940s. On Friday afternoons, 
                                                 
177 Ibid. 
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Angelica’s mother collected young Angelica from school, and together they boarded the 
bus from Rancho Grande to nearby Reynosa. In Reynosa, they took another bus across 
the border to McAllen, and from there, another to Edinburg.  Once they reached the bus 
station in Edinburg, Mrs. Castañeda phoned the Olguin house, and Mrs. Olguin sent her 
husband Senaido to pick them up. Angelica and her mother stayed with the Olguin family 
during the weekend. Both Mrs. Castañeda and Mrs. Olguin spent the weekend doing the 
laundry and ironing for the young Castañeda and Magallan men. While Mrs. Castañeda 
presumably did not get paid for doing her sons’ laundry and ironing, Mrs. Olguin could 
expect to receive a small sum for her services. In addition, Mrs. Castañeda cleaned the 
men’s quarters, described by Angelica as barracks, and the other men did pay her for the 
cleaning. On Sunday afternoons, Angelica and Mrs. Castañeda returned to their home by 
the same route, stopping in the shops in Reynosa to purchase food from her earnings to 
take back to Rancho Grande.178 
Since Noe Magallan also related an instance of his mother accompanying him and 
their kin to the Norquest farm to perform similar duties, it seems probable that women 
from Rancho Grande often fulfilled this role.179 Having some of the workers’ mothers 
travel to the Norquest farm to spend some, or all, of the season, is important for a number 
of reasons. First, their labor, some of which was paid, some which was not, ensured that 
the workers’ wages stayed within the Rancho Grande kinship network. Through this 
practice, only the money workers spent for food or other incidentals left the family circle. 
Otherwise, the workers got to keep their money, or if they paid for laundry services and 
cleaning, the money went to perhaps an aunt, cousin, or neighbor. Having the ability to 
extend their money in this fashion may have been a determining factor in migrants’ 
                                                 
178 Ibid. 
179 Noe Magallan, interview, June 2, 2010. 
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decisions to stay close to home. While they might have received higher wages further 
north, their living expenses also increased. Secondly, in addition to the monetary 
considerations, the emotional sustenance that their mother’s presence gave them cannot 
be overlooked. Instead of the homesickness and loneliness endemic to seasonal migration 
far from home, these migrant farm workers were able to enjoy frequently visits from their 
younger siblings and their mother. 
The workers from Rancho Grande negotiated the social laboring space loosely 
built around the ideas of the family, in a kind of South Texas-style paternalism, to 
maintain their own family and kinship relationships. They helped strengthen family 
bonds that carried them through other periods in their lives that extended beyond the 
period in which the Magallanes worked for the Norquests. For example, Angelica related 
that after she married Tomás Magallan and had her two sons, she and her husband 
decided to move to South Texas permanently in 1968.180 When they moved, they stayed 
with the Olguin family, who had long since stopped working for the Norquests, and 
bought a house in town in McAllen. Tomás, Angelica, and their two boys stayed with the 
Olguin family until they could find an appropriate apartment to rent. The relationships, 
which Angelica and her mother had nurtured while on the Norquest farm spending all 
those weekends with the laundry and the ironing, stood them in good stead for years after 
their experiences there. 
Noe and Angelica’s narratives of migration—depending on extensive family 
networks and cooperation for survival—differed  sharply from Carrol Norquest’s 
                                                 
180 Angelica Magallan interview. She discovered in the course of casual conversation while 
visiting relatives in Granjeno, Texas, that her father had been born, raised, and married in the 
United States, and moved to Mexico just after he married. Her father’s U.S. citizenship made it 
easy for her to obtain her U.S. citizenship, and through her, U.S. citizenship for her husband and 
two sons. 
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interpretation of workers’ migration decision-making process. In the preface to his book, 
Rio Grande Wetbacks, which he originally wanted to title The Swarming of the 
Wetbacks, Norquest described the meaning behind his choice of titles. Informed by his 
early experiences as a young farmer trying to raise bees, Norquest compared Mexican 
workers’ migrations to those of bees. 
When bees swarm, they merely divide. They allow a queen to develop. When this 
queen decided to leave, half of the bees went with her. Their pasture will not 
support all of them. But they know nothing of where they are going—what 
direction—how far—or when they’ll get there. They just go…Compulsion, 
ignorance of route, a total disregard of the location and their ultimate home base 
of operation…This is an accurate description of the early wetbacks.181 
 
According to Norquest, undocumented workers’ migration processes were not 
based on logic or knowledge about their destination, but on a presumably ingrained 
compulsion. Furthermore Norquest seemed not to recognize the complex kinship 
networks that Mexican migrant workers accessed and maintained so successfully by 
disparagingly likening their family migrations to a swarm of bees. 
By the time Noe Magallan turned seventeen years old in 1955, he had been 
accompanying his mother, brother, and other relatives and neighbors to work at the 
Norquest farm for three years. In 1955 Noe went to work without his mother and 
immediate family members, though he still worked in a crew of about twenty people, 
made up of neighbors and kin from Rancho Grande. According to Noe Magallan, 1955 
was different from earlier years, when Border Patrol enforcement was a sham that 
allowed growers to get their crops harvested. This time, the law cracked down.182 “The 
                                                 
181 Carrol Norquest, Prefatory Material to “The Swarming of the Wetbacks.” 
182 Noe Magallan interview. 
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order was given [that] now there is no defense.”183 But the work crews continued to 
work and evade the surveillance. They went out to the fields very early in the mornings, 
and they returned to pick at night sometimes by the light of the moon “if there was a 
pretty moon,” since the cotton was white and would be visible. If they went out to pick in 
the early mornings, workers gathered the cotton into mounds and covered the mounds 
with weeds, so as to be invisible from above and out of the sight of Border Patrol flying 
in planes overhead. 
 The work crews had almost made it through the entire cotton harvest season 
before they were caught by the Border Patrol while they were out working in the fields. 
Though they tried to hide amongst the cotton plants, they were apprehended and rounded 
up, and locked up in a detention facility a few miles away in McAllen, Texas. This 
detention facility, called the Corralón, or pound, was enclosed by a high fence, and 
contained barracks for sleeping and bathrooms. Noe and his companions were detained at 
the Corralón for two or three days, while Border Patrol agents waited to apprehend 
enough people to fill one load. After a couple of days of waiting, the workers were 
boarded on a bus and, in Noe’s words, “thrown across” the border in Ciudad Juarez, 
about 1200 miles away from his home in Rancho Grande.184 Rancho Grande was 
                                                 
183 Ibid. This change in Border Patrol policy was part of a larger coordinated effort, named 
Operation Wetback, to deport Mexicans working illegally throughout the Southwest, beginning in 
California and moving east through Arizona, New Mexico, and then Texas. Though much of the 
publicity for this military-style campaign focused the nation’s attention on Border Patrol activities 
along the U.S.-Mexico border during the summer of 1954, scholars have argued that some of 
these techniques began earlier than 1954 and continued well after that summer. For more 
information regarding Operation Wetback, see Juan Ramon García, Operation Wetback: The 
Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workers in 1954 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1980); and Kelly Lytle Hernández, Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010). 
184 The word Noe consistently used during the course of this account to describe being deported, 
or sent across the border by the INS was aventar, saying for example, nos aventaron por allá en 
Ciudad Juárez. He used the same word to describe being sent to the detention facility in McAllen 
as well, and the process of being deported in general. The word conveys a particular physicality, 
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located less than five miles from the international bridge at Hidalgo, Texas. At the time, 
Noe recounts, the Border Patrol was also taking people by boat to Veracruz, or by plane 
to Irapuato, Guanajuato.185 In 1945, the United States and Mexican governments agreed 
to work together on the process deporting Mexican citizens back to Mexico, an attempt to 
decrease easy return migration to the United States. Under this arrangement the Border 
Patrol transported workers to various border points, and the Mexican government paid for 
their transport by train to points inland: Torreon, Coahuila; Monterrey, Nuevo León; and 
Jimenez, Chihuahua.186 This is exactly what happened to Noe. Noe and his companions 
were given tickets for transportation to Torreon, Coahuila, from whence they pooled their 
money and made their way home to Rancho Grande, Tamaulipas. The INS classified 
Noe’s deportation in 1955 as a voluntary departure, a mechanism INS officials used to 
deport people without having to go through the time and expense of the administrative 
hearings associated with formal deportation.187 Though informal, Noe Magallan’s 
deportation when he was seventeen years old still contained the violence and humiliation 
of forced expulsion, the memory of which was graven clearly in the mind of a seventy-
three year old man. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the case of Noe Magallan, he was deported only one time in his life, yet the 
threat of deportation hovered over constantly, having a significant impact on agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
and even violent action, different from nos mandaron a Ciudad Juárez (they sent us) or nos 
llevaron a Ciudad Juárez (they took us).  
185 Ibid.  
186 Hernández, Migra!, 127-130. 
187 In the following chapter I will more closely examine the policy of voluntary departure as a 
border enforcement mechanism the Border Patrol used to facilitate a flexible labor migration at 
the U.S.-Mexico border. 
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relations in South Texas between growers and workers. Growers, who sought to take 
advantage of the Border Patrol’s collusive methods of enforcement, represented their 
farms to undocumented workers as spaces of protection from law enforcement.  Within 
the intertwining of the Border Patrol’s federal authority to enforce immigration laws and 
growers’ traditional sources of power derived from patriarchal notions of agricultural 
relations, growers created paternalistic images of themselves in relation to workers. That 
calculus of power, however, was based on the worker’s undocumented status and the 
Border Patrol’s presence policing the social space of the border. The introduction of 
bracero program in South Texas which legalized formerly illegal workers, as well as the 
Mexican government’s pressure on the Border Patrol to change their approach to border 
enforcement threatened to undermine growers’ power base, and transform social relations 
between growers and workers in South Texas. The promise of the bracero program 
notwithstanding, undocumented Mexican migrants negotiated the space of growers’ 
paternalism to nurture and sustain their own transnational family networks, undertaking a 
number of border crossings even in the context of their compromised mobility. 
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Chapter Three: The Flexible Border: Mobility Within Restriction in 




Trailing after a group of Mexican workers on September 24, 1947, U.S. Border 
Patrolman John P. Longan reached a farm in Doña Ana County in southeastern New 
Mexico bordering El Paso.188 Longan entered the property of farmer E. N. Crossett and 
apprehended the fifteen workers he had been following for not having the necessary 
documentation authorizing their presence in the United States. Crossett violently objected 
to the patrolman’s actions and a fight broke out between the two men on the road outside 
Crossett’s property, Crossett later claimed that Longan had broken his nose.  According 
to Longan, Crossett’s attack was unprovoked—Crossett cursed at him and struck him in 
the face. For his part, Crossett did not dispute the sequence of events, saying, “I admit 
hitting Longan, but after the name he called me, I feel that I was justified in doing so.” 
Despite his broken nose, Crossett, himself a former Border Patrolman, felt the incident 
portended more important issues than a mere dust-up between himself and Patrolman 
Longan, wondering “whether or not the American people are going to live under the 
Gestapo method,” referencing the Third Reich’s notorious police force, a still-fresh 
memory in the immediate post-war period. 
Crossett’s concerns—and those of members of the New Mexico Farm and 
Livestock Bureau who fired off telegrams to U.S. Senator Carl Hatch’s office and 
                                                 
188 The following account was taken from the El Paso Herald Post, “Farmers Charge Border 
Patrol Raids Farms,” Sept. 25, 1947; “Dona Ana Farmers Will Contract Juarez Laborers,” Sept. 
26, 1947; and the El Paso Times, “Valley Farmer Says Patrolman Beat Him Up,” Sept. 25, 1947; 
“Federal Man Says Farmer Began Fight,” Sept. 26, 1947; and “30 Patrolmen Round-Up 
‘Wetbacks’,” Sept. 27, 1947. 
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Representatives Lusk and Fernandez—centered on two distinct, yet interrelated claims: 
that the U.S. Border Patrol was engaging in raids on farms in Doña Ana County to search 
for undocumented agricultural workers, and that they were doing so without warrants or 
permission. Telegrams from the Farm Bureau charged the Border Patrol with “unjustified 
and illegal tactics,” and asked public officials to intervene on their behalf. New Mexico 
grower, Mrs. H.C. Mandell also likened the Border Patrol to the Gestapo, claiming that 
the “Gestapo has struck again—they took all our cotton pickers.” Invoking a fundamental 
principle of American democracy, Mrs. Mandell recommended that District Director 
Grover C. Wilmoth’s “attention…be called to our Fourth Amendment in the Constitution, 
assuring us of no search without a warrant.” W.P. Thorpe, the secretary of the New 
Mexico Farm Bureau wondered aloud to newspaper reporters whether the Border Patrol 
had the authority to search farms without warrants: 
There is still one issue we want settled. That is the right of a border patrolman to 
search a farm without getting the owner’s consent or having a search warrant. It’s 
not constitutional. While it’s not likely to come up again, we still want a ruling on 
it.189  
 
Wilmoth also exhibited some confusion about this issue saying, “it is a legal question 
whether officers can seize aliens on private property.”  
In response to a query from Senator Hatch’s office, the El Paso district of the INS 
initiated an investigation into the quarrel between Patrolman Longan and E. N. Crossett, 
and organized a meeting in Las Cruces, New Mexico, attended by representatives of area 
farm bureaus, El Paso District Director Grover C. Wilmoth, as well as Willard F. Kelly, 
assistant commissioner for the INS in charge of enforcement, who came in from the 
                                                 
189 El Paso Herald Post, “Dona Ana Farmers Will Contract Juarez Laborers,” Sept. 26, 1947. 
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central office in Philadelphia to tamp down the commotion wrought by the fight.190  At 
the meeting, the Immigration Service agreed to conduct a “re-education program” to 
teach border patrolmen courtesy in dealing with the public. Secondly, the Border Patrol 
agreed that they would ask growers for permission to search their properties for 
undocumented labor. However, if they declined to permit Border Patrolmen to enter their 
property, the INS would cancel the contracts legalizing the individual growers’ labor.191  
The fight between E. N. Crossett Patrolman Longan reflected the larger struggle 
for control over the nature and rhythm of the flow of labor, and thus control over the 
border itself. What seemed like a chaotic, laissez-faire immigration enforcement policy 
on the U.S.-Mexico border during the mid-twentieth century was actually an approach to 
enforcement resulting from years of contestations and negotiations between border 
growers and the Border Patrol. That approach was also shaped by the limitations of the 
federal policing body’s authority. The combination of forces melded together to maintain 
a flexible border open to the movement of undocumented Mexican laborers, while 
creating a diffuse border zone of broad enforcement potentiality. In other words, 
immigration laws, immigration enforcement officials, and growers helped create a labor 
system that encouraged Mexican workers to migrate to work in U.S. agricultural fields, 
                                                 
190 “Juarez Workers Move to Farms not in Texas,” El Paso Herald-Post, Sept. 27, 1947, pg.1. 
The headquarters for the Immigration and Naturalization were located in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania at the time. The headquarters moved to Washington, D.C. in 1948. U.S. Department 
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but were not free from the possibility of apprehension and deportation once they crossed 
the border. 
This chapter will trace U.S. immigration laws in the early twentieth century, to 
demonstrate how the increasingly restrictive legislation also created loopholes and 
exceptions temporarily allowing the migration of Mexican workers. This seeming 
paradox of U.S. immigration law had important consequences for Mexican migrants, 
because while exceptions to immigration laws created a precedent of Mexican cross-
border labor mobility, the underlying legal scaffolding of immigration restriction 
remained in place, thus defining Mexican migration as tenuous and temporary.192 
Immigration and border control legislation, testimony given during Congressional 
hearings, and annual reports published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
tell a story about Border Patrol’s approach to enforcement on the U.S.-Mexico border 
paradoxically based on flexibility, the facilitation of movement, and ambiguity, rather 
than deterrence, rigidity, and clarity. From its earliest years, the Border Patrol’s mode of 
operation permitted growers access to undocumented Mexican laborers. Even in cases of 
deportation, the agency opted for the less rigid voluntary departure mechanism instead of 
initiating measures of formal deportation. The mechanism of voluntary departure became 
the INS’ most dominant form of expulsion during the 1940s, its speed and ease relative to 
formal deportation allowed the INS to move a greater number of Mexican migrants back 
across the border. Furthermore, the light penalties associated with voluntary departure 
compared to formal deportation created a situation of low risk for workers returning to 
                                                 
192 Of course history has shown that many migrants deemed temporary stayed in the United 
States permanently. They married, raised families, and contributed to the growing Mexican 
communities across the U.S. Southwest and Midwest. Many of these migrants had to negotiate 
permanent settlement in the U.S. as undocumented migrants, regularizing their legal status many 
years after the fact or not at all.  
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the United States. This chapter examines the INS’ increasing use of voluntary departure 
during the 1940s, arguing that this strategy of border enforcement characterized the U.S.-
Mexico border as a space of mobility within restriction. 
This chapter also explores the spatial and temporal dimensions of Border Patrol 
authority. The Border Patrol’s decisions about where its territory ended, and which 
spaces officers considered appropriate for policing, or off limits, had important 
consequences for Mexican undocumented migrants. The blurred boundaries of INS 
authority meant that much of the real limits and reach of the Border Patrol were worked 
out on the ground, in the intimate, daily, back-and-forth interactions between growers and 
members of the Border Patrol. Growers, Border Patrol officers, and workers were all 
highly attuned to the complex nature of immigration enforcement. Slight nuances in the 
where and the when of enforcement efforts made the difference between facilitating, or 
disrupting a vast illegal agricultural labor system along the U.S.-Mexico border. 
  
U.S. IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON MEXICAN IMMIGRATION, 1917-
1939 
 
Immigration laws became increasingly devoted to restriction during the 1910s and 
1920s, yet created exceptions and loopholes to allow for the continued migration of 
Mexican laborers to the United States, but within limiting and temporary parameters.193  
The Immigration Act of 1917 expanded deportation categories and initiated further 
                                                 
193 In beginning this examination of immigration laws in 1917, I do not mean to imply that U.S. 
immigration restriction first began in this period, as some have argued. I acknowledge Erika 
Lee’s contention that the U.S.’s regime of immigration restriction began in the late 19th century, 
with Chinese exclusion laws. Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration During the 
Exclusion Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 
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restrictions on immigration, seeking to exclude low-waged laborers.194 For example, the 
new law instituted a literacy test as a prerequisite for obtaining a visa. Even with the ink 
still fresh on the new immigration law, the U.S. government bowed to pressure from the 
agricultural industry in the Southwest, and began issuing temporary exemptions in 1917. 
The Department of Labor waived the eight-dollar head tax each immigrant had to pay as 
well as the literacy test for Mexican laborers coming to work in the U.S. agricultural 
industry. This action, often referred to as the first bracero program, lasted until 1921, and 
brought in between 50,000 and 80,000 Mexican agricultural workers.195  
The flexibility in the enforcement of the law resulted from the significant 
influence of agriculturalists in the U.S. Southwest. Though the exemption was meant as a 
temporary wartime measure, Southwestern growers clamored for the government to 
extend them, citing shortages of appropriate labor and customary access to Mexican 
migrant workers. As one growers’ representative from South Texas testified in a 1920 
Senate committee hearing: “Until now we had no cause to complain, for the reason that, 
the restrictions being suspended, we were permitted to get the labor we needed.”196 
Another agriculturalist from South Texas explained about the region’s historical 
dependence on Mexican labor and their inability to hire enough workers from elsewhere, 
such as African Americans from Dallas or Shreveport. He warned the committee about 
the possible consequences if Congress allowed the exemptions to lapse: 
Of course, if this law stands, if you do not put a river guard on there, we will get 
our help all right. If you gentlemen have any objections to admitting Mexicans by 
                                                 
194 The 1917 law also instituted restrictions for those deemed ideologically dangerous, such as 
anarchists. 
195 Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 156. 
196 Senate Committee on Immigration, Admission of Mexican Agricultural Laborers: Hearings on 
S.J. Res. 66, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1920, 12-13. 
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law, cut them out and take the river guard away and let us alone, and we will get 
them all right…I prefer to get them lawfully, if I can.197  
 
With his testimony the grower revealed his determination to hire Mexican workers, 
legally or illegally. 
Though the 1917 immigration law introduced new restrictions for prospective 
immigrants, official, but temporary, exemptions for Mexican laborers created ambiguity 
about its applicability on the southern border of the U.S.  This allowed space for growers 
to place continued pressure on legislators and the INS to pass legal measures to relax the 
immigration enforcement of Mexican migrants for the growers’ benefit.  
The National Origins Act of 1924, the next major piece of U.S. immigration 
legislation, again presented a Janus face on the prospect of Mexican immigration. On its 
surface, the National Origins Act represented an opening for legal Mexican migration to 
the United States. While legislators assigned numerical quotas for visas to prospective 
migrants from almost all regions of the globe, countries from the Americas were 
exempted from the quota system. Theoretically, U.S. consuls could assign unlimited 
numbers of visas to migrants from Mexico, Canada, and Central and South America. 
Scholars have largely attributed this exemption to the U.S. diplomatic community’s 
                                                 
197 Ibid., 11. Another line of questioning revealed the ways in which Mexican workers were 
always being implicitly (or explicitly) compared to African American workers. Questioned by 
Senator Sterling of North Dakota about who were better workers, African Americans or 
Mexicans, Fred Roberts, a cotton grower and the president of the South Texas Cotton Growers’ 
Association, said he would “take my chances with the Mexican,” because though he judged that 
an African American “will do more work than a Mexican while he works,” he thought perhaps 
Mexicans were more reliable. In the following passage from the transcript, Senator Sterling 
pressed, “But he [African American worker] is not as reliable in sticking to the job? Mr. Roberts: 
No sir; there was a time when the Negroes were more reliable than they are now.” Making an 
oblique reference to slavery, along with its attendant images of violence and coercion, Mr. 
Roberts employed worn stereotypes about the work rate of African Americans. This passage 
demonstrates the implicit and explicit comparisons growers frequently made between African 
American and Mexican agricultural workers. 
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desire to preserve cordial relations in the Americas, as well as from the pressure of the 
powerful agricultural lobby, who wanted to preserve their access to cheap and plentiful 
Mexican labor.198  
The prospect of unlimited Mexican migration induced fear in immigration 
restrictionists, who sought ways to limit it by attempting to pass legislation extending the 
quota limits to include the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, restrictionists raised 
questions in at least one committee hearing about Mexicans’ racial makeup in order to 
determine whether or not they could be targeted for exclusion on the basis of racial 
inadmissibility, since the 1924 law held that those barred by their race from naturalization 
could not be issued immigration visas.199 In response to a question about whether or not 
Mexican Indians were allowed entrance to the United States, the INS District Director in 
El Paso replied that he had no directions from the courts to indicate that Mexicans were 
ineligible for citizenship.200 The lack of established precedent in the courts on the issue 
of race and the naturalization of Mexicans, as well as Mexicans’ mixed racial heritage 
made the legislators’ line of questioning unsuccessful.201 In addition to facing 
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difficulties regarding the racial inadmissibility of Mexican migrants, legislative attempts 
to limit their migration on the basis of applying quota limits to Mexicans also went down 
to defeat during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Belying restrictionists’ concerns of untrammeled immigration from Mexico, the 
Western Hemisphere quota exemption did not lead to significant increases in legal 
Mexican immigration. According to A. M. Warren, Chief of the Visa Division of the 
Department of State testifying before a Senate Subcommittee on Immigration in 1939, 
immigration from those areas was “not a problem.”202 Officials from the Visa Division 
pointed out that immigration from Canada and emigration to Canada generally balanced 
each other out.203 And while legal immigration from Mexico had been heavier between 
1921 and 1930, officially numbered at 459, 287, the numbers dramatically tailed away 
during the Great Depression. Between 1931 and 1940 only 22, 319 persons legally 
immigrated to the United States from Mexico.204 Warren credited these reduced 
numbers to immigration restrictions already on the books, arguing that “existing 
immigration law, particularly those sections of the 1917 Immigration Act dealing with 
public charges, illiterate, and contract laborers, would seem, as administered for a number 
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202 Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration, Deportation of Aliens, 76th Cong., 1st 
sess., March 21-23, 1940, 175. 
203 Ibid. 
204 U.S. Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Table 4. “Immigration by Country: For Decades: 1820 to 1948” (Washington, D.C., 1948). 
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of years past, to form an effective and permanent barrier against any undue immigration 
of Mexican labor.”205 The strictures of the 1917 immigration law, if rigidly enforced, 
were already sufficient to block a significant portion of legal immigration from Mexico. 
Thus, the exemptions from quota limits many have pointed to as evidence of a U.S. open 
door policy toward Mexican immigration during the first half of the twentieth century 
had little statistical effect on legal Mexican migration. In reality, U.S. policy toward 
Mexican immigration was much more limiting and complicated. 
The U.S. government enforced exclusionary immigration categories or relaxed 
their enforcement in response to economic and political demands. When economic and 
political circumstances changed during the Great Depression, government agencies began 
to interpret some of the clauses of the 1917 law so strictly that very few prospective 
migrants could acquire immigration visas during the 1930s.206 Local, state, and federal 
government entities also initiated intense campaigns throughout the U.S. Southwest and 
the Midwest to rid the country of Mexicans during the Great Depression through a 
coercive combination of deportations and repatriations.207 These efforts at both 
exclusion and expulsion worked together during the 1930s to create the context by which 
Mr. Warren, the head of the Visa Division of the State Department, could report in 1939 
                                                 
205 Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration, Deportation of Aliens, 175. 
206 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation 
Pressures, 1929-1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 30-33. 
207 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexicans; see also R. Reynolds McKay, “Texas Mexican Repatriation 
During the Great Depression” (Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1982); and Francisco E. 
Balderrama and Raymond Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995). While the exact numbers of repatriated 
Mexicans during the 1930s is not known, the most common estimate claims 500,000 Mexicans 
and Mexican Americans left the U.S. for Mexico between 1929-1939. [cite Hoffman] Half of 
those, or 250,000 ethnic Mexicans may have been repatriated from Texas. McKay, v. 
 111 
that legal immigration from Mexico had averaged less than 1,400 persons per year for the 
last three years.208 
Despite the evidence of some malleability within immigration laws Mexicans 
found it increasingly difficult to obtain legal visas for immigration during the 1930s, their 
exemption from quota laws notwithstanding. Even as the U.S. economy rebounded after 
1939, legal Mexican immigration did not increase dramatically. Legal immigration from 
Mexico declined sharply in the 1930s—22,319 down from 459,287 during the 1920s.  
Surprisingly, the 1940s did not bring a surge of legal immigration. Between 1941 and 
1950 immigration had only increased to 60,589 persons, a very slight increase and far 
below the actual numbers of Mexicans migrating to the U.S. during the 1940s.209   
 
 
Fig. 3.1. Mexican Emigration to the United States, 1940 to 1964. Graph detail taken from 
Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke 
and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 38. 
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Thus, the fight in Congress between immigration restrictionists and agricultural 
business interests about whether Mexicans should be subjected to quotas seems to have 
been of secondary importance in the end. Most migration from Mexico to the United 
States during the 1940s was illegal; managed almost exclusively within the shadowy 
administrative channels of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials from the 
INS, especially those involved on the ground in the early contact with migrants bore an 
extraordinary amount of discretionary power over the process of migration at the 
southern border of the United States. 
 
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE BORDER PATROL: LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF POWER  
 
Since much of the migration from Mexico to the U.S. was illegal during the 
1940s, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had an outsized role in affecting 
Mexican migration and deserves closer examination. The first in-depth study of the 
workings of the INS conducted by the Wickersham Commission in 1931 came to a 
startlingly contradictory conclusion about the agency: it had at once too much and too 
little power.  This section examines the foundations and development of Border Patrol 
authority, both the power vested in the police body by legislation as well as the authority 
the agency itself developed as on-the-ground modus operandi. Over the years, these 
processes became established as settled law over time.  
On the U.S.-Mexico border, the Border Patrol worked mostly within a nebulous 
zone of loosely interpreted laws, in which Constitutional rights did not fully apply. Most 
immigration procedures, such as deportation, fell almost completely within the power of 
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the executive branch of the federal government, and deprived most migrants of access to 
the judicial system. Legal constitutional scholars have argued that deportations laws 
consistently came under the plenary powers doctrine, delegating power to the executive 
branch and outside the purview of judicial due process.210 The process of deportation, 
easily the most common police act on the U.S.-Mexico border, contained within the 
power of the executive branch, made the border itself a pre-Constitutional space in some 
ways. 
In 1924 and 1925, the U.S. Congress created the Border Patrol, gave the newly 
formed police body its first budget of one million dollars, and outlined its original 
powers. Though Border Patrol officials bemoaned the strictures placed upon them by the 
legislation, namely, limiting their ability to make arrests without warrants, officers 
quickly hammered out procedures to work around the limitations they faced. According 
to the 1925 legislation, officers could only arrest, without a warrant, “any alien who in 
his presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the United States” in violation of 
immigration laws.211 Though this wording would seem to indicate a very narrow spatial 
and time-sensitive window in which officers could make arrests without warrants, the 
INS stretched the boundaries of those powers to an extraordinary degree. In 1928 El Paso 
District Director was questioned before a House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization about the Border Patrol’s authority to apprehend migrants away from the 
border and take them immediately to a port of entry for deportation. El Paso District 
Director Grover Wilmoth alluded to a federal court ruling, Lew Moy et al v. United States 
                                                 
210 Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (Cambridge, MA: 
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which found that “an alien was in the act of effecting entry until he had reached his 
interior destination.”212 “We exercise that authority,” Wilmoth averred, and added, “I 
believe, based upon that, that we could get away with taking them into custody as we do, 
and delivering them to the nearest immigration office.” 
The ways in which INS officials stretched the powers granted to them had 
temporal and spatial dimensions that defined the nature of federal authority on the U.S.-
Mexico border. A close consideration of the Wickersham Commission’s findings helps 
demonstrate the importance of temporality in a space in which legal historian Daniel 
Kanstroom described “government power [operating] largely unmediated by 
constitutional or significant legal constraint.”213 Formed by President Hoover, the 
Wickersham Commission undertook an extensive, multi-volume study of law and order 
in the United States, with an entire volume dedicated to deportation laws. Released in 
1931, lead investigator Reuben Oppenheimer found that the process of deporting 
migrants from the United States violated American ideals of transparency and due 
process. In one of the first in-depth studies of INS procedures in deportation cases, 
Oppenheimer declared that the agency operated in an environment excessively free from 
oversight—combining in one administrative agency (often in one office, and even in one 
person) the functions of police, judge, and jury, and basing many of its most fundamental 
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procedures in non-statutory authority.214 “It is believed,” he claimed, “that nowhere else 
in legal processes of so important a nature is there the deplorable combination of all the 
elements of illegal procedure, absence of safeguards and despotic power which is to be 
found in the proceedings of deportation.”215  
One of the most pointed critiques to emerge from the Wickersham Commission 
centered on deportable migrants’ limited access to rights, as well as the ways in which 
even those limited rights were not available until the deportation process was well 
advanced. Because the INS interpreted the Lew Moy case so liberally, border patrol and 
immigration inspectors generally waited until after they made arrests to obtain warrants, 
thus often initiating warrantless searches of businesses, other public places, and property. 
During this initial period, the immigration officer subjected the migrant to a series of 
interrogations, first at the scene, in order to determine whether or not the officer would 
detain the migrant, and secondly, at the immigration office, where the officer initiated a 
lengthier questioning to gauge if acquiring a warrant was necessary.216 At no time 
during these primary interrogations did the migrant have access to a lawyer. Once a 
warrant was received, the migrant went through a hearing, similar to a judicial 
proceeding in that evidence could be heard and presented, but different because the 
hearing was performed by immigration officials, and not an independent judiciary.217 
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Only when the proceedings had reached the hearing stage, could a migrant summon 
counsel, paid for at his or her own expense, and not guaranteed by the state. Because 
many migrants could not afford lawyer’s fees, lawyers were present at fewer than 20% of 
the hearings.218 At the U.S.-Mexico border, this situation was greatly exacerbated: 
lawyers represented migrants at no more than 2% of the hearings.219  The results of such 
closed-door proceedings were stark: district level hearings recommended deportation for 
95% of the cases.220 The district offices sent their recommendations for final approval to 
the office of the secretary, where a review board considered them, and followed the 
district’s recommendations 90% of the time.221 Two conclusions can be drawn from the 
genealogy of deportation narrated above. One, the local border patrol district office, 
especially the investigating border patrol inspector, held a great deal of power over the 
deportation of migrants. Second, getting caught by the Border Patrol meant almost certain 
expulsion from the country, whether through voluntary departure or formal deportation. 
Within the system of deportation as whole, then, the INS operated mostly within 
an administrative, non-Constitutional span of time. The few quasi-Constitutional rights 
migrants could claim in the process of deportation, were triggered very late, if at all.222 
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When applied to the physical jurisdiction in which most INS officers operated, at the 
borders of the United States, one can see the ways in which the seeming temporariness 
implied by Lew Moy could go beyond a temporary individual state and become a 
permanent condition. That is, until an undocumented migrant was apprehended, he or she 
could be considered to be in the process of effecting entry into the United States.  
Through the temporal and spatial expansion of their powers to patrol the border in the 
enforcement of immigration laws, the Border Patrol extended the liminal, nebulous state 
of permanent temporariness of individual migrants to the space of the border region, 
creating a federally administrated, non-Constitutional space. 
INS officials’ strategic decision to use their expanded powers established two 
discernible layers of police presence in the border region and created a border zone of 
enforcement based on the elasticized notion of a migrant’s sustained status of effecting 
illegal entry. The Border Patrol’s construction of a patrollable border zone occurred early 
in the formation of that police body. Questioned in a 1928 hearing, El Paso INS district 
director Grover Wilmoth described the physical dimensions of their patrols:  
We have about 900 miles of border in our district, about 300 miles for each 
subdistrict, but you can put an army out there right on the border and you could 
not stop their crossing. The only way to do is to station your at strategic points 
where you know that the main crossing is done, or station them back in the 
interior where you will catch them after they have left the border at points on the 
road where they are almost forced to pass.223 
 
The Border Patrol set up their force in both places, at the border and at strategic 
points in the interior, often up to 100 miles into the interior, thus forming two clear 
boundary lines.224 All Mexicans moving within that border zone were suspect and 
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subject to being questioned and detained.225As Hernández has argued, the Border Patrol 
“policed Mexicano mobility instead of enforcing the political boundary between the 
United States and Mexico.”226 The physical territory of the strategically constructed 
border zone became a movement zone of sorts: all workers were judged to be in transit, 
their residence in the border fragile and insecure. 
  
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF A FLEXIBLE BORDER 
The INS mechanism of voluntary departure became the most common form of 
managing Mexican migration at the U.S.-Mexico border during the 1940s. This method 
gave the INS the power to expel migrants from the United States while avoiding the 
expensive and time-consuming process of formal deportation by allowing them to leave 
the country at their own expense. Codified into law in 1940, this procedure allowed for 
the full operation of a border agricultural system based predominantly on undocumented 
Mexican labor, and shaped a flexible border with a consistent movement of Mexican 
workers back and forth across the boundary line.227 The mechanism of voluntary 
departure was advantageous for migrants as well; the penalties for illegal re-entry were 
minor or non-existent, while those who were caught entering the country illegally after 
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being formally deported faced the possibility of high fines and jail time. Because 
voluntary departure was a still a method of deportation, however, INS administrators 
could protect themselves against critiques of ineffectiveness by touting the large numbers 
of expulsions its officers had effected in a given year and the many miles they had 
patrolled. It seemed to be an ideal arrangement for all concerned: growers acquired the 
labor force they desired, workers caught in the country illegally were expelled from the 
country without serving long detentions and were theoretically free to obtain legal visas 
in the future, while the Border Patrol maintained a semblance of control of the border 
without overwhelming the system. This process, however, continued to define Mexican 
migrants as temporary and illegitimate sojourners in the United States, and did not 
provide avenues for Mexican migrants’ permanent legal migration. The increased 
movement of Mexican workers into the United States and their forcible removal through 
“voluntary” departure formed a picture of Mexican migration that was circular and 
temporary, placing the image of Mexican migrants as illegitimate in high relief.   
Voluntary departure had been used at both the Canadian and Mexican land 
borders since the late 1920s, though employed for different reasons and with different 
effects. Between 1927-1930, annual figures for voluntary departures ranged from 11,387 
to 25,888. Rueben Oppenheimer of the Wickersham Commission noted that voluntary 
departures were used primarily on the Canadian and Mexican land borders adjacent to the 
United States. Because people who utilized voluntary departure had to shoulder the costs 
for their return, few deportable European migrants left the country in this manner.228  
However, by the early 1940s, the overall numbers for voluntary departures had decreased 
substantially, reflecting the many years of diminished levels of immigration during the 
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Great Depression. In 1942, for example, there were a total of 6,904 voluntary departures 
with 2,552 departing to Mexico and 2,189 departing to Canada.  
While the figures seem very evenly matched, a closer look behind the figures 
reveal how the INS used voluntary departure differently at each border, helping 
crystallize a fundamental difference between the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican 
borders. On the Canadian border, voluntary departure formed part of a legalization 
process for illegal immigrants, called pre-examination. In use since 1935, pre-
examination referred to a procedure by which a migrant would be pre-approved for legal 
entry by the INS, “depart voluntarily” to Canada, immediately apply to the nearest 
American consul for a visa, and then return to the United States as a legal immigrant.229 
Used briefly at the U.S.-Mexico border, protests from the U.S. consul in Juárez ended the 
use of pre-examination on the southern border, because migrants’ poverty made them 
inadmissible for immigration, the consulate argued. Pre-examination became exclusive to 
the northern border.230 At the northern border, then, voluntary departure represented a 
technical mechanism toward legalization. At the southern border, voluntary departure 
remained strictly a process of deportation.231 
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The INS used the voluntary departure procedure much more during the mid-1940s 
than before, and almost exclusively at the U.S.-Mexico border. The numbers of voluntary 
departures steadily crept upward as the 1940s wore on: in 1944 the INS conducted 32, 
270 voluntary departures, a sharp increase from the 6,904 just two years before. 







1944 7,179 32,270 39,449 
1945 11,270  69,490 80,760 
1946 14,375 101,945 116,320 
1947 18,663 195,880 214,543 
1948 20,371 197,185 217,555 
1949 20,040 276,297 296,337 
1950 6,628 572,477 579,105 
Table. 3.2. Deportations and Voluntary Departures. Modified from table in U.S. 
Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, (1950), 50. 
 
In the post-World War II period, between 1946 and 1950, the INS conducted 
1,343,783 voluntary departures, a staggering increase from the preceding years and 
decades. The great majority of the voluntary departures passed through the U.S-Mexico 
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border. For example, of the 572,477 voluntary departures in 1950, ninety-eight percent 
were from the Border Patrol districts in San Antonio, El Paso, and Los Angeles.232  
In discussing the procedure of voluntary departure, INS officials consistently 
defined it as a more humane and efficient method of deportation that allowed migrants 
the possibility of an eventual legal return. According to INS policy, migrants who were 
found to be “deportable on other than criminal, moral, or subversive grounds, or because 
of mental or physical defects” were expelled through voluntary departure.233 The 1949 
INS annual report added: 
Such a procedure is advantageous to the alien since he is not prevented from 
applying immediately for readmission if the basis for his deportable status 
includes no element which might disqualify him for readmission. It is also 
advantageous to the Service as it results in a saving of deportation expense.234 
 
After apprehension, a Border Patrol officer subjected a migrant to a quick initial 
interrogation, to determine his or her legal status. Once the officer discovered the 
migrant’s legal status, made a further decision whether to opt for voluntary departure or 
initiate formal deportation proceedings. Unless the migrant had been caught committing 
another form of criminal act, the Border Patrolman most often decided to use voluntary 
departure. Though its name implied a migrant’s consent in the proceedings, it is not clear 
that most migrants did consent.235 But faced with the choice of quick expulsion or 
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several weeks or months of detention, followed by an administrative hearing with no 
counsel, and then almost certain deportation, most migrants would have chosen voluntary 
departure in any case. At that point, the migrant remained in custody for several hours, in 
detention facilities at or near immigration offices, until Border Patrol officials could 
transport him or her to the nearest international port of entry, and then released to cross 
the border into Mexico. 
The humanity of the process of voluntary departure depended almost entirely 
upon the individual Border Patrol officer. Many of the everyday cruelties and 
humiliations of expulsion were lost amidst the high volume of traffic sent across the 
international bridges, only occasionally surfacing in newspaper reports or investigations. 
On one mid-August day in 1950 a group of ninety migrants waited to cross into Mexico 
at the Gateway International Bridge in Brownsville, Texas, after having been 
apprehended in the Harlingen area earlier in the day.236 Among that group was Abelino 
Mendez Leon, his wife Rufina Barajas Ramirez and their six children, ranging in ages 
from four to fourteen.237 Mendez had just purchased groceries for his large family that 
morning, and had no money to pay for the bridge fare to cross back, for himself or for his 
family.238 Mendez had made his way halfway across the bridge, when the toll collector 
turned him back, telling him that U.S. immigration officials would give him tickets to 
cross. Mendez claimed that he approached the Immigration Inspector who was checking 
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vehicular and foot traffic on the bridge, Officer Boudreaux, and told him he “had no 
money to get across.” In response, Boudreaux  “spoke to him roughly in English… and 
motioned him to go on and get across the bridge.”239 Upon turning to walk back, 
Mendez says he was “hit on the back and almost knocked to the ground.” José Julian 
Sanchez Peña of Matamoros corroborated Mendez’s account, reporting that he had seen a 
“short man in khaki clothes” hit Mendez.240 
After the press reported this story, INS officials in Brownsville questioned the 
officer and submitted their own version of events contradicting Mendez’s testimony. The 
report to the district office in San Antonio cleared Immigration Inspector Boudreaux of 
any wrongdoing. According to his testimony in the report, Boudreaux did not strike Mr. 
Mendez, but had merely placed “his hand on the alien’s back, pushed him to the head of 
the steps, and told him to remain there until he got his tickets.”241 Boudreaux further 
accused Mendez of speaking to him “loudly and insolently,” while demanding money or 
tickets to cross the bridge.242 In his report Charles Lonergan, the Officer in Charge at 
Brownsville, TX, concluded that Boudreaux acted just as any other officer would act in a 
similar situation.  
Instead, Lonergan charged the Chief of the Mexican Immigration Service at 
Matamoros, Tamaulipas, with concocting a “lurid story” for the press based only on 
hearsay and trusting the word of a “three-time criminal law violator.”243 The three-time 
“criminal law violator” to which Officer Lonergan referred was Abelino Mendez Leon, 
who had been apprehended in Harlingen, Texas on two previous occasions and sent back 
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to Mexico through voluntary departure. On three occasions, a Border Patrol had deemed 
Mendez “worthy” of voluntary departure, normally offered to people of otherwise good 
moral character, as Border Patrol officials themselves had defined the procedure before 
Congress. Suddenly Mendez became an untrustworthy criminal who should have been in 
jail, but for the mercy of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Voluntary 
departure, therefore, was a highly flexible process that could instantly transform a person 
deemed formerly worthy into a criminal whose charge of mistreatment at the hands of a 
Border Patrol officer held no value. 
As voluntary departure became the most common form of immigration 
enforcement on the U.S.-Mexico border, the act of removal further moved out of the 
processual and adjudicatory, and into the informal realm. The dominant form of 
enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border was characterized by its flexibility and built on 
the possibility and probability of transborder Mexican mobility and labor migration.  The 
INS touted voluntary departure as a humane process of deportation that allowed migrants 
the opportunity initiate the process of legal immigration to the United States. This 
approach emphasized the probability of Mexicans’ return migrations. In doing so, 
however, INS administrators must have been well aware that most Mexican migrants, 
under the current laws, would be judged inadmissible, unable to meet literacy 
requirements and/or considered likely to become a public charge. Thus, INS officials 
knew that Mexican migrants’ return migrations would most likely be illegal. Voluntary 
departure wiped migrants’ slates clean, however; a subsequent illegal entry treated as the 
first.  
The very large number of expulsions the INS effected during the second half of 
the 1940s, over 1.3 million in a span of five years, would not have been possible without 
the mechanism of voluntary departure. The INS’s physical and administrative 
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infrastructure could not have handled so many formal deportations. The mechanism of 
voluntary departure, a response to a high volume of migration at the U.S.-Mexico border, 
also contributed to that volume, and made deportations a characteristic experience on the 
southern border. Relying so heavily on voluntary departure as a form of deportation 
meant that the INS conducted most expulsions of Mexicans without providing any form 
of written accounts of their actions whatsoever, apart from taking their names, time and 
place of apprehension, and time and place of departure. Forcing expulsions without 
documenting the process left a great deal of room for manipulation, collusion, and 
maneuvering. 
 
THE CONTESTED TERRAIN OF BORDER PATROL PRACTICES 
Within the broadly defined border zone, members of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service wove their enforcement routines into the daily social interactions 
between employers, the Border Patrol, and Mexican workers. The relationship between 
growers and the Border Patrol would seem to have been necessarily adversarial. Growers 
sought the cheapest possible, i.e., illegal, labor force, and the Border Patrol’s primary 
mission involved stopping the entrance of unauthorized migrants. Though a measure of 
mutual hostility and tension did exist between growers and the Border Patrol, the Border 
Patrol’s quiet but consistent commitment to protecting the border’s agricultural industry 
provided a shared foundation of stasis and stability. The local social dynamics of power 
continued to play a fundamental role in shaping the space and timing of enforcement, 
even when INS enforcement strategies changed during the 1940s and in the early 1950s. 
During the early 1950s, the Border Patrol conducted several large-scale deportation 
drives that temporarily relocated Border Patrol officers from other posts to South Texas. 
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For the most part the INS merely sought to control growers’ excesses regarding the 
manipulation of labor mobility, and did not seek the overall destruction of the system 
based on undocumented labor. 
As the opening anecdote to the chapter, the Crossett affair, attested, growers 
strenuously, and sometimes violently, objected to what they perceived were new Border 
Patrol encroachments on their power and their property. Legislation passed in the second 
half of the 1940s and the early part of the 1950s gradually augmented the power of the 
Border Patrol to make searches and arrests without warrants.244 However, the increase 
of Border Patrol powers did not lead to a correspondingly clear path toward the 
disengagement of federal and local bases of authority. Occasionally, Border Patrol 
authorities did use their expanded powers to keep certain disagreeable or uncooperative 
growers or employers in line, though they had to take great care in these instances. 
Growers, for their part, sought to apply social and political pressure to contain the Border 
Patrol within the scope of their world and to use the police force as a tool for the 
maintenance of their labor system. Even as overall Border Patrol apprehensions increased 
during the 1940s, the border agricultural labor system continued to operate.  
The Crossett affair in 1947 and similar events that took place in the El Paso 
immigration district signaled a period of increased tensions between the INS and the 
agricultural industry in the area. These incidents reflected a slight shift in the operations 
                                                 
244 While the 1925 Powers of the Border Patrol Act did allow for searches and seizures without 
warrant of people found in the act of illegal entrance, who otherwise would have escaped 
apprehension if warrants were sought, the Act of August 7, 1946 added to that earlier authority 
the power to arrest without warrant those they believed had violated crimes related to 
immigration. It was not until 1952, the Act of March 20, 1952, that the law specifically granted 
the Border Patrol the power to search “private lands but not dwellings” for undocumented 
immigrants. Cited in United States of America v. John J. Brennan, United States Court of 
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Sept. 13, 1976. 
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/538/538.F2d.711.75-3939.html (accessed July 18, 2011). 
 128 
of the El Paso district. In the late 1940s, the longtime District Director of the El Paso 
region, Grover C. Wilmoth, began instructing his officers to use their authority to target 
those growers who were severely exploiting or otherwise abusing Mexican workers.245 
In a May 1949 memorandum circulated among his staff officers, section chiefs, chief 
patrol inspectors, and officers in charge, Wilmoth advised his subordinates to continue 
operating under the policy directives he had recommended in a memorandum he had sent 
a year earlier. Wilmoth reminded officers to use the full extent of their authority against 
growers who were “taking advantage of the situation to under-pay or otherwise mistreat 
deportable farm laborers.”246 In addition he urged officers to also “include those farmers 
who actively engage in smuggling aliens, or in transporting aliens from the Border, or 
whose farms are used as relay stations.”247 In directing officers to focus on growers 
subjecting workers to extraordinary abuse, Wilmoth used apprehension policy to attempt 
to influence and ameliorate growers’ treatment of their workers. By inference, the 
absence of these kinds of explicit instructions directing officers would have given 
growers greater freedom to continue mistreatment and exploitation. In any case, even 
with Wilmoth’s specific and explicit directions, not all of the officers were following his 
lead, he noted, and he exhorted them to do so.248 
In the second part of his memorandum, Wilmoth distinguished between growers 
who were passive recipients of undocumented laborers, and those who played a more 
active role in recruiting laborers and facilitating their migration process. Wilmoth 
                                                 
245 In a memorandum dated May 31, 1949, Grover C. Wilmoth refers to an earlier circular he had 
sent to the officers of his district, in April 12, 1948, outlining operating policies. I do not have the 
April 12, 1948 circular. 
246 Circular, from El Paso District Director Wilmoth to Officers under his charge, May 31, 1949, 




directed his officers to disrupt a common practice by which border area growers 
communicated with workers and pre-arranged to meet them at the border and transport 
them to their farms. By focusing on this particular part of the transaction, Wilmoth hinted 
at a possible direction for border enforcement, that is, defining growers as alien 
smugglers, and thus subject to criminal prosecution. Instituting a widespread practice of 
arresting farmers on charges of alien smuggling would have represented a radical legal 
and procedural departure on the U.S.-Mexico border, and there is no evidence to suggest 
that Wilmoth tried to do so in the El Paso area. However, in one instance in October 
1947, six New Mexico farmers were arrested for alien smuggling and faced trial in U.S. 
district court.249 More commonly, however, Wilmoth advised his officers to target these 
growers by simply apprehending their workers, without bringing charges against the 
growers themselves. Any evidence of aggressions by Wilmoth would have greatly 
alarmed area growers and could have accounted for the various outbreaks of hostility 
between growers and Border Patrolmen in the area. 
Despite the evidence of an increasingly aggressive enforcement strategy in the El 
Paso region, Border Patrol agents continued to exercise circumspection when it came to 
entering growers’ properties. In a June 6, 1949 memorandum from District Director 
Wilmoth to the Central Office, Wilmoth recounted a confrontation between Border Patrol 
officers and a particularly hostile Doña Ana County grower, Jake Sweet. Wilmoth 
pointed out that Sweet took every opportunity to “’cuss out’ the Border Patrol and 
everyone connected with the Immigration Service,” including calling the District Director 
                                                 
249 “Six Farmers Await Labor Trials,” El Paso Herald Post, Oct. 4, 1947, pg. 12. The six farmers 
charged with alien smuggling were Roy Ingram, H. Victor Parker, Hugh Moutrey, Quintin 
Mendoza, and Guadalupe Padilla de Cassares, all of Artesia, NM. The sixth farmer was Wayne 
Dill of Doña Ana County, NM. 
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a “son of a bitch.”250 Despite such open provocation, or perhaps because of it, Border 
Patrol officers took great care to obtain arrest warrants to enter Sweet’s property, once 
rumors began circulating that he had amassed a “considerably larger number of farm 
workers than were actually needed.”251 Although Border Patrol officers had the 
authority to obtain arrest warrants to apprehend any undocumented migrants on Sweet’s 
farm, officers felt the need to further justify their actions by pointing out that the workers 
were surplus labor. Wilmoth’s assurances that “Jake Sweet’s cotton was chopped” 
suggests that he believed that conducting a raid upon Sweet’s farm during a critical point 
in the cotton season might have left him open to criticism, certainly from farmers, but 
perhaps even from the INS Central Office itself. 
On June 7, 1949, the same day that Wilmoth sent the report on Jake Sweet to 
Washington, D.C., the Central Office issued a lengthy memorandum to the El Paso and 
San Antonio districts resulting from an internal survey conducted of policies and 
conditions in those areas.252 INS Commissioner, Watson B. Miller, initiated this survey 
in order to “effect coordinate policies and procedures” within the southern border 
districts. The memorandum also had the effect of drastically revising El Paso District 
Director Wilmoth’s more aggressive enforcement strategies.253 Miller concluded that in 
general, the San Antonio and El Paso districts followed similar procedures.  
                                                 
250 Memorandum from Wilmoth to Central Office, June 6, 1949, File 56246/339-F, RG 85, 
NARA. 
251 Ibid. 
252 The San Antonio INS district accounted for almost the whole of Texas, with the exception of 
the Panhandle and the extreme western edge of Texas, which fell within the province of the El 
Paso INS district. In addition to those parts of Texas, the El Paso district had the whole of New 
Mexico and three-fourths of Arizona under its jurisdiction. Together, these two districts oversaw 
most of the U.S.-Mexico border region. 
253 Memorandum from Immigration Commissioner Watson B. Miller to Southwestern districts, 
June 7, 1949, File 56246/339-F, RG 85, NARA. 
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To discuss the similarities in enforcement procedures, which Miller proposed both 
districts continue, the commissioner used the San Antonio district to provide a case study 
about their daily operations. He found that officers in the San Antonio District mostly 
apprehended “all moving illegal aliens found upon the highways, in railway stations, bus 
stations, or other public or quasi-public places,” and intercepted workers crossing the 
“Rio Grande River without documents or inspection.”254 According to Miller’s findings, 
INS officials in El Paso also followed this general approach. Therefore, the Border 
Patrol’s common strategy of patrolling public spaces in towns and public places of 
transport made workers in movement or transit more vulnerable to apprehension than 
those that stayed on farm lands, and away from public spaces. This was characteristic to 
the southern border as a whole. 
Miller also outlined the limited and specific circumstances in which it was 
appropriate to enter growers’ properties, revealing the Central Office’s cautious and 
circumscribed approach in dealing with border enforcement. As Miller noted, the San 
Antonio District Director “has cleaned up some farms and stock ranges where the 
proprietors have been acting as labor hoarders of illegal Mexican nationals, and who have 
been “farming out” or “transferring” the workers so hoarded to other ranches or 
farms.”255 Thus, officers did not necessarily target the general grower population who 
may also have been using undocumented labor, but only those they knew were engaging 
in activity that resulted in undocumented workers moving inland beyond the geographical 
location of the border. Miller further clarified this geographical containment strategy in 
the memorandum, reminding officers that their approach was a “job of forcing all 
                                                 
254 Ibid., 1. 
255 Ibid., 1. 
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possible illegals toward the border.”256 By also targeting labor hoarding, which could 
possibly create restiveness among workers through oversupply and underemployment, 
Border Patrol officers attempted maintain a semblance of stability in the overall labor 
system.  
Though the murkiness regarding the INS’s legal authority to enter private 
property without warrants may have contributed to Commissioner Miller’s advocating 
extreme caution regarding entering grower’s properties, the overall tone of his 
memorandum suggested restraint and cooperation rather than aggression. His directions 
provided a clear signal to Border Patrol officers regarding their relations with growers. 
Commissioner Miller encouraged officers to enter farms in the “presence of conditions of 
such as set out the fore part of this memorandum,” thus limiting their raids to labor 
hoarders.257 These directions also limited Border Patrolmen to targeting growers who 
were on the verge of releasing their workers to other agricultural areas, thus signifying 
that such growers had already harvested their crops and workers were no longer 
necessary.  
In addition to his directions that supported an immigration enforcement strategy 
sensitive to growers’ harvesting schedules, INS Commissioner Miller even more clearly 
communicated the message that INS officials should keep the protection of the 
agricultural industry in mind while still doing their job. In a statement aimed at both the 
El Paso and San Antonio district directors, Commissioner Miller sought to rein in El Paso 
District Director Wilmoth’s aggression, while very gently spurring San Antonio District 
Director Whalen to more action: 
                                                 
256 Ibid., 2. 
257 Ibid., 4. 
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It has been said that some of our District Directors are not interested in the crops 
or the farmers. I think this cannot be well sustained though it is conceded that the 
officials of our Service do meet with exasperating circumstances, and yet the 
feeling and even truculence of producers who are engaged in vital production who 
have been discommoded can be understood. It seems better, however, to chance 
occasional complaints or disaffectations where the circumstance giving rise to 
them are fully warranted and at the same time to lend a hand to proper crop 
protection than to refrain from ever approaching the premises of the 
producers.258 
 
In this statement Miller reminded officers of growers’ important work, advocating 
forbearance even in the face of hostility. The reminder to officers of the vital nature of 
growers’ production seemed to be aimed at Director Wilmoth, whose district had a record 
of heated confrontations between growers and officers.259 On the other hand, when he 
gently advised officers to risk the wrath of growers by occasionally approaching their 
premises if officers were fully in the right, Miller seemed to be addressing Whalen. In 
trying to coordinate the activities at the two southwestern districts, Miller’s overall tone 
supported Whalen’s understated approach in San Antonio rather than Wilmoth’s more 
aggressive strategy in El Paso.  
In his internal investigation, Miller pointed out the one major difference 
separating the two districts’ general enforcement strategies. Miller noted that Wilmoth 
paid attention to issues of workers’ “disastrously low wages,” “overcharging at some 
commissaries,” “inadequate quarters,” and “sanitary conditions.”260 By contrast, Whalen 
had rarely “interjected his forces” to address these issues. Commissioner Miller directed 
Wilmoth to “refrain from entering premises for the purpose of correcting these particular 
                                                 
258 Ibid., 5. 
259 Ibid., 5. Miller closed the memorandum by emphasizing again to officers that “It is proposed 
to carry out the duties of our Border Patrol imposed by laws in the most considerate manner, 
especially as to those whose attitude is not unreasonable or intentionally provocative.” 
260 Ibid., 1. 
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reported abuses.”261 Miller made clear that dealing with worker abuses did not fall 
within the INS’s purview; that was the responsibility of the United States Employment 
Service and Mexican consular authorities in the bracero program. In order to make his 
point even plainer, Miller drove the point home by noting that: 
The San Antonio District Director has not generally concerned himself in the 
matter of wages, living conditions, prices of commodities or personal treatment of 
the workmen. The El Paso District Director has concerned himself with these 
conditions. It is agreed that, pending the completion of the proposed international 
agreement between Mexico and the United States, neither District will enter into 
these personal and economic matters.262 
 
In fact, neither the protection of worker welfare nor the protection of growers’ 
interests fell within the explicit mission of the Border Patrol. Yet, Miller’s instructions 
had expressed the idea that protecting the agricultural industry was a valid concern when 
considering enforcement strategies. On the other hand, Miller instructed Wilmoth to stop 
using Border Patrol raids to target those growers who were mistreating undocumented 
Mexican workers. 
In addition to revealing a great deal about the strategies behind the Border 
Patrol’s daily operating procedures, the memorandum also revealed possible enforcement 
paths not taken, and the implications of such decision-making.  For at least a year, Grover 
C. Wilmoth had instructed the officers in his district to follow up on reports of abuse they 
heard about during interrogations of apprehended workers, or that they witnessed 
themselves in their raids on farms and general patrols. By raiding these farms, and 
perhaps even using the tool of repeated raids on these properties, Wilmoth may have 
hoped to force growers into modifying their practices, be it by improving housing 
                                                 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid., 4-5. 
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conditions or raising wages.263 In employing these strategic raids, Wilmoth was 
evidently aware of the overall impact Border Patrol enforcement had, and could have, on 
workers’ lives while they were in the United States.  By explicitly rejecting Wilmoth’s 
initiatives, the INS Commissioner revealed the central agency’s unconcern with 
migrants’ living and working conditions. Far from being a position of neutrality, a policy 
of non-intervention meant the Border Patrol allied itself with growers’ interests, matched 
as it was with the agency’s position on protecting crops. As the memorandum made clear, 
the joined Border Patrol policy of extreme sensitivity to growers’ harvest schedules and 
non-intervention in worker abuse was the standard operating procedure in the San 
Antonio district, a set of practices that the INS Commissioner wanted to see in El Paso as 
well.  
Directives from the Central Office had clear effects on Border Patrol officers’ 
practices in El Paso. Following Commissioner Miller’s memorandum, Border Patrolmen 
in the El Paso district had to take even greater care when deciding to enter growers’ 
properties, especially as word leaked out about their new instructions. In June and July of 
1949, Wilmoth reported several incidents with growers in New Mexico and Arizona and 
warned Miller that his office would “probably receive a report or complaint about this 
occurrence as nearly every farmer in West Texas and New Mexico is now aware of the 
limitations placed upon the authority of patrol officers of this Service.”264 In one case 
                                                 
263 Of course, the workers on the raided farms suffered the most immediate consequences from 
Wilmoth’s directives, by being deported, but, Wilmoth may have hoped to effect lasting positive 
changes to workers’ conditions in the El Paso district through the efforts of his officers. I thank 
Verónica Martínez for helping me see this point. 
264 Memorandum from El Paso District Director Wilmoth to INS Commissioner Miller, June 20, 
1949, File 56246/339-F, RG 85, NARA II. Wilmoth went on to complain, “and you can guess 
who has been responsible for disseminating that information,” but did not name that person. Later 
in the memo he described another complaint by a farmer from Fort Stockton who had reported 
Border Patrolmen going onto his farm. Wilmoth attributed this complaint to the fact that “J.C. 
Wilson of Pecos is passing out the information that an “understanding” was recently reached in 
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near the town of Tucumcari in northeastern New Mexico, Border Patrol officers searched 
the farm of Mr. Brown based on information from a former worker who claimed he had 
been displaced by undocumented workers who were being paid 35 cents per hour to drive 
a tractor, when he had been making 75 or 80 cents an hour for the same work.265 Upon 
receiving this tip, Border Patrolman Clayton believed “the Mexicans should be 
investigated as it did not appear to be fair for American laborers to have to compete 
against such low wages.”266 Immigration Investigator Clyde Nichols did not approve a 
raid on the farm, however, until he received information from the local sheriff’s office 
that Mr. Brown had traveled to El Paso to acquire the workers, thus possibly engaging in 
alien smuggling. After questioning the apprehended workers, Nichols discovered that 
although Mr. Brown had traveled to Ysleta, Texas, just outside of El Paso, and had 
transported the workers to his farm in northeastern New Mexico, “apparently he had not 
smuggled them into the United States.”267 Perhaps in anticipation of criticism from the 
Central Office or to communicate the difficulties his officers faced under the new 
directives, Wilmoth forwarded Nichol’s report to Washington, attaching his own 
memorandum. With a slight inflection of sarcasm, he reported going ahead and 
processing the paperwork to deport the apprehended migrants anyway, having “deemed it 
inadvisable to return the aliens to the Brown farm.”268  
In the months following, growers in the El Paso district continued to openly resist 
the Border Patrol, emboldened by the knowledge of the spatial limitations of Border 
                                                                                                                                                 
Washington that our officers would not go upon the farm.” I do not know if this is the same man 
to which Wilmoth referred earlier in the memorandum. 
265 Report from Clyde Nichols, Investigator, Albuquerque, NM to Grover C. Wilmoth, El Paso 
District Director, June 18, 1949, File 56246/339-F, RG 85, NARA. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Memorandum from El Paso District Director Wilmoth to INS Commissioner Miller, June 20, 
1949, File 56246/339-F, RG 85, NARA. 
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Patrol authority. According to one report from Wilcox, Arizona, Border Patrolmen 
attempted to stop grower Joe Deerman, Jr. while he was driving on a county road near his 
farm, after recognizing the passenger in the car as a migrant whom they had previously 
deported. According to the report, “Deerman did not stop the car, however, until he had 
turned into the gate at the farm, this move was apparently deliberate as we had signaled 
him we wanted him to stop.”269 As Border Patrol officers apprehended the worker, 
Deerman pointedly reminded them that “you fellows need a warrant to come on to a 
place and the next time you come here, you had better have one before you come in my 
front gate.”270 Deerman’s threat was ultimately successful. In a memorandum to District 
Director Wilmoth, Carson Morrow, Chief Patrol Inspector in charge of the Tucson area, 
reported that “in view of outstanding, confidential instructions…the apprehension of 
Mexican alien farm laborers on the farms in the Wilcox, Arizona territory should be 
discontinued for the time being.”271 Growers’ continued contestation over the Border 
Patrol’s authority to enter their property, coupled with directions from the INS Central 
Office, led El Paso Border Patrol authorities to curb their activities in the region. 
 
BORDER PATROL COLLUSION IN SOUTH TEXAS 
As the INS Central Office’s memorandum stated, Border Patrol relations with 
growers in South Texas operated more smoothly than in the El Paso region, due to a 
greater amount of collusion between officers and growers. Examining a couple of INS 
Central Office internal corruption investigations of senior patrol inspectors in South 
                                                 
269 Report from Patrol Inspector in Charge, Paul Watson, to Tucson, AZ Chief Patrol Inspector 
Carson Morrow, July 5, 1949, File 56246/339-F, RG 85, NARA. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Memorandum from Chief Patrol Inspector Carson Morrow to El Paso District Director Grover 
C. Wilmoth, July 8, 1949, File 56246/339-F, RG 85, NARA. 
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Texas allows for peek behind the curtain of annual enforcement statistics. Innovations in 
border enforcement beginning in the late 1940s, which shifted officers from other posts to 
a particular locale for short-term, high-intensity deportation drives disrupted local 
relations between growers and the Border Patrol. Because such mobilizations were 
temporary, however, nothing, aside from official investigations, prevented local Border 
Patrolmen from reverting back to their customary relations with growers once the drives 
were over. The two cases, one of Senior Patrol Inspector in Charge, Charles Wroten, in 
1952, and the other of Senior Patrol Inspector in Charge, Albert Quillin in 1954, reveal 
the deep interconnections between Border Patrol officials and local communities. Though 
the two stations headed by officers Wroten and Quillin were small, and the number of 
officers they supervised were few, these stations were located in the heart of the Rio 
Grande Valley, in intensively cultivated areas with large numbers of agricultural workers. 
During the spring of 1952, the INS initiated an internal investigation against 
Charles Wroten for allegations of neglect of duty, misuse of a government vehicle, and 
employing undocumented migrants on his own farm. At the time of his investigation, 
Charles Wroten was in charge of the Border Patrol office in Weslaco, Texas, whose 
jurisdiction included the town, located about seven miles north of the Rio Grande, as well 
as the territory extending down to the river. Although it is not clear who brought the 
charges, nor which event[s] triggered the complaints, the investigating officers in charge 
of the Wroten case primarily focused on incidents that had occurred during the preceding 
year.272 The nature of the charges, however, suggested a pattern of behavior by Wroten 
extending far beyond 1951 alone.  
                                                 
272 Because I only have the investigators’ report of the case, and not the entire file of the case, 
which would have included full transcripts of everyone interviewed during the investigation, 
some of the details of the Wroten case remained obscured, including the names of the 
investigating officers. The report they submitted, however, was quite detailed, listing all the 
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A picture emerged from the report of a Border Patrol office run with such extreme 
laxity, that officers did not even attempt a pretense at enforcement. The officers who 
served under Wroten, either permanently, or temporarily during a special detail in the 
summer of 1951, testified that Wroten communicated an attitude against apprehending 
migrants on farms, and even against patrolling the Rio Grande. Wroten only permitted 
officers to apprehend migrants found in public places.273 INS investigators thought it 
particularly damning that none of the officers, even those who worked under him on a 
permanent basis were familiar with Wroten’s schedule, or the nature of the work that he 
did, calling into question whether he did any work at all. According to the testimony of 
his subordinate officers and the owner of the local domino hall in town, Wroten spent 
much of his time playing dominoes.274 When he was not playing dominoes, he also 
spent some of the time while supposedly on duty supervising the work of the crews in his 
own cotton fields while his government-issued Border Patrol vehicle was parked nearby. 
Under questioning, Wroten explained that he had driven the government vehicle onto his 
property merely to check on government-owned property he had stored there. 
Investigators found this explanation profoundly unpersuasive, noting that “the stored 
Government property was later found to be two old Border Patrol stop signs (used in 
                                                                                                                                                 
charges, the evidence, and their conclusions about the validity of that evidence. An internal 
investigation would normally have sent in immigration investigators from outside the San 
Antonio district, and I assume this protocol was followed in this investigation as well. 
Investigators’ Report relating to the case of Charles E. Wroten, File 56364/41.16 Pt. 1, Box 84, 
RG 85, NARA. 
273 Investigators’ Report relating to the case of Charles E. Wroten, File 56364/41.16, Pt. 1, Box 
84, RG 85, NARA. Special task forces were assigned to South Texas during 1951 to conduct 
mass deportations, often airlifting deportees back to Mexico in an attempt to disrupt the quick 
turnarounds in return migrations to the United States. 
274 Ibid. Even though the investigators were pretty convinced Wroten played dominoes while on 
duty, and though his car was often seen parked near the domino hall, the domino hall’s close 
proximity to the immigration office, as well as the witnesses’ inability to pinpoint exact times, 
made it difficult to prove this charge conclusively, and investigators recommended that this 
charge be dropped. 
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checking highway traffic) which had been nailed to the wall of a shed. Both were 
described as in a state of collapse.”275  
Wroten’s complete disregard for his duties as the senior patrol inspector in charge 
in Weslaco signaled more than just laziness. Wroten cultivated a large circle of friends 
and acquaintances in town; and those friendships, together with his own property 
interests, influenced his enforcement practices. Among his other charges, Wroten was 
also accused of improperly releasing migrant Doroteo Lara from custody after he had 
been apprehended by other patrolmen from the Weslaco office during the spring of 1951. 
Wroten claimed that he had released the migrant because Lara was married to an 
American citizen and was also ill, producing a doctor’s note from a local clinic as 
supporting evidence. Further investigation found that Lara was neither ill nor married, 
and had been released by Wroten as a favor to his friend, the city manager of 
Weslaco.276 The incident surrounding Doroteo Lara’s release illustrates the close 
relations between Border Patrolmen and the local grower community in Weslaco, as well 
as the wide acceptance in the area for hiring undocumented laborers. In the first place, the 
city manager, a public servant, had hired Lara, an undocumented immigrant. Secondly, in 
trying to cover up his violation, Wroten persuaded a local doctor to write a note falsely 
diagnosing an illness for Lara. Furthermore, in trying to defend himself against other 
various charges, Wroten claimed that his wife owned and operated the farm, not him, and 
submitted five letters from area businessmen supporting his claim.277  Wroten’s 
subterfuge broke down under questioning, and he admitted his ownership of the property, 
but the five letters written on his behalf again demonstrate the ties between Wroten and 
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members of the local agricultural industry, as well as their willingness to lie for him to try 
to undermine an official INS investigation.  
The fact that the San Antonio District Director allowed INS officers to own 
agricultural property at all is surprising as well, considering the possible conflicts of 
interest that could arise. The San Antonio District Director, William Whalen, had 
addressed these concerns before, in a memorandum to all the employees in his district, 
from 1949. Whalen stated that though he felt such a reminder was hardly necessary, 
because of the large amount of publicity and criticism the INS was presently receiving, 
“from certain sources because of the presence of wetbacks in such large numbers,” he 
decided to issue “a word of caution” to his employees: 
Some of you may own or have an interest in acreage or other business enterprises 
on the side, in connection with which it may be necessary to employ laborers. As 
stated above, it is hardly necessary to advise you not to use any wetback labor. 
However, someone else may employ the laborers for you, and you may not be in a 
position yourself to determine whether such laborers are wetbacks. You should 
not take anything of that nature for granted. You should personally see to it that 
alien laborers of any kind of a job in which you have an interest, are lawfully in 
this country.278 
 
Despite his many assurances to the contrary, Director Whalen evidently felt it 
necessary to issue his warning. Though most employees probably did not compromise 
themselves as much as Charles Wroten, the use of undocumented labor was so pervasive, 
and enough INS employees also owned external businesses and properties, that Whalen 
felt he had to issue a warning for them to maintain a sense of professionalism. The social 
                                                 
278 Memorandum from San Antonio District Director William A. Whalen to All Employees, San 
Antonio District, July 15, 1949. Included as evidence in Misconduct case of Senior Patrol 
Inspector and Assistant Officer in Charge in McAllen, TX, James L Turner, Nov. 30, 1954, 
accused of hiring undocumented migrant, fifteen-year old Ramona Molina Carrera to work as a 
housekeeper and nanny in his home. File 56364/41.16 Pt. 1, Box 84, RG 85, NARA. 
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and economic ties linking Border Patrol officers to their local communities were so 
varied and so extensive, that operating at odds with the community’s wishes was very 
difficult, if not impossible. 
Investigators found Wroten guilty of neglect of duty, of misusing a government 
vehicle, and of employing undocumented laborers on his farm. Considering the severity 
of the violations as well as Wroten’s obvious guilt, investigators would have ordinarily 
called for his firing. Several mitigating circumstances, however, convinced investigators 
to recommend a lesser punishment. First, because he was eligible for retirement, 
investigators evidently believed he should be given the option to retire instead. Secondly, 
as they stated, “the wetback situation in the Lower Valley of Texas was completely out of 
hand and tremendous pressure was on the entire Service to relax its efforts there.”279 
Whether the investigators believed the pressure came from within the agency, or from the 
outside community remains unclear, but this statement suggests that Charles Wroten’s 
approach to enforcement was perhaps not so singular after all. In the end, investigators 
recommended Wroten’s demotion to a non-supervisory position and transfer to a location 
outside the San Antonio district. After offering several locations along the northern U.S. 
border, and receiving no response from Officer Wroten, officials decided to transfer him 
to Detroit.280 Before his transfer could be effected Wroten applied for retirement from 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service.281 
The periodic drives that the INS undertook through the first half of the 1950s, 
culminating in Operation Wetback during the summer of 1954 momentarily disrupted the 
                                                 
279 Investigators’ Report relating to the case of Charles E. Wroten, 5. 
280 Memorandum from F. L. Cuneo, Director of Personnel to W.F. Kelly, Assistant 
Commissioner, Enforcement Division, May 7, 1952, 56364/41.16, Pt. 1, Box 84, RG 85, NARA. 
281 Memorandum to W. F. Kelly of a telephone call from Cuneo, June 20, 1952, 56364/41.16, Pt. 
1, Box 84, RG 85, NARA. 
 143 
typical daily interactions between local Border Patrolmen and growers. For a few weeks 
or a month, Border Patrol chiefs had to incorporate officers from as far away as Buffalo 
and Miami into task forces designed to “sweep” the area’s agricultural fields. The task 
forces traveled in convoys and were often supported by an airplane providing directions 
from above to fields filled with workers. During the operation of these mass deportation 
drives, officers temporarily in South Texas might note irregularities in local officers’ 
procedures, or get feedback from surprised farmers irate at the task forces’ disruption of 
normal enforcement patterns, thus exposing local Border Patrol officers’ practices. This 
scenario embroiled Albert Quillin, Senior Patrol Inspector in charge of the San Benito 
unit in controversy in July 1954. 
The best-known mass deportation campaign of the mid-twentieth century, 
Operation Wetback, which targeted the agricultural fields between California and Texas, 
was lauded at the time for its military-style innovations and splashy deportation 
numbers.282 Scholars have identified Operation Wetback as a key turning point in the 
history of immigration enforcement on the U.S.-Mexico border, signaling the beginning 
of the hardening and militarization of the border that would become characteristic in the 
late twentieth century. The INS’s investigation of Patrol Inspector Albert Quillin 
demonstrates that increased militarization on the border did not equal a rigid approach to 
immigration enforcement. In fact, Quillin had been credited for innovating many of the 
techniques that were later used during Operation Wetback.283 Ironically, the large-scale 
                                                 
282 For a detailed account of Operation Wetback please see, Juan Ramon García, Operation 
Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workers in 1954 (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1980).  
283 Hernández described Albert Quillin as part of a “new generation” of Border Patrolmen not 
overly influenced by local power dynamics, and demonstrating the larger “delocalization of U.S. 
immigration law enforcement.” Hernández, Migra! 152-156. 
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implementation of those techniques created the context that brought Quillin under 
suspicion for collusion with growers during Operation Wetback. 
During the summer of 1954, Task Force D-8 was conducting operations in 
Cameron County, in and around the areas of San Benito, Rio Hondo, and Harlingen. The 
officer in charge of the task force, Senior Patrol Inspector Maurice Dixon, was disturbed 
by how badly things were going for his group of officers. He had just wrapped up a very 
successful drive in northern California, and the task force had been working as a well-
oiled machine. Yet it seemed to the men that every field they hit in their assigned 
territory in South Texas was either filled with legally-contracted braceros or American 
citizens of Mexican extraction.284 Dixon’s early misgivings about the officer assigned to 
act as their guide, Albert Quillin, increased daily. Dixon began to suspect Quillin of 
deliberately leading them astray. Dixon’s suspicions were confirmed when Quillin 
botched their planned raid on one of the largest farms in the San Benito area. Instead of 
guiding the convoy to the Wells farm as planned, he had sent them way past, alerting 
workers to the Border Patrol’s presence. This allowed workers the time to escape across 
the Rio Grande to Mexico.285 After the raid had gone awry, Quillin explained to Dixon 
that he had gotten “turned around and lost his bearings,” despite his eight years as a 
                                                 
284 Exhibit C, Sworn Statement from Alan Murray, July 26, 1954, File 56364/41.16, Pt.1, Box 84, 
RG 85, NARA. Alan Murray, an Immigrant Patrol Inspector stationed in Niagara Falls, NY, 
stated that the morale of the unit plunged shortly after their arrival in South Texas. “All the other 
units, you see, we felt were lesser as far as our own pride went, and they are all catching them and 
making good hits and here we supposedly had two guys who knew the area and the one who was 
leading us all the time—Quillin—took us to fields that had nothing or had citizens or braceros.” 
285 Exhibit A, First Sworn Statement of Maurice Dixon, Senior Patrol Inspector, West Palm 
Beach, FL, July 26, 1954, File 56364/41.16, Pt.1, Box 84, RG 85, NARA. The Wells farm was 
located very near the Rio Grande. In response to a question by Investigator E. R. Decker about 
how many workers he saw across the river who had escaped, Dixon estimated them at 100 or 150. 
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patrol inspector in that exact territory.286 Disbelieving his story, Dixon lodged a 
complaint against Quillin, which triggered an internal INS investigation soon afterward. 
In the course of the investigation, Immigrant Investigator Decker and Immigrant 
Inspector C.W. Gordy questioned officers who had worked with Quillin, including 
colleagues from nearby Border Patrol units who were familiar with his territory and 
practices. Some of Quillin’s subordinate officers showed a marked reluctance to give 
negative testimony, whether out of fear that their words would get back to him, or fear of 
being implicated themselves.287 But others were more open. His second-in-command, 
Wally Baxter, testified to Quillin’s coziness with area farmers, stating, “My opinion is 
that he is friendly with the majority of the farmers in the San Benito area to the extent 
that when he meets them on the street, he drinks coffee with them and discusses 
everything about the farming situation.”288 The officers from the nearby Brownsville 
unit provided some of the most damning testimony when they reported straying onto 
territory normally patrolled by the San Benito unit and being met by surprised and hostile 
farmers who asserted that Quillin had assured them they would be able to keep their 
workers until a particular date. “Over a period of time this became such a common 
practice that some patrol inspectors told me they didn’t like to work in that area, because 
of what they termed the static and mouthing of the farmers,” stated Senior Patrol 
Inspector David Snow of the Brownsville unit.289 
                                                 
286 Ibid. 
287 Maurice Dixon raise the former concern, claiming that Quillin’s men were aware that Valerie 
J. Trimble, the stenographer employed in the interrogation sessions, which first took place in 
Brownsville, Texas, was a friend of Quillin’s. Perhaps in response to this, the investigation was 
moved to McAllen, Texas, and another stenographer was used. Second Sworn Statement of 
Maurice Dixon, August 5, 1954, File 56364/41.16, Pt.1, Box 84, RG 85, NARA. 
288 Exhibit B, First Sworn Statement of Wally Baxter, Immigrant Patrol Inspector, San Benito, 
TX, July 26, 1954, File 56364/41.16, Pt.1, Box 84, RG 85, NARA.  
289 Exhibit F, Sworn Statement of David Snow, Senior Patrol Inspector, Brownsville, TX, July 
26, 1954, File 56364/41.16, Pt.1, Box 84, RG 85, NARA.  
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The investigation’s testimony revealed both the general inertia that seemed to 
exist among Border Patrolmen when it came to reporting on the misconduct of fellow 
officers, and also the ways in which special law enforcement disrupted regular 
enforcement patterns. Officers such as Quillin were placed difficult positions as they 
sought to negotiate between their relationships with the local agricultural establishment 
and the momentarily altered Border Patrol practices. In addition to the tales of 
contretemps with San Benito-area growers used to working with Quillin, as well as 
general rumors about Quillin’s closeness to the influential farmers of the area, Snow also 
recounted a conversation he had with Quillin during the time of the airlifts in 1951. After 
a month of intensive patrolling, Quillin had apparently had enough. During one visit to 
the Brownsville station, where the San Benito unit officers dropped off apprehended 
migrants for deportation processing, Quillin bitterly complained to Snow and another 
colleague that “he thought the airlift had gone on long enough now and it ought to quit 
and give farmers a chance to pick their cotton. The Immigration Service had promised the 
farmers that they would be able to pick their cotton with wetbacks and he thought the 
Immigration Service was obligated to keep its promise.”290 Though Snow was “amazed” 
he did not report Quillin to their superior officer, Fletcher Rawls. “I always more or less 
took the position that Quillin would sooner or later hang himself anyway,” he said, “and I 
never made any attempt to run to McAllen to report such things.”291 In the end, though 
most local officers were well aware of Quillin’s inappropriate relationship with growers, 
it was an officer from West Palm Beach, FL, working temporarily in South Texas, who 
brought a complaint against Quillin.292 
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291 Ibid. 
292 Snow also recounted an instance in which he confronted Quillin, during the period of the 1951 
airlift, about rumors that Quillin was going around warning farmers the night before that the task 
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Quillin’s own testimony only raised more questions about the nature of his specifc 
relationships with growers. He admitted to being in significant personal debt to Rio 
Hondo grower Ernest Talbert, who had loaned Quillin $5, 500 to purchase his house.293 
Thus, Quillin was under obligation to a man whose farm lay within his jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, Ernest Talbert was a member of an extensive family who owned several 
farms within Quillin’s territory, inevitably raising questions about Quillin’s professional 
interactions with the entire Talbert clan.  
In questioning Quillin, investigators became suspicious about his general 
approach to immigration enforcement. In response to a line of questioning about whether 
or not he had ever pre-arranged with growers to deliver a certain number of migrants to 
the Border Patrol office, he said, “I have done that hundreds of times.”294 Quillin then 
began to spin an incredible tale about how growers sometimes drove truckloads of 
workers to the International Bridge in Brownsville upon Quillin’s request, due to Border 
Patrol officers’ lack of proper hauling equipment to do the job themselves. The 
questioner seemed skeptical: 
Q: In this connection, you mean that the farmers, during the harvest season would 
voluntarily haul these aliens to Mexico for you? 
A: Yes. In fact I will go so far as to say that I could have caught half of the aliens 
in my territory with my own telephone.295 
 
Quillin’s fantastical boast was belied by the Wells incident for which he was being 
investigated in the first place. If the farmers were so well trained that Quillin had merely 
                                                                                                                                                 
force would be in their area the following day. According to Snow, Quillin “was rather flustered 
and embarrassed,” giving some stories that Snow thought were “thin.”   
293 Exhibit X, Sworn Statement of Albert Quillin, Senior Patrol Inspector in charge, San Benito, 
TX, Aug. 2, 1954, File 56364/41.16, Pt.1, Box 84, RG 85, NARA. 
294 Ibid., 35. 
295 Ibid., 36. 
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to call them on the telephone for them to deliver their illegal workforce, why had Mr. 
Wells allowed his workers to evade arrest and flee across the river into Mexico? 
If indeed growers hauled workers to the border themselves, then the more likely 
scenario was that they did not do so during the height of the harvest season, but once it 
was already over. Quillin’s unit could register the apprehension numbers they desired and 
growers could rid themselves of a surplus workforce after getting their crops picked. That 
scenario corresponded more closely to Brownsville officers’ reports of growers’ stunned 
dismay if they were raided by forces other than Quillin’s men, as well as their complaints 
that Quillin had promised them they could get their tomatoes harvested.296 In addition, 
the existence of these types of arrangements between Senior Patrol Inspector Albert 
Quillin and area growers explains why Quillin was so flustered during special deportation 
drives, such as the airlifts of 1951 or Operation Wetback in 1954. During these 
campaigns, which were initiated during the summer cotton-harvesting season, Quillin had 
no control over the timing of the deportations. As the investigation revealed, during these 
campaigns Quillin made clumsy attempts to undermine the INS’s enforcement efforts, 
ultimately unmasking his operations in the San Benito territory. These campaigns were 
temporary, however, most of the time, local Border Patrol forces controlled the rhythm of 
enforcement. If South Texas Border Patrol units delivered the apprehension numbers, 
was the INS predisposed to look behind the numbers? 
In the end, Investigator Decker and Inspector Gordy concluded that the evidence 
against Albert Quillin, while extensive, was not specific enough to convict him of 
collusion or other misconduct beyond the failure to lead the Border Patrol unit onto the 
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Wells farm. However, because of the comprehensive nature of the suspicions against 
him, investigators felt Quillin should be “removed from the supervisory position in his 
present area.”297 His ultimate fate is unclear in the records. It appears that he was not 
immediately fired. A memorandum listing the INS officers who separated from duty 
during 1954 did not contain Quillin’s name.298 
The INS investigation of Albert Quillin for misconduct during 1954 complicates 
the notion of a Border Patrol force becoming independent from local bases of authority 
during the first half of the 1950s. If Albert Quillin represented a new generation of 
Border Patrolmen when he first joined the Service in 1940, by 1954, he was part of the 
old guard, with deep and extensive ties to local power brokers. The agricultural system, 
whose foundation was built by undocumented labor, was so deep and wide that INS 
officers could easily become implicated in it by seemingly simple acts of living life. In 
Quillin’s case, in buying a house and becoming indebted to an area grower, he ratcheted 
up the social ties connecting Border Patrolmen to the local growing establishment. 
Finally, the investigation of Albert Quillin helps shed light on the burgeoning 
apprehension numbers in South Texas during the latter part of the 1940s and first half of 
the 1950s. As the extensive testimony from the investigation revealed, Quillin’s 
apprehension numbers were not all they seemed to be. Large numbers of apprehensions 
and deportations, as experienced in South Texas, did not necessarily disrupt the 
agricultural economy.  
 
                                                 
297 Report of Alleged Misconduct of Senior Patrol Inspector Quillin, Aug. 16, 1954, File 
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298 Undated memorandum, Separation from the Border Patrol, File 56364/41.16, Pt.1, Box 84, 
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CONCLUSION 
During the first half of the twentieth century, restrictive U.S. immigration laws 
continuously narrowed the boundaries of acceptability for legal immigration into the 
country. Even as migrants found it increasingly difficult to obtain immigration visas, U.S. 
economic demands for the kind of cheap labor usually performed by immigrants did not 
diminish. Under pressure from business interests in the Southwest, legislators extended 
exemptions to allow for the temporary migration of Mexican workers into the U.S. These 
exemptions and loopholes created a precedent of labor mobility and flexibility at the 
U.S.-Mexico border, while still maintaining the logic and scaffolding of restriction. As a 
result, Mexicans were defined in a state of permanent temporariness, and less than full 
members of U.S. society. As I will demonstrate later in this dissertation, the U.S. state 
was not alone in contributing to this formulation of Mexican migration. The Mexican 
government also played a significant role in maintaining the temporariness of Mexican 
migration through its reluctance to let go of its citizens and its support of U.S. deportation 
efforts up through the mid 1950s. 
As the agency charged with the enforcement of immigration laws, the INS also 
had to face the paradox of the U.S.’s desire for Mexican labor but unwillingness to have 
many Mexican American citizens. The INS used the technique of voluntary departure at 
the U.S.-Mexico border because it was more convenient and less expensive than formal 
deportation.  The INS had used voluntary departure since the 1920s, but it became the 
primary tool for deporting Mexicans during the 1940s. Between 1945 and 1950, over 1.4 
million Mexicans were deported through voluntary departure. What was once a 
convenient tool for effecting the expulsion of unauthorized migrants helped create a 
convenient border that facilitated movement through the mechanism of restriction. 
Scholars have begun to take a closer look at the defining role of deportation in U.S. 
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immigration history. That is, immigration has not been all about entrance and eventual 
integration. It has also been as much about restriction and expulsion. Nowhere has this 
been more evident than at the U.S.-Mexico border. Rather than thinking about 
deportation only as a failure of the system of enforcement, the Border Patrol’s heavy use 
of voluntary departure on its southern border has shown that expulsion through voluntary 
departure was also a mechanism for the management of the mobility of Mexican laborers. 
Though concerned with fundamental issues of national sovereignty and authority, 
immigration laws and Border Patrol enforcement practices were not pure expressions of 
national power. On the contrary, they were influenced, shaped, and contested in daily 
interactions between local growers and Border Patrol officers living and working in the 
border region. As this chapter has demonstrated, Border Patrol enforcement practices 
were shaped as much by the contours of the border agricultural system, as it shaped the 
border agricultural system through its enforcement of laws. 
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Chapter Four: Exploitative Villain or Community Leader? Agricultural 
Labor Contractors, the State, and Control over Worker Mobility 
 
 
On September 12, 1946, a group of fifty men, women, and children had gathered 
in the yard adjacent to Armando Salinas’s house in Elsa, Texas, in Hidalgo County.299 
Their belongings already packed, the migrant workers, all residents of Elsa and other 
nearby towns, climbed into the trucks to begin the long journey north from deep South 
Texas to work in cotton fields outside the state. Before they could leave the yard, 
however, the small convoy was stopped by the arrival of Thad Hoot, Deputy Labor 
Commissioner, who detained the entire group, threatening them with arrest if they did not 
stay put. According to the subsequent suit brought by Armando Salinas against Mrs. 
Maureen Moore, Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Thad Hoot, her 
deputy, Thad Hoot had used “threats and intimidation,” against Mr. Salinas and his 
assembled relatives and friends, “browbeating and frightening this plaintiff and his 
relatives and friends, and [having] his said friends and relatives bunched up like little pigs 
in a sty; without shelter or food.”300 
Thad Hoot detained the migrant workers, accusing Armando Salinas of operating 
as a labor agent in Texas without first purchasing the requisite licenses, posting the 
bonds, and paying the occupation taxes. For his part, Salinas denied being a labor agent, 
describing himself as a crew leader, the head of a self-organized kinship group working 
                                                 
299 In the spirit of full disclosure, Armando Salinas is my grandfather. Previously unaware of this 
history, I first came across a reference to this lawsuit in the newspaper.  “High Tribunal Affirms 
Local Labor Case Rule,” Valley Evening Monitor, March 21, 1947. 
300 Armando Salinas v. Mrs. Maureen Moore, et al (Tex. 92d Dist. Ct. 1946). 
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together to find the places with the best wages and working conditions to maximize their 
earnings.  
More than just a technical disagreement about licenses procured and taxes paid, 
the disagreement between Salinas and Hoot centered on the control over the mobility of 
Mexican American migrant farm workers. State of Texas labor officials used the 
regulatory apparatus meant to manage employment agencies that moved thousands of 
workers into the agricultural and railroad industries, against smaller endeavors of twenty 
to fifty workers organized into field working crews. Labor agents primarily made their 
money in connecting laborers to employers, charging workers, employers, or both, a fee 
for providing the procurement service. Labor agents often provided transportation to the 
place of employment, charging workers for that as well. By contrast, agricultural crew 
leaders traveled with workers to their destinations, often sharing their accommodations, 
and serving as intermediaries between employers and workers, and supervising some 
aspects of the agricultural work. Though they did not fulfill the same role in the 
agricultural economy, labor agents and crew leaders resembled each other in that they 
both facilitated the movement of low waged workers.   
Despite the differences between different types of facilitators of labor mobility, 
from labor agents, crew leaders, or coyotes, both the U.S. and Mexican governments 
depicted them as exploiters of poor workers.301  In sharing such a view of such people, 
U.S. growers and Mexican government officials were able to forge common ground 
during difficult bracero program negotiations in South Texas during 1947. The agreement 
between American growers and Mexican government officials about the villainy of the 
labor contractor created a convenient scapegoat that could be held responsible for the ills 
                                                 
301 The term coyote was used to describe a person who smuggled migrants across the border for a 
fee. 
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of the agricultural labor system, and allowed both parties to face each other during the 
negotiations of the many iterations of the bracero program. As a 1947 labor conference 
held in South Texas between growers, Mexican officials, and U.S. INS officials 
demonstrated, once the parties deflected the blame for workers’ desperate conditions onto 
the intermediary labor contractors, then they could make gestures about “turning the 
page” on the past, and cooperating in the future.  
Focusing on the labor contractor, in both the seasonal domestic migration of 
Mexican American farm workers, and in the illegal international migration of Mexican 
agricultural workers, Texas and the Mexican government officials attempted to establish 
greater state control over workers’ mobility. Viewing self-organized migration groups as 
chaotic, inefficient, and or exploitative, officials sought to bring Mexican migration 
further under the wing of both the Mexican national state and Texas state control.302  
 
 
CONTROLLING MEXICAN MIGRATION: TEXAS EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR AGENCY 
LAW 
Salinas and his partner Tomás Castillo owned three trucks, which they used to 
transport the workers to their location, a location chosen after consultation with the entire 
group and decided upon as a group. According to Salinas, he did not charge the workers, 
to whom he referred as his “relatives and friends,” for their transportation, nor deduct 
anything from the wages they earned picking cotton. He was paid, directly from the 
grower, fifty cents per hundred pounds of cotton picked by the crew for his job weighing 
cotton, hauling cotton to the gin, and hauling water from town to the workers. In his 
                                                 
302 For more about Texas state labor agencies’ attempts to organize agricultural labor markets, see 
José Guillermo Pastrano, “The Bureaucratic Origins of Migrant Poverty: The Texas Cotton 
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petition to the 92nd District Court in Hidalgo County, he pointedly and repeatedly stated 
that he received not a “penny in compensation” from the workers themselves.303 The 
group, described by Salinas as working together as “friends and co-laborers” for “their 
common good,” entrusted him to lead and negotiate for them with prospective employers, 
relying on his “judgment and loyalty to see that they are treated fairly.”304  
The threats and intimidation state labor officials used against Mexican American 
migrant farm workers to inhibit and control their movement stood in great contrast to the 
manner in which agencies such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Texas State 
Extension Service presented themselves to the public. Emphasizing the building facilities 
they helped maintain for migrants’ rest and refreshment, officials touted their service to 
migrants, by helping efficiently direct migrants to available work, thus decreasing time 
lost on the migrant road. The actions of state employees such as Thad Hoot, supported by 
legislation such as the Texas Employment Labor and Agency Law of 1943, revealed state 
officials’ true intent in keeping Mexican American labor within the state’s borders as 
much as possible during harvesting season. Ironically, to be able to pass laws effectively 
restricting the mobility of American citizens within the borders of their own country, 
seemingly violating the migrants’ fundamental civil rights of free movement, the state of 
Texas targeted the labor intermediary long designated as the enemy of free labor in 
American history: the labor contractor.  
Charging Hoot with trespassing on his property and attempting to force him to 
buy licenses and post the bonds, fees he deemed “unlawful” and “prohibitive,” Armando 
Salinas hired Edinburg attorney and long-time Hidalgo County politico, Joe V. Alamía to 
represent him in a suit against Maureen Moore and Thad Hoot. In the suit, Salinas’s legal 




counsel asked Judge Bryce Ferguson for an injunction against the two and their “servants, 
lackies [sic], employees, deputies and Inspectors” ordering them from “interfering with 
this plaintiff in the free use and operation of his said trucks or causing this plaintiff or his 
truck drivers, relatives and friends to be arrested or otherwise interfered with on any of 
the highways of the State of Texas or elsewhere.” Judge Ferguson rejected the suit, ruling 
that the question should be settled in criminal court, if or when Maureen Moore filed 
criminal charges against Salinas for being an unlicensed labor agent.  
Though he ruled the lawsuit outside his jurisdiction, Judge Ferguson did find that 
Salinas was indeed operating as a labor agent, while agreeing with Salinas that the fees 
levied by the state of Texas were excessive. “We could not operate in the Valley without 
the crew leaders, and the costs of his licenses and bonds is prohibitive,” Ferguson 
averred.305 Ferguson observed that the Employment Labor Agency Law was in place to 
“discourage Texas labor from crossing state lines,” noting that “little attention is paid by 
state officials to the crew leaders who move from county to county.”306  Tellingly, the 
crew led by Salinas had been working in the South Texas cotton fields during the entire 
summer, and it was not until they were preparing to leave the state to follow the cotton 
crop that the labor officials began their program of harassment. Demonstrating their 
awareness of the motivations behind such legislation, Salinas took pains to convince the 
court that neither he nor the workers were depriving South Texas of their agricultural 
labor force, arguing that in addition to having worked the during the South Texas cotton 
season, they intended to return to Hidalgo County in time for the beginning of the 
vegetable harvest.307 The Fourth District Court of Civil Appeals upheld Judge 
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Ferguson’s original ruling, however, and Armando Salinas was ordered to pay the 
defendants two hundred dollars plus court costs.  
Vilified by American growers and Mexican governmental officials alike for being 
the corrupt, exploitative element in the agricultural labor system, the figure of the labor 
contractor/crew leader represented one of the few options ethnic Mexican agricultural 
laborers had for achieving financial stability in the United States.  Crew leaders were 
often agricultural laborers who had accumulated enough capital after years of labor to 
buy a truck, used to transport people and goods to and from the agricultural fields. In 
many cases, relatives, neighbors, and other kin made up the crews the leaders organized. 
Doubtless some crew leaders engaged in the kind of corrupt practices that growers 
alleged took place: skimming off the workers’ already low wages and charging exorbitant 
prices for food and transportation, but often the crew leaders rightly earned the trust of 
Mexican families and communities of which they were a part.  
Armando Salinas contended that he was not a labor agent because he did not 
charge workers a fee for finding the group employment, housing, or transportation, but 
state officials cited the Texas Employment and Labor Agency Law to the contrary. The 
law classified any person as a labor agent who, with our without a fee, attempted to 
procure employment for “common laborers or agricultural workers.”308 Under the guise 
of protective regulation for agricultural workers, the legislation represented a thinly 
veiled attempt to discourage the movement of migrant farm workers, especially out of the 
state.  Focusing on manual laborers, and specifically on agricultural workers, the 
legislation broadly encompassed anyone who might procure work for another. The law 
did not recognize the distinction that Salinas wanted to draw between himself as a crew 
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leader and co-laborer along with the other workers, and that of a labor agent whose 
remuneration was drawn from the workers themselves.  
According to the 1943 legislation, labor agents had to apply for licenses to operate 
within the state, post a hefty bond, as well as pay an additional annual tax if the agent 
transported workers across state lines. The agent was required to purchase a license, 
costing one hundred and fifty dollars, for each county in which the agent intended to 
operate.309 For a crew leader at the head of one group of fifty workers who traveled the 
state following the cotton harvest, these licenses were prohibitive and impracticable. 
Furthermore, in order to obtain an operating license the agent had to include with his or 
her application, the “affidavits of at least five creditable citizens” from the counties in 
which the agent intended to operate, to testify to the agent’s “good moral character.”310 
Moreover, labor agents had to post a five thousand dollar bond, in order to guard against 
any “false statement or representation” made to prospective workers. The bond 
guaranteed a fund from which the state could draw if workers were in any way “injured 
or aggrieved” by any “false or fraudulent” statements made by labor agents.311 The 
state’s seeming concern for workers’ possible victimization by defrauding and corrupt 
labor agents stood in stark contrast to the complete lack of legislation regulating 
agricultural workers’ wages, housing, and working conditions in Texas.312 In addition to 
licenses and bonds, Texas labor agents who wished to take workers across state lines had 
to pay an annual state tax of six hundred dollars as well as a county tax ranging from one 
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hundred to two hundred dollars, depending on the county’s population.313 The numerous 
taxes, bonds, and fees assessed against labor agents, on the one hand, and the paucity of 
legislation regulating other aspects of agricultural labor in Texas, on the other suggests 
that the state was less concerned with workers’ wellbeing and more concerned with 
workers’ mobility. Judge Ferguson’s statement asserting that the labor agency law was 
mainly used to discourage migrants from leaving the state, and mostly left crew leaders 
alone as long as they stayed in Texas, supports this view. 
In passing the 1943 legislation which employed indirect methods to impede the 
mobility of ethnic Mexican agricultural laborers, the State of Texas updated earlier laws 
that sought to achieve the same ends. As historian David Montejano has demonstrated in 
Anglos and Mexicans, the Texas agricultural industry and the state legislature 
implemented a series of informal and formal measures to create a temporarily captive 
seasonal agricultural labor force in order to keep wages extraordinarily low, a 
phenomenon he termed the “web of labor controls.”314 The Texas Employment and 
Labor Agency Law of 1943 bore a close resemblance to the Emigrant Labor Agency 
Laws passed by the Texas legislature in 1929, the latter which included occupation taxes, 
licenses, and bonds, all features of the 1943 law as well. The original law was also 
designed to discourage the movement of migrants across state lines, especially to 
Midwestern sugar beet fields.315 The main difference between the 1929 legislation and 
its later iteration was that the earlier law proposed a five thousand dollar bond to 
guarantee the transportation for migrants’ return to Texas. A federal court ruled the 
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assessment of this bond unconstitutional. 316 In the later legislation, the five thousand 
dollar bond was required to protect the job seeker from fraudulent or misrepresenting 
statements, instead of needing the bond to guarantee the migrants’ transportation back 
home. This revision between the two laws further suggests that the state of Texas made 
demands on labor agents for the sake of expediency, rather than any moral rationale. 
In targeting labor contractors and imbuing the legislation with moral overtones, 
state legislators exploited a deep-seated hostility in U.S. society against labor middlemen, 
exemplified by the immigrant padrone of the nineteenth century. As historian Gunther 
Peck has shown, during the last decades of the nineteenth century an expanding federal 
immigration bureaucracy, middle class reformers, and labor unions joined together in a 
campaign against padrones, identifying such immigrant labor contractors as being the 
enemies of free labor.317 Padrones were often stigmatized in the popular press as 
purveyors of Old World vices of servility and degradation, thus undermining the values 
of freedom and independence attributed to the American worker. The confluence of the 
efforts from government agencies and civil society to undermine the influence of the 
immigrant padrone helped usher in the passage of the Foran Act in 1885, which 
prohibited the “importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or 
agreement to perform labor in the United States.”318 By the middle of the twentieth 
century, then, the figure of the exploitative and despoiling labor contractor had already 
been an enduring image in American society for over fifty years. It represented no big 
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leap for the State of Texas to pass legislation regulating the operations of agricultural 
labor agents. Furthermore, in requiring affidavits to testify to the labor agents “good 
moral character” in the 1943 legislation, state officials were calling into question the 
agents’ moral integrity, thus playing into existing concerns about labor agents’ typical 
modes of operation. Thus it was quite ironic that the State of Texas played on long-held 
fears of labor middlemen as the enemies of free labor in order to pass legislation designed 
to manipulate and control the free movement of Mexican American migrants. 
In his lawsuit against labor officials from the state of Texas, Armando Salinas 
protested against what he called the illegal “trespass” of Hoot onto his private property 
when Hoot entered Mr. Salinas’s yard to detain Salinas and the rest of the group when 
they were on the verge of initiating their journey up north.319 The petition suggested that 
Mr. Hoot had entered the Salinas property on numerous occasions, and was one reason 
Salinas sought the restraining order against him.  In some ways, Salinas’s complaint 
echoed the complaints of farmers challenging the right of Border Patrol officers 
(addressed in Chapter 3). In contrast to the ambiguity surrounding the power of the 
Border Patrol to enter farmers’ property, and the political pressure farmers could bring 
upon Border Patrolmen from above, no ambiguity existed regarding Hoot’s authority to 
enter Salinas’s property and conduct interrogations. According to the Texas Employment 
and Labor Agency Law of 1943, deputies and inspectors from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics had the “authority of peace officers in making arrests of any person or persons 
who violate, in their presence, any of the provisions of this Act.”320 Furthermore, as a 
deputy of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hoot also had the power to “enter any 
employment office at any time when such employment office is open for business and 
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inspect the registers and all other records,” belonging to that office.321 Though the 
wording of this section of the law suggested that lawmakers had public, bricks-and-
mortar establishments in mind when crafting the employment agency legislation, it 
nonetheless gave Hoot the power to enter Armando Salinas’s homestead. While there, 
Hoot allegedly asserted his authority in an aggressive and threatening manner, thus going 
beyond the letter of the law, to inspect labor agencies, more closely approaching the 
spirit or motivation of the law, which was to discourage the movement of workers out of 
the state of Texas into other labor markets. Hoot sought to accomplish this aim by 
threatening and intimidating the migrants. 
Armando Salinas’s account of abusive labor officials provided a stark contrast to 
the image that state labor agencies wanted to project to the public. In a special feature 
insert included in the April 20, 1947 Sunday edition of the South Texas publication, the 
Valley Morning Star, the Texas A&M College Extension Service promoted its expanding 
services to traveling farm workers, all geared toward managing the agricultural labor 
flow. The story described the Extension Service’s various services, including distributing 
information at the quarantine stations at Falfurrias and Riviera highways bound north out 
of the Rio Grande Valley.322  The Extension Service also employed female agents to 
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visit the homes of migrant farm workers in order to give the women “an understanding of 
the program and to obtain their assistance in getting the cooperation of the male 
workers.”323 In addition, the Extension Service also managed community funded 
reception centers “where workers can rest, bathe, and cook a hot meal.”324  
Employing some of the worker-centered language developed by the Farm 
Security Administration during the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Extension Service’s 
extremely pared down service program, however did not conceal the real reason behind 
its operations.325 Because of the program, officials asserted, “unlike the hit-or-miss 
migrations of other days, the laborers this year, as they have for the past three years, will 
be following an orderly pattern, will know where there is a need for their labor, and will 
be certain of a welcome on their arrival.”326 Though promoted as an ideal resource for 
traveling migrant families, workers’ reluctance to use the services demonstrated, perhaps, 
past experiences with state labor officials and/or suspicions about the agency’s motives. 
According to the article, “at first workers were suspicious of this newly developed 
interest in their welfare, but as they tested the word of the fieldmen and the county 
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agents, they learned to trust them and to depend more and more on their advice as to 
where to go.”327  
The article attested to a new feeling of cooperation between growers, workers, 
and the government, with government officials playing an important role in facilitating 
this improved relationship. As Armando Salinas’s lawsuit demonstrated, however, the 
friendly instructions about where migrants could travel for work sometimes turned into 
threatening and coercive attempts to limit workers’ mobility within the borders of the 
United States. As Carey McWilliams has described, many migrants believed that state 
and law enforcement officials sought to prevent their movements. As they left their home 
regions, many migrants tried to avoid the intervention of labor officials and law 
enforcement officers, traveling at night and skirting the major highways. “In their minds, 
they are fugitives fleeing through the night, attempting to avoid innumerable perils and 
hazards.”328 What labor officials considered a necessary intervention in order to 
rationalize the agricultural labor market and for the migrants’ own good, some migrants 
saw the state’s attempt to interfere with their rights to travel in search of better wages.  
 
MIGRANT CREWS: EXPLOITATION OR SELF-ORGANIZATION?  
Though the state of Texas made no distinction between labor contractors and crew 
leaders for the purposes of its legislation in the Texas Employment and Labor Agency 
Law, Carey McWilliams captured the significant differences in Ill Fares the Land. 
McWilliams’s descriptions echo those of Salinas. According to McWilliams:  
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The Mexican contractor is not a contractor in the strict sense of the term… The 
contractor is really a capitán or jefe who happens to own a truck. In addition to 
transporting workers, he is hired to weigh the cotton, take charge of the 
commissary, and oversee the work…He may also be paid for the use of his truck 
in hauling cotton to the gin.329 
 
His description of the jefe, or crew leader, matched Salinas’s almost exactly, even 
going as far as noting that many of the crews were made up of family units who, because 
they often did not speak English, turned to the leadership of the crew leader, who with his 
knowledge of English mediated between the crew and the English speaking grower. 330 
McWilliams deplored this system overall, arguing that such worker groups tended to 
defer to the crew leader and shunned union organizing.331  
During the mid-1940s most mainstream labor unions paid little attention to 
agricultural workers, especially in Texas. Thus, the fact remained, that workers and 
family members organized themselves into these groups, as a method of finding work and 
negotiating conditions. According to Carey McWilliams’s estimation, sixty percent of the 
cotton harvested in Texas was performed by workers organized and headed by a crew 
leader.332 Labor crews’ mobility to other regions of the country with better wages and 
working conditions than those in Texas also represented one of the few viable options for 
improving their conditions, and for those with no personal form of transportation, 
becoming part of a work crew was a necessity. 
The crew leader described as described by Carey McWilliams and Armando 
Salinas differed significantly from that of the classic labor contractor. That labor 
contractor tended to receive a fee from the employer per worker. The labor contractor 
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might also charge workers a fee for finding employment and/or charge them for their 
transportation and housing.333 Thus, the labor contractor made money several times for 
the same labor transaction. Furthermore, because he made his money up front, the labor 
contractor had no incentive to make sure he sent workers to areas where the work was 
abundant and sustained.334 On the other hand, crew leaders made their money alongside 
the workers, by weighing the cotton, bookkeeping, hauling water to workers and cotton to 
the gin. If the field workers did not work, neither did the crew leader, and thus, neither 
were paid. In that way, it behooved the crew leaders to find the locations with the most 
sustained work. And while unscrupulous crew leaders might cheat workers, by 
overcharging them for groceries or skimming off the top of their wages, the crew leader 
system was not inherently more exploitative than any other agricultural labor system, and 
had the possibility for being a good deal less. 
For many Mexican male agricultural workers, accumulating enough capital to 
purchase a truck and becoming a crew leader represented one of the few avenues for 
economic stability for themselves and their families. Growing up in Granjeno, Texas, a 
small town located on the north bank of the Rio Grande in Hidalgo County, Alberto 
Magallan began to work in the field as a young schoolboy during the 1940s and 1950s, 
working weekends, Christmas vacations, and during the summer.335 He and his siblings 
worked for a crew leader, Carlos Garza, who also lived in the same small town. While 
Alberto Magallan’s father worked in nearby construction jobs, he entrusted his children 
to Carlos Garza’s crew. During the summer Alberto and his siblings traveled with Garza 
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up from the border to the coastal cotton region near Corpus Christi. After that, the 
younger siblings traveled back to the Rio Grande Valley to begin the school year, while 
the older Magallanes continued with Carlos Garza’s crew into the cotton region near the 
Texas Panhandle. Carlos Garza’s crew was made up of his relatives and other members 
of his small community in Granjeno.  
Alberto Magallan’s father purchased his own truck to transport workers and also 
became a crew leader, after a number of years of working in manual labor in South 
Texas. His labor, in addition to his children’s agricultural labor with Carlos Garza’s crew, 
and his wife’s unpaid labor in their home allowed him to accumulate enough money to 
purchase a bob-tail truck. “At a later date my dad bought a truck and he would haul 
people…We became a crew, cuz there was a bunch of us and he said, might as well buy 
my own truck. I could use my whole family. But we took other people with us, related to 
us, cousins, uncles,” Alberto Magallan recalled.336 In buying a truck and forming a labor 
crew from amongst his own children and other relatives, Alberto Magallan’s father 
followed the path of many other residents of Mexican communities in South Texas. In 
doing so, he built on his own experience, the knowledge and experience of people like 
Carlos Garza, and the experience of his children who worked in Carlos Garza’s crews. 
Though often depicted as chaotic wanderers crowded into rickety trucks traveling 
the highways, Mexican farm workers established their migratory circuits according to 
many years of experience. Even as they consistently remarked upon the “aimless 
wandering” of migrant workers, labor officials from the Texas State Employment Service 
and other state labor departments carefully studied workers’ migratory patterns as they 
constructed their plans for the rationalization of the agricultural labor system in 
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Texas.337 Mexican migrant workers began picking cotton in the Rio Grande Valley from 
mid-June through the end of July. Workers then headed to the Coastal Bend region of 
Texas around Nueces County once the cotton season got underway there. As autumn 
approached, the Central Texas region’s cotton season kicked into high gear, its season 
overlapping somewhat with the Coastal Bend and perhaps creating some competition for 
labor. Many workers then moved on further north after that, picking cotton in the region 
near the Texas Panhandle, around Lamesa and Lubbock. Migrant workers then returned 
to South Texas in time for the winter fruit and vegetable crops, thus completing their 
migratory circuit.338  
Using the established migrant circuit as a model, labor officials from the Texas 
State Employment Service fashioned a systematic state intervention into agriculture, 
attempting to regulate the state’s agricultural migration flow. Soon after it had been 
established in 1935, the Texas State Employment Service (TSES) undertook a 
comprehensive survey of worker migrations, agricultural regions, and growers’ labor 
needs in order to design “employment techniques,” for future agricultural seasons. 
According to the TSES, its goal was to “furnish a working knowledge of the available 
labor supply at any given time and of farmer-employer needs in the successive 
seasons.”339 Describing the Texas labor market as being completely disorganized before 
the existence of the TSES, the report’s authors commented that “there was no 
disinterested agency in those years to organize a labor market that would provide labor 
supply when and where needed within the State and to set up an economy of employment 
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that would abolish wasted movement and loss to both employer and worker.”340 With its 
aim in creating an organized and efficient agricultural labor market, the TSES focused in 
on undirected movement as being the primary factor for the market’s dysfunction.  
Wanting to facilitate the distribution of agricultural labor around the state of 
Texas, TSES labor officials identified “unscrupulous” labor contractors as both their 
main source of competition and the major perpetrators of migrant workers’ miserable 
conditions. The report detailed the state’s long-standing efforts to discourage the 
operation of labor agencies through the passage of various pieces of regulatory 
legislation. In order to emphasize the need for their agency, officials detailed many 
examples of workers stranded in desperate destitution, far away from their homes with no 
work. The report attributed these heartbreaking scenes to either workers’ naïveté, labor 
contractors’ greed, or both, downplaying the role growers played in creating labor 
oversupply as they over exaggerated their labor needs: 
It was a crazy pattern in which worried farmers wanted an ample supply of labor 
on hand at peak seasons in any way available, credulous migrants dreamed of 
better picking a little farther on, and opportunist labor agents wanted as much 
money as they could fleece from uneasy farmers and hopeful migrants—white, 
brown, and black.341 
 
Through their efforts scouring the agricultural regions of Texas, talking to 
growers, labor contractors and workers, the TSES reported a growing role in placing 
agricultural workers where they were needed without disrupting the domestic labor 
market. According to the 1940 report, officials were pleased they had obtained the 
confidence of workers and labor contractors in a short period of time, commending 
themselves for having done away with the “labor racketeer.” Making a distinction 
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between labor agents and crew leaders that would be lost a few years later, labor officials 
reported dealing mostly with a type of contractor that was “usually a truck owner acting 
as “capitán” or “jefe” in handling contracts for a group which he represented. For the 
most part,” the report stated, “these truckmen-contractors were found to be reliable and 
fair in their transactions.”342 It seemed that once crew leader-contractors established 
contact with officials from the TSES, and were willing to be directed by them to 
agricultural fields, then the labor contractors were considered acceptable and trustworthy 
and not greedy and opportunistic. 
Wanting to rationalize the Texas agricultural labor market, and having studied 
migratory workers’ seasonal migratory circuits, the Texas State Employment Service felt 
confident by its 1940 report that is could fill growers’ needs and create a sense of order 
and predictability in a highly unpredictable industry. The migration of Texas-based 
workers out of the state in search of higher wages represented the only visible threat to 
the agency’s plans for the efficient administration of the agricultural labor market. The 
TSES concluded its report with the following observation: 
The interstate problems centering upon migratory labor are so serious as to 
demand either new legislation or strict enforcement of the legislation already on 
the statute books. The disrupting of the labor market in Texas at peak seasons 
reveals itself with special force in 1940 as a very real peril to workers, farmers, 
and State prosperity.343  
   
Perhaps it was this attitude that led to the labor official’s aggressive pursuit of 
Armando Salinas because he had refused to accede to labor officials’ plans and 
expectations in staying within the bounds of the state of Texas. Thus, officials ceased to 
view Salinas as an honest and reliable type of truckman-contractor who cooperated with 
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state officials, and began to see him instead as an unsavory labor agent who needed to be 
regulated. 
In trying to control and inhibit migrants’ movements in the name of efficiency 
and rationalization, the Texas State Employment Service failed to make a few key 
calculations, however. First, in designing their Farm Placement techniques in the middle 
of the Great Depression when immigration was down—there was, in fact, a great deal 
more emigration to Mexico during this decade through voluntary and coercive means—
they failed to account for a time when immigration might pick up again, therefore 
creating the same labor surpluses they were trying to avoid. Secondly, the TSES did not 
seem to account for the possibility that growers might not prefer the orderly scenario the 
Service proffered. The TSES publicized the work of the Farm Security Administration’s 
construction of migrant labor camps as a stabilizing factor for migrant farm workers. 
Perhaps such stability might have sent troubling signals to Texas growers.344 As long as 
growers could be sure to get their crops harvested when they wanted, they preferred a 
superabundance of workers living in inadequate housing because unstable conditions 
allowed them to pay workers lower wages.  
 
SOUTH TEXAS INTERACTION WITH THE BRACERO PROGRAM  
Even as the various labor bureaus in Texas sought ways to direct a domestic 
agricultural migration flow, other states mainly in the U.S. Southwest had been 
participating in an international labor importation program since 1942, bringing in 
workers from Mexico on a temporary, seasonal basis to labor in the agricultural and 
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railroad industries. The labor importation program, commonly known as the bracero 
program, began as a temporary wartime measure as a response to farmers clamoring for 
the protection of their labor force in the face of losses due to the draft and surging 
defense industries.345 The bracero program assured growers a guaranteed workforce at 
wages determined by industry-friendly U.S. government agents. The Mexican 
government viewed the program as a way to institute a modicum of protection for its 
citizen-workers who crossed the international border, often illegally, to labor in U.S. 
agriculture. According to the dictates of the bracero agreement, the employer had to pay 
for braceros’ transportation to and from recruitment centers in Mexico and their place of 
employment.346 Workers were guaranteed minimum wages as high as the prevailing 
wages in a given area. In addition, growers had to provide adequate housing, board, and 
medical services at no extra charge to workers. Lastly, the Mexican government reserved 
the right to unilaterally terminate the program by region if U.S. growers or government 
officials failed to satisfy the program’s requirements. 
After five years of shutting the state of Texas out of the bracero program, 
Mexican government officials decided to allow Texas growers to obtain legally 
contracted Mexican agricultural laborers during the spring of 1947. The Mexican 
government had officially barred Texas from participation because of the state’s long 
history of violence and discrimination against Mexicans, discrimination that continued 
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during the mid-twentieth century. Trying to appease the Mexican government and to 
appear that his administration was tackling the problem of racism in the state, Texas 
governor Coke Stevenson established the Good Neighbor Commission in 1943 to 
investigate issues of discrimination in the state and promote good relations through 
special programs and cultural exchanges between Texas and Mexico.347  From the 
outset, Mexican officials had reservations about the efficacy of the Good Neighbor 
Commission, realizing that while the committee was charged with investigating instances 
of discrimination, it had no enforcement capacity to address any reported abuses. After 
five years of denying Texas growers access to braceros, Mexican officials reluctantly 
realized that their strategy had not appreciably transformed the racial climate in Texas; 
their efforts to leverage Mexican agricultural labor during a time of relative scarcity due 
to World War II had been unsuccessful. Ever rising rates of illegal migration from 
Mexico meant that Texas growers had abundant access to Mexican workers in positions 
of legal and social vulnerability, which worsened their overall conditions. The Mexican 
government recognized a need to intervene in Texas agriculture, however, and thus 
grabbed at the token gesture of the Good Neighbor Commission in order bring the 
thousands of Mexican agricultural laborers now working illegally in Texas under the 
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protective confines of the bracero program. Because Mexican officials wanted to preserve 
some negotiating space and also did not want to be perceived by the Mexican public as 
having backed down on the question of racial discrimination in Texas, they insisted that 
Texas’s entrance into the bracero program was temporary and experimental, and should 
not be considered permanent.348 
Though the Mexican government had encountered difficulties in administering 
the bracero program throughout the Southwest and the Pacific Northwest, with many 
growers violating the wage rates and housing provisions of the bracero contract, Mexican 
officials soon found Texas to be an even more hardened case than the rest. Even after the 
Mexican government offered to legalize undocumented workers already in the United 
States, thereby guaranteeing growers the right to keep the workers they already had, 
Texas growers protested many of the features of the bracero contract, from the housing 
stipulations to the bonds required to ensure braceros’ return transportation back to 
Mexico.349 Most important, the wages in Texas for agricultural labor were far below the 
wage rates in other states, creating another obstacle for the Mexican government. 
Mexican officials were bound by the prevailing wages determined by Texas State 
Employment Service agents, but the Mexican government was reluctant to approve 
bracero contracts with wages under thirty-seven cents an hour.350 Soon after they 
extended legalization to South Texas, Mexican government officials faced serious 
problems in South Texas, the result of years of collusion between growers and INS 
officials. 
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 As the day approached to begin the process of legalizing Mexican agricultural 
workers in the Rio Grande Valley, news stories abounded with details and clarifications 
about the new program, with observers and officials alike speculating about the 
prospective changes the program would bring to the Rio Grande Valley. José Reyes 
Nava, the head official in charge of processing workers in the Reynosa office, was cited 
in the Valley Morning Star, one of the Rio Grande Valley’s two prominent newspapers, 
proclaiming his satisfaction that the legalization program would “crack down on labor 
“contractors” who have grown wealthy through the exploitation” of undocumented 
workers.351 According to the story Reyes Nava was aware of several cases of “labor 
contractors taking advantage of Mexican workers, and he intended to see the practice 
stopped immediately,” judging that labor contractors deserved to be in jail. Reyes Nava 
placed much of the blame for workers’ exploitation on the heads of labor contractors, and 
none, at least publicly, on the farmers. One advantage to that approach was that the 
Mexican official established cordial relations with prospective grower-clients. 
The local Valley news media reacted similarly about the possible benefits of 
replacing the system of undocumented labor with braceros. Heralding the end of the era 
of “fugitive wetbacks,” the Valley Evening Monitor declared the new agreement as “one 
of the most far-reaching humanitarian moves in the area for years.”352 The article 
touched very briefly on the prospective benefits workers could experience being free 
from the fear of deportation, which hindered their movement and left them vulnerable to 
cheats and hucksters. According to the article, the most egregious exploiters were labor 
contractors, crew leaders, and coyotes. Migrants “were sometimes defrauded of their 
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wages, particularly by crew leaders, who will be ineligible to contract for alien workers 
under the new program.” The article also looked forward to the eradication of the 
“profitable boat transportation business.” Farmers, on the other hand, were portrayed as 
fair and just, often providing workers with the necessities of life, such as blankets, 
clothing, and food. “In many cases,” the “alien workers have been employed by the same 
farmer for several years, with mutual respect and fair dealing.” Although the author of the 
piece did admit the possibility that the wages could be considered too low, he quickly 
resolved the question and surmised that the wages must be acceptable to workers 
“otherwise they wouldn’t have come 500 miles or more and undertaken risks and 
hardships to work here.”353 Again, labor middlemen shouldered most of the blame for 
the exploitation of Mexican agricultural workers. 
Monday, April 21, 1947, dawned with great fanfare. It was the first day of 
contracting, the process by which undocumented workers presently living and working in 
the Rio Grande Valley would be transformed into legal braceros. Administrators of the 
program chose A.L. Cramer to be the first grower to bring one hundred of his employees 
to the labor office for certification.354 As the manager of Engelman Gardens, a large 
citrus and cotton growing operation in Hidalgo County, and the chairman of a grower’s 
committee to study the labor issue in South Texas, it was deemed appropriate that he be 
the first to model the new program to other Valley growers.  
The certification process necessitated visits to several offices on both sides of the 
border where workers had to submit themselves to interviews and examinations. Cramer 
accompanied the workers to the INS office at the north end of the international bridge in 
Hidalgo, Texas. After INS officials interviewed the workers, the workers walked across 
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the international bridge to the offices of the Mexican Intersecretarial Commission, 
located on the second floor of the Mexican Immigration building, situated near the 
southern end of the international bridge.355 At that office, workers received a copy of 
their contract and identification cards. Newspapermen and photographers were on hand 
on both sides of the bridge to record every step of the process. Workers received their 
contract and identification card, and walked back across the river to the U.S. At the 
offices of the U.S. Public Health Service physicians administered physical examinations 
to workers. If they passed the exam, they returned to the INS offices, where they had 
started the process, to receive permission to enter the United States.356 After that series 
of trips back and forth across the international border, being questioned, processed, and 
prodded, workers were granted permission to enter the United States, transformed from 
“wetbacks” to braceros.  Such a spectacle of state approval (through questions and 
physical examinations) was meant to suggest a transformation of the individual workers 
from illegal to legal. The workers, however, were exactly the same; it was the state’s 
treatment of the workers that was now supposed to be transformed. 
The good feelings over such demonstrated international cooperation between 
Mexican and U.S. officials and U.S. growers proved to be short-lived. Growers objected 
to Reyes Nava’s insistence that they provide a deposit ranging from ten dollars per 
worker up front, to be placed in the Bank of Mexico in Reynosa, and to be deducted at a 
rate of 5% per week from workers’ paychecks.357 According to the agreement, farmers 
were instructed to deduct five percent from workers’ weekly wages until the amount 
totaled thirty dollars, which the workers would receive upon their return across the 
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border. The Mexican government designed the measure as an involuntary savings plan, 
meant to ensure that workers would have enough money at the end of the season to return 
to their homes in Mexico.358 Growers thought that a statement from their financial 
institutions testifying to their financial solvency would obviate the need for a deposit.  
A second problem arose over questions regarding the prevailing wages. Though 
the Rio Grande Valley border counties all belonged to one zone according to the Mexican 
Intersecretarial Commission office, different county farm advisory councils in the Valley 
had placed the prevailing wages at different rates, ranging from twenty to thirty-five cents 
per hour.359 Reyes Nava naturally wanted to certify contracts for the higher wage, but 
disagreements arose about which wage would prevail for the entire region. 
Soon after these difficulties slowed the worker legalization process, Mexican 
officials and Valley growers agreed to hold a labor conference to provide further 
information, clarification, and possibly hash out the points of divergence between the two 
parties. A.L. Cramer presided over the meeting, held on April 29-30, 1947 and acted as a 
representative for the growers. Gustavo Ortiz Hernan, Consul General in San Antonio, 
headed the Mexican delegation. José Reyes Nava, head of the Intersecretarial 
Commission office in Reynosa, and Lauro Yzaguirre, Mexican Consul in McAllen, also 
formed the Mexican delegation. The U.S. officials present were William A. Whalen, 
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District Director of the INS in San Antonio, and Allan Skinner, Officer-in-Charge of the 
INS office in Hidalgo, Texas. The rest of the attendees included growers, and 
representatives from packing and shipping cooperatives and other industry 
organizations.360 
Cramer began the meeting by summarizing the growers’ complaints, which 
centered on the required deposits and the differences over the prevailing wages. Mexican 
officials quickly conceded on the question of the deposits once it became known that the 
Mexican Minister of Labor had agreed at a previous meeting with Valley growers that a 
receipt from a growers’ financial institution was an acceptable substitute.361 The 
prevailing wage, however, was a more difficult matter. Growers pointed out that the 
Minister of Labor had agreed to follow the prevailing wages in the area, as was 
customary in the bracero program.  
Though Mexican officials agreed that they had promised to abide by the 
prevailing wages determined by U.S. county agents, Consul Ortiz Hernan explained that 
those drawing up the plan in Mexico City had no idea that the prevailing wages in the Rio 
Grande Valley would be so low.362 The prevailing wages in the Rio Grande Valley were 
far below the Mexican government’s long-established rule, written into previous 
iterations of the bracero agreement, of requiring a minimum wage of at least 37 cents per 
hour. Consul Ortiz Hernan pointed South Texas’s unique position regarding wages. He 
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noted that the program was proceeding smoothly in the El Paso area because Mexican 
officials were certifying contracts there for forty cents an hour, not to mention the fifty 
and sixty cents workers garnered in New Mexico and California.363 According to 
Consul Ortiz Hernan, “when [Minister of Labor] Mr. Castorena publicly stated that 
county agents’ certifications would be satisfactory, he never once thought it would be any 
lower than 37 cents.”364 
In response, Cramer assured the Mexican delegation that the twenty-five cent 
wage rate was not really as bad as it seemed. In a revealing statement that probably did 
not inspire much confidence in Mexican officials, Cramer asserted, “if you will 
investigate this twenty-five cents prevailing wage, you will probably find that this is 
actually at least 25% increase over what workers were getting before.”365 According to 
Cramer, a majority of the workers made twenty cents an hour, or less. Thus, a twenty-five 
cent per hour wage rate represented a significant increase.  
Cramer attempted to further deflect attention from the low wage rates by placing 
blame on Mexican American crew leaders.  The crew-leaders were the real problem, 
Cramer argued, which the new agreement would address. “If you leave out the sub-
contractor, who has been exploiting the worker, these men could continue to make this 
[increased] amount of money even though the minimum prevailing wage written into the 
contract showed only 25 cents. The crew leader is the fellow who has been making the 
money, and he is the fellow they want to eliminate.”366 William Whalen, the INS 
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District Director in San Antonio, added his support for Cramer’s point by assuring 
Mexican officials that his Service would aggressively police crew leaders, and not allow 
them to continue operating. “Our Service will check the crews of sub-contractors and 
take the “wets” away from them.”367 
Consul Ortiz Hernan admitted to feeling pressure from all sides. The Mexican 
government wanted to institute a program of legalized labor in South Texas, but was 
reluctant to project an image to the Mexican public that the government had caved in so 
drastically on the minimum wage rate. The fact that this problem was occurring in Texas 
made it so much worse. “The Mexican government cannot grant special privileges to any 
one section of the country,” the consul declared, “particularly to a section in Texas 
because of Mexico’s attitude toward Texas due to discrimination and racial prejudice 
against the Mexican people.”368  
Because Mexican officials felt they had to be realistic about workers’ conditions 
in South Texas, however, they accepted the small improvements that growers and the 
INS promised. In addition to the housing and board, and medical services now provided 
by growers, the major “improvement” seems to have been the projected demise of the 
crew leader. In the end, Consul Ortiz Hernan, agreed to the twenty-five cent prevailing 
wage, though he maintained the government’s view that wages should be higher. He 
authorized Reyes Nava to sign contracts for twenty-five cents and hour, but not “in the 
name of the Government of Mexico but for immigration purposes only.”369 
 According to Allan Skinner’s report on the proceedings, Consul Ortiz Hernan 
explained: 
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They are going to sign the contracts in this manner in order to save face. In other 
words this will be a little trick they will be pulling on their own people, but they 
do not want their Mexican nationals to know about it. He agrees to fix a certified 
rate of wages on all kinds of work and in this way try to make the program 
operate. 






From the nineteenth century onwards, labor middlemen have been crucial yet 
reviled components of the development of U.S. capitalism. Often connecting immigrant 
low-waged, manual laborers to labor-hungry industries throughout the country, these 
labor middlemen formed a key piece of the immigration story in U.S. history. During the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, immigration agents, middle-class reformers, and 
labor union activists waged a successful public relations battle against such agents, 
branding them as the enemies of American free labor. These forces succeeded in passing 
legislation prohibiting the contracting of foreign labor, but ultimately did not succeed in 
stopping the practice. Employers relied on labor contractors and kept the practice alive 
and well, especially in the railroad and agricultural industries.  
These types of anti-labor contractor campaigns created a broad, undifferentiated 
category, labeling all manner of labor middlemen as exploitative, fraudulent predators. 
The regulatory language and legislation enveloped everyone from labor agencies moving 
thousands of workers a year, to Mexican American crew leaders who created crews of 
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twenty to fifty workers from among their own relatives, friends, and neighbors. During 
the mid-twentieth century, the system of agricultural labor was structured in such a way 
that required workers to band together in crews in search of work. For Mexican male 
agricultural workers, becoming a crew leader represented one of the very few options 
they had to attain economic stability for their families, as well as social prestige for 
themselves. 
During the mid-twentieth century Texas labor officials exploited existing laws 
regulating labor agents to try to control and contain the mobility of Mexican agricultural 
migrants to better direct the progress of Texas agriculture, essentially attempting to take 
over the job that labor agents performed. 
Labor middlemen also featured in the compromise reached by Mexican officials 
and South Texas growers as they struggled to transform an agricultural system based on 
illegal labor into one based on legally contracted workers. Very soon after South Texas 
growers began bringing their undocumented workforce to the border town of Reynosa, 
Tamaulipas to be certified, Mexican officials and South Texas growers became tangled in 
disagreement over the very low prevailing wage rates in the Rio Grande Valley. 
Extension Service officials had placed the minimum prevailing wages between twenty 
and twenty-five cents an hour.  In order to iron out their difficulties over the wage rates as 
well as other features of the contract Valley grower found objectionable, the two sides 
held talks in a two-day public meeting held in the Mid-Valley Chamber of Commerce 
offices on April 29-30, 1947. The seeming impasse between Mexican officials who 
wanted a minimum wage of at least thirty-seven cents per hour, and Valley growers, who 
would never agree to such a rate hike, broke when the Mexican government relented on 
the wage issue. Though the wages of twenty-five cents an hour were the lowest wage 
rates for agricultural work in the country, and far below the Mexican government’s stated 
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minimum wage stipulations, both sides were able to come to an agreement forged upon 
the figure of the hated labor contractor. Agreeing that eradicating the labor contractor 
from South Texas agriculture was an acceptable level of improvement for workers, 
growers and Mexican officials shook hands over their new understanding at the close of 
the two-day meeting. Once again, focusing upon the border-crossing labor middleman 
screened the more fundamental problems in the Texas agricultural labor system. 
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Chapter Five: El Paso/The Passage: The 1948 El Paso Incident and the 
Politics of Mobility 
 
 
Waiting for the sun to fall on Saturday, October 16, 1948, a group of over a 
thousand men massed at the river’s edge in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. Mexican troops 
from the First Battalion, lately dispatched to the river to guard the areas around the two 
international railroad bridges in response to reports that Mexicans were crossing the 
border illegally, watched the crowds intently. According to newspaper reports, the scene 
of thousands crowding at the river at dusk had been repeated every evening since 
Wednesday, October 13.371 Directly on the other side of the river in El Paso, another 
massing was taking place. Large trucks had pulled in to the area directly across from 
where the men were gathered, and parked. American growers, or growers’ employees, 
climbed out of the trucks, and also waited.372 As dusk fell, Mexican men by the 
hundreds, responding to an apparent signal given by the growers, began to wade across 
the shallow river. Mexican troops shouted at the men to stop, to stay on the Mexican side 
of the border, but they were met only with jokes and jeering insults from the men as they 
crossed. A few over-zealous soldiers also crossed the river in pursuit of the men but were 
quickly called back to Mexico by their commanders, who were aware than any such 
action by armed soldiers might be viewed by American authorities as a violation of the 
sovereignty of the United States.373  
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What followed next must have been a chaotic scene, as growers rapidly conferred 
with workers and counted out the number that they wanted before loading them on to the 
trucks that were normally used to transport cattle. Once growers had their desired 
numbers, they trudged over to the Immigration offices to report the number of men they 
were taking, and promised to send along a list of their names at a later date. Some 
growers found upon returning to their trucks that the workers had moved onto the trucks 
of other growers who had promised them higher wages. Arguments soon broke out 
amongst the growers, greatly adding to the noise and confusion. In an official report to 
officials at the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE) in Mexico City, Consul Raul 
Michel referred derisively to this scene as an auction. Some cattle trucks loaded with 
workers rumbled away to their destinations in the cotton fields in and around West Texas, 
New Mexico, and Arizona, while other trucks headed to the train station to send their 
human cargo on to more remote locations in the Colorado sugar beet fields.374 
Michel posted other high-ranking officials from his El Paso office to witness the 
events. Consul Adscrito Urrea approached one truck full of workers in order to question 
them and receive a first-hand account of the events unfolding before him. The workers 
verified that they had indeed crossed the border illegally by wading across the river, and 
the driver of the vehicle confirmed that the workers were being taken to work in 
agricultural fields, in this case to Roswell, New Mexico. At Urrea’s request, Vice Consul 
Chavez brought two American immigration inspectors back to the truck so they too could 
be present to hear the statements, which to the Mexican officials’ minds clearly showed 
that U.S. immigration laws had been violated. After listening to the statements repeated at 
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the Consul’s request, one of the inspectors headed back to the office to phone his superior 
and soon returned with the information that his boss, M.R. Toole had given instructions 
that they not intervene in these matters. Urrea thanked him politely, having secured 
formal confirmation of what must have been evident to anyone observing the scene: that 
the INS had foreknowledge of the event and had given their approval to the transactions 
now taking place.375 Mexican officials had to consider a response to what looked like 
the United States government’s deliberate undermining of a bi-national labor importation 
program that both countries had agreed to and tortuously negotiated just eight months 
prior. 
The El Paso Incident represented a breakdown of the smooth administration of the 
bracero program. Over a period of four days in mid-October, 1948, between four and six 
thousand Mexican workers illegally crossed the Rio Grande in full view of assembled 
Mexican governmental officials, Mexican military troops, and American immigration 
authorities. Frustrated Mexican officials bitterly accused the INS officers of abandoning 
their duty to uphold U.S. immigration laws and of deliberately undermining the bracero 
agreement by their calculated inaction in allowing the workers to cross uncontested.  For 
their part, officials from the United States Employment Service (USES), a division of the 
Department of Labor, accused the Mexican government of instigating the chaos, by 
attempting to usurp the USES’ role in determining the prevailing wages of prospective 
braceros, and thus mucking up the process. INS officials pointed to the inadequacy of 
their numbers to stop the assault of thousands of Mexicans determined to cross the border 
at any cost. The Incident became a public relations embarrassment, as the United States 
was forced to offer an official apology to the Mexican government for the poor judgment 
                                                 
375 Ibid. 
 188 
demonstrated by INS officials in El Paso. The Mexican government, furthermore, 
dissolved the bi-national agreement in response to the events in the El Paso-Juarez border 
region, and the two countries would not begin negotiations for a new agreement until 
early the next year, with ratification coming only at mid-summer 1949. 
The El Paso Incident resulted from both countries’ struggles to manage Mexicans’ 
migrations and through it maintain their power over the bracero program on the ground. 
The bracero program was fundamentally a contestation between two sovereign nations to 
exert control over a highly mobile labor force. The El Paso Incident represented much 
more than just a dramatic, yet brief interruption in what would become a twenty-two year 
program of labor importation. It revealed just how both governments scrambled to 
respond to a large-scale migration that posed various challenges to each nation. The 
Mexican government sought to manage the emigration of its citizens, sometimes in the 
face of resistance from the workers themselves. The U.S. government’s response 
reflected the profound ambivalence with which U.S. officials viewed the flow of 
undocumented labor across the border, as local and national interests became hopelessly 
tangled and often worked in contradiction to each other. Finally, the El Paso Incident is 
important to consider because it exemplified the ways in which the policies and actions of 
both the Mexican and U.S. governments concentrated the unequal politics of Mexican 
migration at the physical location of the border.  
Most immigration scholars agree that the advent of the bracero program also 
spurred a parallel illegal migration of workers to the U.S. Few have considered the 
interconnections between the two beyond noting the negative effects of illegal migration 
on the Mexican government’s position regarding the bracero program. A close 
examination of the El Paso Incident opens up a space to consider how both governments 
responded to, and tried to manage the intertwined strands of these migrations, legal and 
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illegal.  An important aspect of understanding the politics of workers’ mobility is 
understanding how the migrants themselves effected this migration, their movements 
converging and diverging from the interests of both governments at different times. 
Mexican migration has often described in terms pointing to its mass and the seemingly 
inexorable quality of its movement. Racializing discourses often emphasized the mass of 
Mexican migration, employing animal imagery, specifically large groups of like animals, 
such as swarms of bees, locusts, etc. These discourses de-emphasized workers’ agency, 
rendering workers’ migrations as instinctive, rather than decisions made by individuals 
and families. At times, however, workers themselves used their numbers to challenge the 
Mexican government’s attempts to regulate their mobility. 
This chapter examines the ways that both governments sought to manage 
workers’ mobility, and the implications of those responses to state formation at the 
border. Despite their strategies and maneuvers, however, workers’ mobility could never 
be wholly contained within each country’s authority. 
 
WORKERS’ MIGRATIONS AND THE STATE 
For the Mexican government, it was crucial that Mexican workers enter the U.S. 
as legally contracted braceros rather than undocumented migrants. The Mexican 
government was fighting to preserve the legal social status of its citizens, which illegal 
migration certainly nullified. In supporting the bracero program, the Mexican government 
claimed that they pursued this issue so persistently in order to improve migrants’ 
wellbeing once they entered the United States. This was a motivating factor, but did not 
account for all of the government’s investment in the matter. It was also a matter of 
sovereignty, the realization that once the individual Mexican became a documentless 
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illegal migrant in the U. S., his or her legal status was effectively compromised. If that 
process happened on a large scale, many thousands of Mexican citizens would fall 
outside of the state’s official purview.376 As John Torpey has discussed, one of the 
prime functions of the modern nation state has been to “monopolize the legitimate means 
of movement” of its people, through identity-producing documents such as passports and 
other identification cards, thus marking who belonged and who did not belong to the 
nation state.377 The illegal migration of large numbers of Mexican citizens into the U.S. 
was a movement that, in a practical sense, threatened the Mexican’s state ability to 
monopolize the legitimate means of movement of its citizens. As soon as workers crossed 
the border from Mexico without the imprimatur of either state through the mechanism of 
the bracero program, they lost access to the formal advocacy channels built into the 
architecture of the bracero labor contract. Mexicans’ illegal status in the United States 
demonstrated the limits of the Mexican nation-state, and a large migration of 
undocumented Mexicans made those limits readily apparent to both the Mexican public 
and to the United States. 
Scholars have considered the Mexican government’s participation in the bracero 
program as a departure from its policy of discouraging Mexican emigration in the first 
half of the twentieth century.378 In addition to periodic attempts to stop the emigration 
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of Mexicans by refusing to issue passports to migrants from some central states and even 
trying to stop some migrants from boarding trains bound for the border, the Mexican 
government also initially supported the U.S. government’s repatriation campaigns during 
the Great Depression.379 Post-revolutionary nationalism in Mexico viewed the 
permanent emigration of Mexican citizens to the United States as a failure of the 
promises of the Revolution, or more optimistically, viewed the eventual return of 
Mexican migrants as the potential building blocks of a modern Mexico.380 Mexican 
consulates in U.S. Southwest cities actively engaged in local Mexican communities, 
sometimes providing support for labor union activity and Mexican American civil rights 
agendas, straying far into the territory of Mexicans’ permanent, daily lives in the U.S.381 
This history demonstrates the Mexican government’s reluctance to let Mexicans outside 
its state “embrace.”   
Rather than view the Mexican government’s participation in the bracero program 
as a radical departure from its previous stance, when seen in conjunction with the 
simultaneous illegal migration of Mexican migrants, the Mexican government’s active 
support of the bracero program can be seen as a way to keep Mexican migrants within the 
scope of the country’s authority. That is, when faced with the difficulty of stopping the 
emigration of its citizens to U.S. during a time of increased labor demand, the Mexican 
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government viewed the bracero program as a way to secure workers’ legitimacy, but also 
their return to Mexico. 
For the United States, the issue regarding Mexican migration was not so clearly 
determined. Historically speaking, the U. S. was as invested, if not more so, in 
monopolizing the legitimate means of movement of its citizens, and as a nation that 
regularly received immigrants, the U.S. was intensely interested in identifying and 
managing the process by which immigrants were accepted or denied entry into its 
territory.382 The onset of the Cold War only intensified such concerns with the integrity 
of national borders, the authenticity of national identities and the fear of infiltration from 
afar and within the national body politic.383 However, a large illegal migration clearly 
benefited the interests of the very powerful agricultural industry, which was a major 
consideration. Furthermore, the creation of a large class of illegal subjects allowed the 
United States to avoid the problem of integrating an undesired, non-white population into 
its body of citizens, in the short term, yet still allowed the powerful agricultural industry 
to avail itself of the labor of the same illegal aliens. However, as Mae Ngai has shown, to 
create a permanent underclass of this nature posed a conundrum to a (theoretically) open 
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society based on civil/citizenship rights. Though Mexicans were deemed a social 
problem, the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed any US-born children of undocumented 
migrants legal citizenship to the United States. Thus, during the summer of 1948, the 
U.S. Southwest was a complex landscape for agricultural labor. States such as California, 
Arizona, and Colorado, which used legally contracted braceros were situated near a large 
state like Texas that relied significantly on undocumented Mexican workers to harvest 
crops. 
With their movements, workers practiced their own politics of mobility that was 
interconnected, yet not totally defined by the Mexican state. As this chapter will show, 
the group of workers that gathered at the grounds of the prospective bracero recruitment 
office were willing to participate in a state-run program, and avail themselves of its 
benefits. Over the course of subsequent days, however, workers collectively made 
demands upon the Mexican state asserting their identities as citizens, and openly 
challenged, even sometimes disdaining, Mexican authority. Although the Mexican 
government and the Mexican press accused rebellious workers of placing themselves in 
positions of almost certain exploitation, in the highly public and collective manner in 
which they discarded the protection of the state, workers played up the politics of border 
crossing. They politicized and made public an act usually hidden and undertaken 
individually, and in the process highlighted the weaknesses of the bracero program.384 
 
                                                 
384 Deborah Cohen has talked about how migrants appropriated the language of the Mexican state 
touting migration as the path towards Mexican modernization to justify their own movement, 
creating a political context for their migration. Deborah Cohen, “Masculine Sweat, Stoop Labor 
Modernity: Gender, Race, and Nation in Mid-Twentieth Century Mexico and the US” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Chicago, 2001). 
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STRUGGLING TO PLACE RECRUITMENT CENTERS: LABOR AND THE BORDER 
One main point of contention that consistently surfaced between the Mexican and 
American governments in the bracero agreement negotiations centered on which areas of 
Mexico to establish recruitment centers to process and provide workers for American 
agricultural industries. Mexico preferred to keep recruitment centers as far away from the 
northern border as possible, while the United States constantly pushed the Mexican 
government to open centers in border states, and even in border towns. Allowing bracero 
contracting centers to be located in the border region brought together in the same 
geographical space the two strands of migration that the Mexican government wished to 
keep separate and distinct: the legitimate migration protected by bracero contracts, and 
the unauthorized migration that became illegal at the border, once the migrant crossed 
into the United States without proper documentation. Mexico wished to preserve a buffer 
zone of sorts between the legal and illegal transactions of capital and labor.  
U.S. pressure to move recruitment centers closer to the border intensified once the 
new bracero agreement was signed between the two nations on February 21, 1948. In a 
shift from earlier policy, the new agreement stipulated that employers pay for workers’ 
transportation costs from the point of recruitment to their final destination, and their 
return upon the completion of their contracts.385 During the administration of the 
program through World War II and into the immediate post-war period, the United States 
government had covered the costs of transporting workers to American farms from 
recruitment centers in Mexico. That program had expired in 1947, however.386 Now that 
the transportation of workers was not subsidized by the U.S. government, and growers 
had to cover the costs, growers became very aware of the additional costs of a train ride 
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from the Mexican interior to various points in the United States. Not surprisingly, 
employers resented having to pay these transportation costs at all, and wished to pay as 
little as possible for their workers’ round trip. Locating recruitment centers closer to the 
border would cut down substantially on those costs, and thus growers placed pressure on 
the U.S. government to have them moved further north. 
 
 
Fig. 5.1. Map of Mexico. 
The gradual movement of the centers closer to the border reflected the power of 
growers to influence the daily administration of the bracero program, both through direct 
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lobbying, and more importantly, indirectly through their power as consumers of labor. 
After a few months of operation in Tampico and Aguascalientes, the Mexican 
government decided to close the centers during the middle of the summer of 1948 due to 
lack of activity, which the U.S. Embassy in Mexico attributed in part to the “high cost of 
transportation over the long distances involved.”387 The two processing centers had 
received between the both of them only 10,000 orders for braceros, certainly many fewer 
than expected. In an attempt to pique the interests of recalcitrant growers the 
Intersecretarial Commission in Charge of Emigrant Workers’ Affairs (Mexican 
Intersecretarial Commission) proposed opening bracero recruitment centers in Culiacan, 
Sinaloa; Torreon, Coahuila; and Monterrey, Nuevo León, all located in Mexican states 
bordering the United States, but not in border cities.388 The USES in turn proposed sites 
in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas; Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua; and Mexicali, Baja California, 
all towns located directly along the U.S-Mexico border.389 Mexico turned down this 
proposal, expressing the desire to avoid the “accumulation of masses of Mexican workers 
at the international line.”390 A series of conferences followed in Mexico City, in August 
1948, to deal with this impasse. Both governments finally agreed to open recruitment 
centers at Monterrey, Nuevo León; Chihuahua, Chihuahua; Culiacan, Sinaloa; and 
Mexicali, Baja California, all but Mexicali being relatively close, but not actually on, the 
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border. Despite their strong reservations, the Mexican government had to move the 
centers closer to the border in response to growers’ economic pressure. 
The Mexican government consistently opposed moving bracero recruitment 
centers closer to the border, being well aware of problems that could, and often did, arise 
from overwhelming responses to the government’s call for workers. Officials from both 
governments had frequently witnessed the overburdened and overcrowded conditions at 
many bracero recruitment centers in central Mexico. In 1943, INS Immigrant Inspector 
Dorr Roubos, temporarily assigned to Mexico City to help facilitate the bracero 
recruitment process, wrote to Assistant Inspector in Charge at El Paso, Gordon Cornell, 
to explain delays in processing, attributed to the Mexican government’s desire to get a 
clear head count on orders from the United States: 
To me that was a fair demand as the infiltration to Mexico City from the 
surrounding towns created quite a problem for local officials. At one time there 
were over 5000 trying to get into our office for processing. We could not handle 
them in such quantities so they would stay in the street all night and wait for the 
office to open the next morning. Most of them had no other place to go and 
nothing to eat. One morning it was impossible for us to get through the mob and 
into the building so we had to return to our hotel.391 
  
Such scenes were endemic to the bracero recruitment process in Mexico, and the 
Mexican government was often shouldered with several associated costs relating to this 
process. First, the government often had to pay to transport workers who had not received 
contracts back to their homes. Often, workers’ meager resources had dwindled while they 
waited for their turn in the processing offices.392 Perhaps more importantly for the 
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government, however, officials had to face the political costs of the Mexican public’s 
awareness of the events: the visual evidence of thousands of Mexican men leaving their 
homes, massing in the streets often without enough food or water, waiting to be 
processed to work in a foreign country because they presumably could not make a living 
in Mexico.393  
The Mexican government was clearly cognizant of the dangers associated with 
having this scenario play out in a border setting. U.S. demand for workers obviously 
influenced labor patterns in central Mexico by spurring intense concentrations of workers 
responding to calls for braceros, as described above. By keeping these transactions in the 
interior, however, the Mexican government retained some control over the process—it 
remained a domestic issue. Once the sites were moved to the border the sovereignty of 
the Mexican nation-state came into direct contact with the sovereignty of the U.S. nation-
state. And while American markets caused the chaotic labor movement even in central 
Mexico, that power would became even more apparent the closer the chaos moved to the 
border. The Mexican state’s claim over the legitimate means of movement of its own 
citizenry would be threatened, thus diminishing its sovereign power. 
The United States government also responded to the dynamics of a twin migration 
from Mexico, and played the large numbers of workers migrating illegally, especially to 
Texas, to advantage in negotiations with the Mexican government. At the time in the 
middle of 1948, the Mexican government had suspended the bracero program in Texas 
after evidence of racial discrimination against Mexicans had surfaced in a number of 
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Texas counties. Texas had, in fact, only just begun to import braceros the year before, in 
1947, after being banned from the program for the first five years for a problem of race 
discrimination in the state.394 The Mexican government sought to leverage Texas 
growers’ desire for bracero laborers against the issue of discrimination, clearly attempting 
to use a politics based on workers’ labor migrations. Tellingly, the U.S. government used 
the same state, and the heavy annual illegal migration of Mexicans to Texas, to pressure 
the Mexican government into making concessions regarding the bracero program, their 
own play on the politics of the workers’ mobility. Federal officials used Texas as an 
example of what the rest of the Southwest could become if the Mexican government 
demanded too much from American growers through the bracero program. Visions of an 
unregulated agricultural labor market based on undocumented Mexican workers dogged 
the Mexican government’s decision making during the late 1940s. 
Both governments tried to position themselves within the almost constant 
negotiations of the bracero program, exemplified in the impasse regarding the placement 
of recruitment centers. As the end of the summer approached in 1948, and ripening fields 
loomed in the American Southwest, officials from the Mexican Intersecretarial 
Commission and the USES met on August 5, 1948 in Mexico City to hash out points of 
difficulty.395 As the crops in the ground grew, so did growers’ pressure on the United 
States to secure their labor source in time for the harvesting season. On September 3rd, 
A. W. Motley, Assistant Director of the USES, wrote to Robert E. Wilson, Economic 
Policy Officer of the Division of Mexican Affairs in the State Department to share his 
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frustrations with the ongoing negotiations. Motley was primarily concerned about the 
Mexican government’s refusal to go through with a plan to open a recruitment center in 
the state of Chihuahua, and the effects that might have the agricultural industries of New 
Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado. Motley worried that without a conveniently close 
location from which to recruit braceros, farmers would begin recruiting and hiring 
undocumented workers, resulting in the illegal migration of thousands of Mexican 
workers into New Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado.396 This course of action would then 
undermine, in his view, the work of the INS, who had been “exerting every effort on 
growers to abide by the procedures outlined in the Mexican Agreement.”397  According 
to Motley, keeping the Chihuahua center shuttered was tantamount to barring those states 
from participation in the bracero program, even though growers were not specifically 
limited to the Chihuahua center to acquire braceros, but could visit other recruitment 
centers.  
In Motley’s view, anything that inconvenienced growers would cause them to 
abandon the program. He pointed to Texas as the classic example of growers’ easy access 
to unauthorized migrants for their labor. According to Motley, Mexico’s strategy to ban 
Texas from the program had achieved the result in which “Mexican laborers have flooded 
into the State of Texas by the tens of thousands to engage in agricultural employment in 
an illegal status and without the protection of work contracts.”398 He saw this could 
happen in Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado as well. Workers were already gathering 
by the thousands in Ciudad Juárez, “1200 arrived in Juarez from the interior of Mexico 
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by Mexican National Railway last Saturday, and 1000, 800, and 300, on three successive 
days” in anticipation of the upcoming harvest, he noted.399  
In the face of Mexican resistance to opening new recruitment centers, Motley 
advised Robert Wilson to pursue an aggressive strategy for the unilateral legalization of 
Mexican workers, one that would have significantly altered the balance of power of the 
two countries at the border. He felt the United States should be prepared to countermand 
the bi-national agreement and admit Mexican workers as they tried to enter the country, 
and also to temporarily adjust the status of workers already in the United States 
illegally.400 
This would at least serve to place needed Mexican agricultural workers in a legal 
status, which is the only reasonable alternative we can suggest to the continuous 
process of the Border Patrol apprehending thousands of such workers and sending 
them back to Mexico only to have them almost immediately return to the United 
States unlawfully.401 
 
Motley’s suggestion resembled several bills in the U.S. Congress throughout the 
1940s and 1950s. Mexican officials responded very forcefully to such proposals in 
Congress, however, because they realized a passage of such legislation would further 
erode their power to negotiate modifications in the bi-national agreement by threatening 
to withhold workers. If the U.S. government took such measures, it would have the 
unilateral right to re-create Mexican workers’ legal identities without reference 
whatsoever to the Mexican government’s sovereign power in issuing or denying 
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passports or other permissions to leave the country. This would have represented a 
serious breach of diplomatic norms between the two countries.402 
Motley requested that the State Department forward the letter to the Mexican 
Embassy, and also assured Wilson that the INS was in complete agreement with his 
recommendations.403 INS officials’ support for Motley at the USES demonstrates that 
the two agencies were in close communication, sharing ideas about which strategies were 
best employed at the border. Everyone involved in negotiating the Bracero Program was 
well aware of the importance of the INS to the administration of the program. Strong 
enforcement of immigration laws supported the Mexican government’s positions within 
the program while lax enforcement weakened Mexico’s negotiating ability.  
Officials in the State Department passed a copy of the letter along to the Mexican 
Embassy in Washington, D.C. along with a note that appeared to express support for Mr. 
Motley’s propositions. The State Department’s apparent willingness to consider the 
USES proposal was notable because the agency was usually quick to guard good 
relations with Mexico and recognize Mexican rights to protect their sovereignty. Paul 
Reveley, head of the Division of Mexican Affairs at the State Department, passed along 
the letter, he said, “on an informal basis,” but indicated that the State Department was 
directing the American Embassy in Mexico City to propose to the Mexican 
Intersecretarial Commission to “reconsider its recent decision not to permit recruiting at 
Chihuahua.”404 Reveley reiterated much of the substance of Motley’s message, warning 
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 203 
that if the Mexican government failed to open a center in Chihuahua, “it will be 
impossible to prevent their entry as wetbacks, and in such a capacity their earnings 
approximate only about one-third the amount they would have received had they been 
legally recruited.”405 Reveley intimated that the Border Patrol would be unable to curb 
the unauthorized migration of Mexican workers once harvesting season was in full swing. 
The U.S’s opening volley set off a flurry of communication between Mexico City 
and the Mexican Embassy in Washington D.C. as Mexican officials considered how to 
respond to the United States. The Mexicans were most concerned about Motley’s threat 
to allow Mexican workers into the United States even without legal contracts if the 
Mexican government did not follow through with its plans to open up a recruitment 
center in Chihuahua. In his letter to the Mexican Embassy in Washington D.C., Manuel 
Tello, the head of the SRE, wanted the Mexican Charge’ d’ Affaires, Rafael de la Colina 
to remind Reveley that the Basic Agreement stipulated Mexico’s right to choose, “at 
liberty,” the locations for contracting centers.406 Tello wanted to remind the Americans 
that the Mexican government had already once conceded to U.S. pressures to move 
centers closer to the border, despite their initial resolution not to do so under any 
circumstances.407 He pointed out that officials were still planning to open a recruitment 
center in Chihuahua; they were merely postponing it until after the cotton crops in the 
state of Chihuahua were completely harvested.408 Tello wanted de la Colina to 
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communicate to Reveley that the Mexican government was acting simply “in legitimate 
defense of its economic interests” in this temporary postponement and in no way justified 
the U.S.’s threat to use this matter to refuse to comply with the articles of the 
Agreement.409  
Accusing Motley of acting in a manner “contrary to the friendly spirit of those 
Agreements,” Tello wished to make Motley aware of the inappropriateness of proposing 
such unilateral action on the part of the United States. “In the event that one party wishes 
to extricate itself from the obligations place by the Agreement, it is imperative that this 
intention should be previously announced in the manner stipulated by the Agreement, at 
which time, then, we express our complete acquiescence.”410 Until that time, however, 
he wished to assure the U.S. of the Mexican government’s complete cooperation to 
alleviate the problem of unauthorized migration to which Motley referred, by alerting 
Mexican civil and military authorities at the border to use all the means at their disposal 
to prevent the workers without contracts from departing Mexico.411 He acidly hoped 
that the United States Immigration Service would also use all their appropriate authority 
to keep the integrity of the Agreement intact.412 
The Mexican government followed up this correspondence by sending a high-
level official from the SRE to Washington, D.C. to meet with officials from the U. S. 
Alfonso Guerra, First Undersecretary of the SRE was already in the U. S. making a tour 
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of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.413 The most contentious issue in the meeting 
centered on the ability of the United States Immigration Service to effectively control 
illegal immigration and its obligations to do so. Guerra stressed the urgent need for the 
INS to “adopt the necessary measures to reduce the clandestine entrance of Mexican 
workers,” noting that in the absence of “strict vigilance,” the Bracero Agreement would 
be a futile exercise.414 American officials pointed out that the INS lacked the sufficient 
number of Border Patrol officers to effectively stop the entrance of thousands of Mexican 
workers who daily crossed the border through back channels and paths, often with the 
help of smugglers.415 Kelly, of the INS, perhaps unwilling to accept the image of the 
complete ineptitude of his force, indicated that small recent increases in the Border Patrol 
force, by relocating officers from other posts, had correspondingly increased the number 
of deportations at the southern border. He hoped, furthermore, that their request for more 
appropriations in Congress would be granted and result in a much more effective Border 
Patrol. Kelly also intimated that the problem with unauthorized migration from Mexico 
lay less with the U.S. Border Patrol, and perhaps more with Mexican migration 
authorities, who he claimed, did not sufficiently concern themselves with Mexican 
workers illegally emigrating from Mexico.416 
Representatives from U.S. agencies reiterated their request that the Mexican 
government open a recruitment center in the state of Chihuahua to hire at least two 
thousand workers for a period of forty-five days. Mexican officials repeated their 
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determination to retain control over the placing of recruitment centers.417 Though no 
official agreement emerged from that specific meeting, the Mexican government agreed 
to temporarily open a bracero recruitment center in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, soon 
afterward. 
 
NARRATING MEXICAN MIGRATION 
The annual concentration of Mexican workers at the border city of Juárez, 
planning to cross into the U.S. for the cotton season, whom U.S. officials invoked in their 
negotiations with the Mexican government, also generated comment in the local El Paso 
media. The popular discourse about Mexican migrants narrated in El Paso newspapers 
employed images of animals to describe the seasonal migration of Mexican agricultural 
workers. Though seemingly unconnected to the U.S. government’s political maneuvering 
regarding Mexican migration, this discourse was connected to U.S politics in several 
ways. First, many of the narratives were perpetuated by state actors, such as INS officials 
interviewed by the press. Second, the discourses helped prop up the U.S. government’s 
position by the work that they did to define Mexican migration. By employing imagery of 
animal migrations when reporting about Mexican migrants, the discourses communicated 
two ideas. One, it constructed the migration as part of the natural environment, rendering 
it harmless. Second, if like animal migrations, Mexican migration was natural, then it was 
also inevitable. Therefore, despite the Border Patrol’s best efforts, it was difficult to stop 
a “natural” and “inevitable” migration.  The depiction of the migration of thousands of 
Mexicans crossing the border illegally every year as natural, unthreatening, and 
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unrelenting was surprising within a Cold War context increasingly concerned with fears 
of political infiltration of the nation.  
Newspaper coverage in El Paso noted an increase in the numbers of Mexican 
workers crossing into the El Paso region from Mexico throughout the month of 
September, framing the migration as part of the natural order of the seasonal calendar. 
One brief news article reported that during the weekend of September 4-6, the Border 
Patrol had “chalked up a catch of 596 wetbacks,” calling it a record for a weekend, also 
noting, “hundreds of other laborers are flocking to Juarez daily from the interior.”418 
Using language that evoked game hunting and fishing, Border Patrol apprehensions of 
undocumented immigrants were narrated as a kind of sport, thus symbolically reducing 
Mexican workers to animals. This imagery also served to downplay the Border Patrol’s 
own job, not imbuing the work with urgent national security functions, but a harmless 
game. In another story, Border Patrol Inspector Griffith McBee was quoted as saying, 
“This season’s aliens are just like grasshoppers, going from farm to farm with the hope of 
finding employment.”419 Such imagery, which compared workers to migratory birds, 
swarms of locusts, or other insentient creatures, reduced Mexican workers to a force of 
nature and also tended to obscure the role that U.S. growers and the U.S. government 
played in facilitating such a movement.420 
Some commentators went beyond the naturally occurring animal kingdom in 
search of metaphors to describe Mexican migrants, looking to the popular comic strip Li’l 
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Abner for inspiration. Created by artist Al Capp, Li’l Abner depicted the Appalachian 
community of Dogpatch and its inhabitants. Inserted within a newspaper article in the El 
Paso Herald-Post on October 14, 1948, in the early days of the El Paso Incident the 
reporter relayed the following anecdote: 
Wetbacks Now Called “Shmoos”  
The word “shmoo” is now rivaling “wetback” as the U.S. Immigration 
Patrol’s unofficial name for illegally entered aliens.  
Immigration men said they started calling the aliens “shmoos” because 
they are “docile, likeable creatures who don’t harm anybody and, though they 
can’t be cooked for chicken, they just want to produce something to eat or 
wear.”421 
 
Introduced in Li’l Abner on August 20, 1948, the shmoo was a small animal, 
shaped like a bowling pin, and prominently featured in that comic strip until December 
22, 1948.422 Shmoos had many amazing characteristics: they reproduced at astounding 
rates, thus being in unlimited supply; they could provide countless quantities of milk and 
eggs; they dropped dead at the first glance of anyone who looked their way hungrily, 
saving people the trouble and pain of having to kill them for meat. Once dead, they could 
be fried, roasted, boiled, or fricasseed, tasting just like chicken, pork, steak, catfish, or 
any other much desired dish. Since shmoos ate nothing, they conveniently cost nothing in 
upkeep.423  
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Fig. 5.2. The character of Abner explains the many functions of shmoos. Detail from Al 
Capp, The Short Life and Happy Times of the Shmoo, with an introduction 
by Harlan Ellison (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2002), 20. 
 
For a short time shmoos helped lift the residents of Dogpatch out of poverty, 
providing for all of their needs and allowing them to disconnect from the American 
system of capitalism. Li’l Abner was one of the most popular comic strips of its day, 
printed in about nine hundred newspapers at its height, and the shmoo characters quickly 
caught on nationally, inspiring dozens of shmoo-related merchandizing items.424 
 Though clearly not making the same critique of capitalism as the comic 
strip’s creator, the Border Patrol agent quoted for the news article was certainly tapping 
into several of that era’s powerful discourses through his association of shmoos and 
Mexicans. First, by referring to Mexican undocumented migrants as “docile” and 
“likeable” he was participating in a long and durable process of stereotyping Mexicans as 
                                                 
424 Ibid., xiv; and Tim Appelo, “Li’l Abner Draws to a Close,” Entertainment Weekly, Iss. 248 
(11/11/94), 96. 
 210 
the ideal stoop laborers. Since the time the National Origins Act was debated in the early 
1920s, Southwestern growers advocating for excluding Mexicans from quota restrictions 
employed arguments emphasizing Mexicans’ (and Asians) unique fitness for agricultural 
labor.425 Second, by saying they “don’t harm anybody,” the Border Patrol agent was 
also attempting to disaggregate Mexican migration from the kinds of migrations and 
movements the United States perceived to be harmful or subversive, keeping it separate 
from politics, and in the natural realm. Third, by emphasizing Mexicans’ productive 
capacity in wanting only to make something to eat or wear he was drawing the most 
direct comparisons to shmoos: what shmoos produced by their very bodies Mexicans 
produced through their labor. By making the comparison, however, the Border Patrol 
agent reduced the distance between the two, placing them on the same plane. His joking 
expression of faux-dismay that Mexicans could not be “cooked for chicken” was also 
intended to reinforce the notion that Mexicans were like animals. Finally, shmoos were 
animal-like in that they never spoke, but unlike the migrations of wild animals (described 
earlier), moving of their own accord without reference to people at all, shmoos were 
domesticated, seemingly living only to be of use and to serve. 
 The discourse comparing the movement of Mexican workers to seasonal 
migration was a very specific process of racialization, as well as justification for their 
own policies. This narrative negated the individual actions that went into each migrant’s 
decision to make a move. The mass quality of the migration was emphasized, described 
as being an unthinking process by instinct-driven beings. This discourse also downplayed 
the politics of the state influencing that migration. It justified the approach taken by 
different federal agencies, such as the Border Patrol, that allowed for this illegal 
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migration even though, in theory, the process of illegal entry into the country had 
theoretical potential to destabilize the authority of the state.  
 
PRESIDENT TRUMAN VISITS EL PASO 
President Truman’s visit to El Paso as part of a whistle-stop tour of the western 
states during his bitterly fought campaign against Thomas Dewey added to the 
complicated whirl of politics in the El Paso-Juarez region in late September. Truman 
delivered a campaign speech on September 25 at El Paso’s train station before a crowd of 
ten thousand.426 Dewey and Truman were running particularly closely in the western 
states according to polls, and thus the west became a key battleground for the two 
candidates, as each chased the other through campaign events in the West.427 As was 
customary, Democratic politicians holding statewide office accompanied the Democratic 
president as he traveled through their state. In Texas, Governor Beauford Jester and U.S. 
Representative Sam Rayburn formed part of Truman’s entourage, as well as the U.S. 
Attorney General, Tom Clark.428 It seems noteworthy that a member of Truman’s 
cabinet would travel with the president while he campaigned, though Clark was a Texan. 
As Attorney General and head of the Justice Department, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service fell within his administrative purview. During the fall of 1948, 
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Truman was in the political fight of his life and would have greatly desired the support of 
the very-powerful agricultural interests in Texas and the West.429 
After the events of the El Paso Incident broke open, investigative reporters from 
the El Paso Herald-Post uncovered a stronger connection between the President’s visit to 
El Paso in late September and the dramatic events of mid-October. During the train ride 
from Deming, New Mexico to El Paso on the morning of September 25, Representative 
Ken Regan of Midland, Texas and Clinton P. Anderson, Senate candidate from New 
Mexico met with President Truman specifically to discuss the issue of acquiring Mexican 
laborers to work in the cotton fields of West Texas and New Mexico.430 President 
Truman made no promises regarding the workers during the meeting, but while he was in 
El Paso he pledged to “see what he could do to ‘ease’ the situation.”431 When Attorney 
General Clark returned to Washington D.C. he immediately met with U.S. Immigration 
Service Commissioner Watson Miller to discuss the situation, in advance of 
Commissioner Miller’s own trip to El Paso to attend a regional inter-agency conference 
regarding border issues held on the 29th and 30th of September.432 
The conference held in the offices of the federal courthouse in El Paso brought 
together representatives from U. S. federal agencies to discuss issues and problems along 
the U.S.-Mexico border. The proceedings were not open to the public, but officials 
released general topics that were discussed to the press, which included reviewing and 
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reconsidering “various regulations and policies affecting border crossings.”433 One of 
the participants, Carl Strom, U.S. Consul at Mexico City, proposed that the United States 
waive the need for Mexicans traveling temporarily to the United States to hold passports 
when traveling to interior points in the U.S., and instead issue identification cards.434 
For Mexican officials already dubious of American motives based on Motley’s earlier 
propositions, the news coming from this conference must have deepened suspicions that 
the United States was trying to get around existing policies limiting Mexican migration.  
It seemed that U.S. agencies were considering ways to put Motley’s ideas into practice, to 
facilitate options for temporary migration outside the parameters of the bracero program.  
The remarks Commissioner Watson Miller made a few days later would have 
only intensified Mexican concerns that the United States wished to undermine the bracero 
program. Congressman Ken Regan, who had previously met with President Truman on 
that train ride from Deming to El Paso, met with Commissioner Miller a few short days 
later to reiterate his request that the U.S. government do something to secure Mexican 
laborers for the West Texas cotton harvest.435 After the meeting, Miller announced that 
he had received word from Washington that Mexico had decided to open a recruitment 
center in Ciudad Juárez to process two thousand braceros. Those two thousand braceros 
were slated to go to New Mexico, and fell far short of demands by growers in the 
region.436 The Great Western Sugar Company alone wanted three thousand workers for 
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their sugar beet fields in Northern Colorado and Wyoming.437 Furthermore, under the 
dictates of the bracero program, none of the workers contracted would be sent to Texas, 
which was banned by Mexico from participating in the program during the fall harvest, 
1948. That fact notwithstanding, Miller declared that the INS “will watch the situation in 
Pecos, Texas, where there is a great need for cotton pickers, and will do everything it can 
to avert an emergency.”438 This was a bold statement from INS Commissioner Miller, 
although it remained unclear what he could possibly do for growers in this area. The El 
Paso Herald-Post surmised that “farmers conceivably might interpret the commissioner’s 
statement as a hint that immigration officers will not be too active in deporting wetbacks 
during the cotton picking season.”439  
 
THE UNRAVELING OF EVENTS AT JUÁREZ 
Perhaps the combined efforts the Motley letter as well as the veiled threats 
emanating from the conference in El Paso convinced the Mexican government to reverse 
their previous decision regarding the recruitment of workers at Ciudad Juárez. On 
October 8th, another Mexican functionary arrived in Ciudad Juarez announcing the 
opening of a recruitment center in that city, this time from the Intersecretarial 
Commission, the Mexican federal agency with authority over the recruitment centers. Mr. 
Francisco Reyes Cortez, the official from the Intersecretarial Commission announced that 
on Monday, the 11th, he would be opening offices at the grounds of the old hippodrome, 
in order to begin processing braceros to work in the United States.440 Reflecting the 
amount of confusion that prevailed in the entire undertaking, Reyes declared that two 
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thousand men would be contracted for work sites in Arkansas, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana.441 These proposed destinations differed greatly from the expectations from 
growers in New Mexico, Arizona, and the mountain states of the West that they would be 
receiving the workers.  
By Sunday, a large group of men began to gather in the grounds of the 
hippodrome, in expectation of the office’s opening on Monday morning. In addition to 
men from the locality of Juárez, trainloads of workers from the surrounding areas in the 
state of Chihuahua and other points south in central and southern Mexico had been 
arriving daily since the news had been announced. The next day, representatives from the 
United States INS arrived at the site accompanied by Stephen Aguirre, the U.S. Consul at 
Ciudad Juárez. INS officials were set to begin identifying, processing, and documenting 
workers, a process that included officials from both countries. When the U.S. officials 
arrived at the hippodrome, however, they encountered six thousand restless men, who 
clamored the Americans for information about when the office would be ready to receive 
workers. The offices were not open and Reyes Cortez was nowhere to be found.442  
The U.S. officials left the hippodrome, but asked Raul Michel to provide military 
protection for them, because they felt that the situation at the hippodrome was 
precarious.443 Workers reportedly broke the doors of the offices under the grandstand of 
the old racetrack, where the offices were to be located.444 Although Michel personally 
could not personally order law enforcement to the area since it was beyond his 
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jurisdiction, someone did place such an order, because he noted that the Municipal Police 
had sent six officers to the scene. At once, the police ascertained that the job was too 
large for their force, and a force of military soldiers were sent to the site instead.445 
Raul Michel crossed the border into Juárez and returned to the hippodrome the 
next morning to monitor any new developments, and to confirm the large numbers of 
workers that had been reported at the site.446 He found the men still waiting. Many had 
been there for two days, but still the office remained closed. Negotiations broke down 
between the Intersecretarial Commission, and the USES over wage rates for prospective 
braceros. Reyes Cortez wanted workers to receive $3.00 per hundred pounds of cotton for 
the first cotton picking, $4.00 for the second picking, and $5.00 for the third.447  
In a reversal from the arguments the Mexican government had made that U.S. 
officials were trying to intervene on their outlined powers to decide bracero recruitment 
centers, U.S. officials now accused the Mexican government of going straying into U.S. 
authority. The USES angrily decried Reyes Cortez’s negotiations, arguing that wage rates 
had already by set by United States officials, according to the stipulations of the Bracero 
Agreement. In other words, they asserted, Reyes Cortez of the Intersecretarial 
Commission had no authority to negotiate wage rates in any case.448 These negotiations 
seemed to be held solely between the Intersecretarial Commission and the USES, since 
Michel charged that Reyes Cortez held himself aloof from other Mexican officials in the 
area, keeping them in the dark about the proceedings. In his several reports made to the 
SRE, Raul Michel often complained that in the course of the entire crisis, he never set 
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eyes on Reyes Cortez, and never even exchanged words with him over the telephone. He 
remarked caustically, that Mr. Reyes Cortez through his continued absence from the 
grounds of the hippodrome was “becoming indeed a man of mystery.”449  
The dispute over wages is important to consider in closer detail, because the issue 
bogged down the recruitment process, later triggering the El Paso Incident. The USES’ 
contention that the Intersecretarial Commission had no authority to set wages for braceros 
was entirely justified. According to the Bracero Agreement, the workers placed under 
contract would be paid the same wages normally paid for agricultural work in a particular 
region, a rate set by the market.450 USES officials certified the wage rate, and it would 
formed the basis for a worker’s Individual Contract. The Mexican government could not 
modify this wage rate, nor could the worker negotiate for higher wages. Any official from 
the Intersecretarial Commission, intimately knowledgeable about every point contained 
in the Bracero Agreement, would have been perfectly aware of this fact. Of course, as we 
have seen with the question of locating the bracero recruitment centers, each country 
often tried to encroach upon the other’s territory to influence the administration of the 
program. With his determination to renegotiate bracero’s wages before beginning the 
processing in Ciudad Juarez, Reyes Cortez may have been trying to take advantage of 
quickly maturing crops in the fields in need of workers to pick them to gain favorable 
concessions from the growers. USES officials certainly believed this to be the case as 
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they accused the Intersecretarial Commission office of  “holding a pistol at the American 
farmer’s head.”451 
Curiously, the specific wage rates Reyes Cortez desired for bracero workers came 
nowhere close to prevailing wages in New Mexico, the presumed destination of the 
workers. Prevailing wages in New Mexico were two dollars per hundred pounds of 
cotton, regardless of the harvest cycle. Some accounts indicate that growers in New 
Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado may have been willing to pay two, two-fifty, and three 
dollars per cycle, but no more.452 Wages in nearby El Paso were even lower, ranging 
from $1.50 to $2.00 per hundred pounds.453 The wages that Mr. Reyes Cortez insisted 
upon, however, were based on the prevailing wages that Mexican braceros were receiving 
in Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, and Louisiana. USES officials pointed out that 
prevailing wages for agricultural work varied across the country, the wages in New 
Mexico and the mountain states were lower, and growers in these areas were not 
predisposed to pay the going rate of Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, and Louisiana. Mr. 
Cortez merely replied that he had been instructed by his superiors to secure these wages 
for the workers.454 
While U.S. and Mexican officials were snarled in these negotiations, the workers 
continued to wait at the hippodrome to begin the process of contracting, under armed 
guard. Although military troops at the hippodrome may have imposed a modicum of 
order upon the men, they waited with increasing impatience for any sign that the 
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processing would commence. Several days of waiting intensified their mounting 
frustration, until they exploded into action beginning on Wednesday evening. The 
workers began to move in large groups toward the river that divided Mexico and the 
United States. According to Michel, labor contractors hired by American growers who 
were becoming desperate to secure their labor instigated the move. One such labor 
contractor, Mr. Maddux, employed by the Great Western Sugar Company to acquire 
workers for their sugar beet fields in northern Colorado and Wyoming, hired out Juárez 
tour guides to direct workers to the river’s edge, much to Michel’s disgust.455 In a scene 
that would be repeated night after night from Wednesday evening to Sunday morning, 
workers waited for a sign from employers gathered on the other side of the river, and 
once that sign was transmitted just after sundown, they began to cross in large 
numbers.456  
Workers waded across the river or employed the two railroad bridges connecting 
Ciudad Juárez and El Paso. It is unclear at this point whether or not Border Patrolmen 
detained workers whom they witnessed crossing at these different points. Border Patrol 
officials claimed to have apprehended four hundred workers on the first evening and sent 
them back across the river to Juárez. One employer on the scene, however, noticed that 
Border Patrol officers were not interfering with employers as they loaded their vehicles 
with workers, even when the workers had obviously just crossed minutes before. “Some 
of the men were wet up to their waist, but the immigration did not bother them. Once the 
men get to our trucks, they were not bothered.” And though Border Patrol officials 
attempted to downplay the numbers coming through, estimating only two hundred men 
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successfully crossed on the first evening, observers witnessed employers zooming away 
in large trucks and trailers, completely packed with workers. Mr. Maddux, representing 
the Great Western Sugar Company loaded two passenger cars filled with workers en 
route to Denver on Wednesday night and Thursday morning.457 
On Thursday morning, Michel demanded explanations from U.S. authorities 
regarding the surprising events of the evening before, to try and make sense of the 
seeming chaos. He first received a noncommittal answer from Immigration officials who 
assured him they were follow usual procedure by detaining, then deporting individuals 
whom their patrols encountered and were found to be in the United States unlawfully. 
Patently incredulous, Michel pressed for more. INS authorities said that the large number 
of workers who had crossed had been authorized to enter by the Texas State Employment 
Service. The next day, Michel tried to reach Will Rogers, an official from the United 
States Employment Service, by telephone, but was unsatisfied with what he called his 
“evasive answers.” He finally tracked Will Rogers down later that day in a restaurant in 
Juarez as he was dining with Stephen Aguirre, U.S. Consul in Ciudad Juarez, and M.R. 
Toole, INS officer in charge at the Santa Fe bridge crossing in El Paso, and had an 
official letter of protest hand delivered to him.458 
The United States INS and the Texas State Employment Service (TSES) offered 
weak explanations of their actions to Mexican officials and the press. According to 
Immigration officials, the large numbers of workers crossing the border each day 
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between Wednesday night and the early hours of Sunday morning were authorized by the 
TSES. Because the TSES had certified the workers, the INS considered the workers of no 
proper concern for their agency, even though it was quite evident to all that the workers 
had not been authorized by the Mexican government to work in the United States as 
braceros.459 Furthermore, the workers had also failed to take the steps the United States 
normally required from prospective migrants, such as applying for visas, paying the 
necessary taxes, and receiving the medical examinations that would have determined 
their eligibility to enter the United States under current laws. Although the INS had the 
power to waive such requirements for agricultural workers, they did not point to this 
authority in public, but instead gestured to the authority of the TSES over this issue.460  
Officials from the TSES claimed that its agency did not inquire into a person’s 
immigration status before assigning them to employers requesting workers.461 They 
were merely an agency connecting workers desirous of positions with employers needing 
workers. It was not their job to determine a worker’s legal status, nor had they any way of 
making that determination, they asserted. In this way they tried to drape a very thin layer 
of legality over their actions to somehow discount the fact that officials from the TSES 
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were positioned at the very edge of the border, and could see the spectacle of hundreds 
and thousands of workers crossing the river with their own eyes. Their claim may have 
been technically correct. Once the workers were on Texas soil, the TSES could treat them 
as any other worker in their state, and post them to sites even in West Texas, regardless 
of the strictures placed by the Mexican government. The state authority of the TSES to 
direct workers to given employment locations could not have superseded the federal 
authority of the INS to detain undocumented immigrants, however. Thus, the INS was 
treading on even thinner ice than the TSES.  
 
CONCLUSION 
While the diplomatic firestorm was just beginning on Saturday, October 16, and 
continued for several tense days of intra- and inter-government negotiations, the daily 
crossings of thousands at the Ciudad Juarez-El Paso border juncture had begun to abate. 
By early Sunday morning many of the crowds had thinned and Sunday night did not see a 
repeat of the preceding four days. 
By opening a bracero recruitment center in Ciudad Juarez, however temporarily, 
the two governments created the conditions for the dramatic events of those four days in 
October 1948, a viscerally visual manifestation of the historically unequal relationships 
between the United States and Mexico. It was a compression, a collapse of those politics 
at the border, and the border would become a metonym for them. That process intensified 
over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, and has become the primary 
mode in which the U.S.-Mexico relationship is filtered today. 
Traces of the events in the preceding week did not immediately disappear. Early 
Sunday morning, October 17, 1948 José Gurrola encountered the body of a man who lay 
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unconscious on the terrain underneath one of the railroad bridges located to one side of 
the International Bridge, at Santa Fe Street and Juárez Avenue in El Paso. An ambulance 
quickly transported the man to El Paso’s county hospital for treatment for a broken leg 
and possible internal injuries. Police detectives set out to discover the man’s identity, 
which was yet unknown, since he had no identifying documents upon his person. His 
pockets contained only a small amount of money in Mexican currency. Later in the day, 
however, the man awoke and identified himself as Macario Acosta, aged fifty-five, 
divorced with two young children, and lived in Ciudad Juárez. Hoping to find 
employment with one of the many growers inundating El Paso during the past week, 
Macario Acosta had attempted to traverse one of the railroad bridges in the dead of night. 
The poor visibility caused him to lose his footing on the tracks and he fell many feet to 
the ground below.462  
Macario Acosta’s experiences can be seen as a microcosm of the contested and 
uneven terrain of the United States-Mexico border. His accident, as well the entire 
episode of the El Paso Incident, palpably exemplify a space in which both the Mexican 
and United States governments were made concerted efforts to control the movement of 
people within and across the border region. By waiting until the small hours of the 
morning to make his move, Mr. Acosta perhaps hoped to avoid the patrols of the 
Mexican soldiers temporarily stationed along the river as well as the more permanent 
installations of U.S. INS Border Patrol on the other side. The situation in El Paso had 
devolved into chaos, much to the Mexican government’s consternation. The Mexican 
government had instituted several restrictions upon workers seeking to receive contracts 
through the temporary processing office in Juárez, hoping perhaps to avoid disruptions in 
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local labor markets. Government officials prohibited workers from Ciudad Juárez and the 
state of Chihuahua to apply for contracts.  In fact, Mexican soldiers stationed at the river 
could only legally apprehend men who were from the state of Chihuahua, and by that 
authority had returned over one thousand workers to the ex-hippodrome site at which 
they had been gathering.463 Mr. Acosta might have been aware that his status as a 
resident of Ciudad Juarez would have given the military power to thwart his crossing—he 
might well have been one of the thousand returned to the hippodrome by the soldiers. 
Furthermore, although INS officers seemed to have been standing by while Mexican 
workers crossed the river before their very eyes, Mr. Acosta could not have counted that 
these novel procedures would remain in place indefinitely.  In any case, although we do 
not know the reasons for Mr. Acosta to have chosen to cross as he did, there were 
significant impediments to Mr. Acosta crossing the border with the rest. 
The very mode in which he attempted to cross is also quite suggestive. He 
climbed onto railroad tracks that spanned the Rio Grande, a connective infrastructure that 
had long been used to transport goods and people into each country. Though he did not 
use the structure in its authorized manner, it did facilitate his crossing in some way. He 
tried to walk across the uneven path shrouded by darkness, and he could not successfully 
navigate the way, but fell through the gaps between the tracks. Mr. Acosta’s fall is a stark 
reminder that within the high-stakes world of diplomatic and political wrangling between 
the United States and Mexico for control over the border, individual workers were the 
ones who often risked the most. 
  
                                                 






This dissertation provides a new paradigm for understanding Mexican 
immigration into the U.S. during the mid-twentieth century. Previous scholarship in 
immigration history has largely fallen into two categories. The first and more 
longstanding body of scholarship has focused on European immigrants and emphasized 
the U.S.’s open approach to immigration in the pre-1920s era of quota restrictions. These 
studies have narrated many of the struggles immigrants faced in U.S. society to realize 
the promise afforded by open U.S. immigration laws. Challenging this emphasis on 
assimilation despite restrictions, a more recent body of scholarship, much of which has 
placed Chinese immigration in the foreground, has analyzed the rise of restriction laws 
and argued that the history of U.S. immigration in the U.S. has been one of restriction on 
racial grounds, rather than openness.  
The history of Mexican immigration does not easily fit into either paradigm.   
Mexicans were not restricted as were Chinese, nor were they expected to assimilate, as 
were European immigrants.  Rather, Mexican immigration has been characterized by 
temporary, insecure and conditional access to the U.S., Given the importance of Mexican 
immigration during the twentieth century we need to develop an analysis that can account 
for the circularity of migrants’ experiences. That circularity was established through 
enforcement practices on the ground that were later encoded into law.  
As this dissertation has shown, the complex historical management of Mexican 
immigration to the U..S during the twentieth century has been characterized by several 
unique features. First, U.S. approaches to Mexican migration were simultaneously 
restrictive and expansive. Second, immigration policy was and has been part of a 
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historical process of nation-making. Third, the U.S. government did not solely shape 
immigration policy; the Mexican government also played a key, albeit unequal, role. 
Fourth, the significant intersection between immigration law and immigration 
enforcement did not occur just in Washington, D.C., and Mexico City, but on the local 
level, as growers, local Border Patrol officers, and workers negotiated day-to-day 
enforcement. Fifth, agricultural labor relations, and more specifically, the management of 
Mexican workers’ mobility, which included growers and the state, were central to the 
politics of immigration during the mid-twentieth century.  
These conclusions emanate from a methodological approach to Mexican 
immigration which links the intimate social space of border agriculture with national 
immigration laws and the bi-national bracero program.   
The study has therefore brought several different kinds of sources into 
communication with each other. National government archives in Mexico City and 
Washington, D.C. have provided key information about the centrality of Mexican 
workers’ migrations to diplomatic relations between the two countries. The National 
Archives in Washington, especially the records of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service also have provided valuable information about the complex interactions and 
sustained engagement with local grower communities on the border. Growers’ collections 
in South Texas have provided significant insight into larger conversations growers were 
having with each other in the Valley, as well as with growers in El Paso. Growers in 
South Texas and El Paso communicated with each other regarding Border Patrol 
activities in their areas, in this way monitoring (and trying to address) any changes they 
saw in enforcement. This correspondence contained information about the daily social 
relations between growers and workers, but the richest source material proved to be 
Carrol Norquest’s published and unpublished stories about grower-worker relationships 
 227 
in South Texas. Though Norquest intended the stories to open up the world of 
undocumented Mexican migrant workers, they reveal much more about Norquest’s 
construction of himself in relation to his workers. Oral histories with members of the 
extended family that labored on his farm have been crucial to further understandings of 
how the laborers themselves understood the process of their migrations. 
Though Mexican migrants found they could enter the U.S., their presence was 
often conditional, temporary, and insecure. Even as immigration laws became 
increasingly restrictive as the twentieth century wore on, growers in the U.S. Southwest 
wanted continued access to Mexican agricultural workers. In response to these seemingly 
contradictory realities, the INS established flexible methods of enforcement that allowed 
for the seasonal migrations of Mexican workers across the U.S.-Mexico border. Some of 
the flexibility took the form of collusion in enforcement at the local level due to deep and 
diffuse social ties between Border Patrol officers and the local power base. Beyond such 
local ties, however, the INS’s extensive use of the deportation mechanism of voluntary 
departure facilitated the movement of undocumented migrants within an overall system 
of immigration restriction. In other words, the U.S. government did not significantly 
expand access for Mexicans’ legal permanent migration, but tried to manage illicit 
migration through a flexible form of deportation that assumed migrants’ eventual return 
to the U.S. In using such tools, the INS regulated high volumes of undocumented 
migration because of growers’ labor demands. Furthermore, through the endless 
repetitions of voluntary departure, the INS helped create the transnational circuit for 
Mexican agricultural workers’ migrations. Rather than thinking about the contradictions 
between laws and enforcement as failures in effective enforcement, this work considers 
the implications of those contradictions as a system that created its own meanings about 
race, citizenship, and mobility. 
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While many histories have pointed out both aspects regarding U.S. attitudes to 
Mexican immigration, they have tended to narrate them as decade long waves, expansive 
during the 1920s, and restrictive during the 1930s, for example. This study has argued 
that U.S. policies toward Mexican migration were simultaneously restrictive and 
expansive, not just restrictive during crises and open during periods of prosperity. This 
duality was built into the everyday nature of immigration enforcement. 
Immigration laws and their enforcement were crucial factors of state formation at 
the border. This dissertation has examined the ways in which the United States and 
Mexico struggled against each other to exert control over Mexican workers’ migration. 
That struggle was the central factor in defining state formation at the U.S.-Mexico border 
during the twentieth century. An examination of the El Paso Incident reveals that the 
bracero program, undertaken by both governments to regulate the agricultural labor 
market in the U.S. Southwest and introduce some protections for workers was more about 
conflict than cooperation. In theory, the bracero program recognized the other’s 
sovereign right to maintain borders, and determine who could legitimately belong within 
those borders. The logic of the bracero agreement also recognized the rights of both 
nations to monopolize the legitimate movement of its citizens. Such recognition of 
boundaries and state sovereign power, clearly delineated, and stamped with official 
signatures and professions of friendship clashed with Southwestern growers’ labor 
demands and the maintenance of agricultural labor systems based on the seasonal 
migration of undocumented workers. That clash represented the larger struggle to control 
Mexican workers’ mobility. 
Rather than thinking about these struggles occurring between two completely 
sovereign and separate states, the El Paso Incident demonstrated the complex 
interconnections of state power at the border. For example, when Mexican officials faced 
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difficulties in wage negotiations for workers gathered in Ciudad Juárez in October 1848, 
they knew that they had to control the workers’ movements through the legal channel of 
the bracero program for their negotiations to succeed. The Mexican government wanted 
to legalize workers’ migrations, partly for workers’ benefit, but also to maintain its 
authority over its citizens. It became apparent, however, that the Mexican government 
had to rely on the U.S. immigration authorities to fulfill their duty to apprehend migrants 
crossing the border illegally. The INS failed to do this largely because the growers 
demanded additional workers. This is one example of the central importance of migration 
politics and policies to state formation.   
 While their power at the border was unequal, both the U.S. and Mexican 
governments played a role in shaping the contours of Mexican migration. The 1940s and 
early 1950s is an especially important time period to examine the politics of Mexican 
migration because of the large-scale dual migration by braceros, who crossed the border 
with the sanction of both countries, and the equally significant migration of 
undocumented workers. In a sense, both legal and illegal migrations were part of the 
same phenomenon in that labor flows mainly served the U.S. agricultural industry. 
Furthermore, both migrations represented the consequences of the U.S. and Mexican 
governments’ attempts to keep workers in positions as temporary sojourners in the U.S.  
U.S. immigration laws continued to restrict legal immigration, while immigration 
enforcement allowed for a more flexible border. The Mexican government sought to 
legalize the migration of its citizens to the U.S. in order to keep migrants within the 
government’s sphere of authority and also to secure better wages and conditions for 
agricultural workers. Mexican officials were not interested in having large numbers of 
Mexican citizens settle permanently in the U.S., and thus the bracero program 
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represented an avenue for the legalization of Mexican emigrants as well as their return 
after the end of the agricultural season. 
Immigration policy was negotiated as much on the ground in daily social 
interactions between growers, Border Patrol officers, and workers, as it was decided in 
the national seats of power in Washington, D.C. and Mexico City. Growers fancied 
themselves to be in opposition to Border Patrol officers’ enforcement strategies. 
However, they relied on the agency’s strategy of patrolling highways, transportation 
centers, and public spaces for undocumented migrants, but being much more circumspect 
with growers’ farms and domiciles. These policies intensified migrants’ vulnerability, 
especially during travel or transit, and created a context of conditional immobility within 
a geographical border zone. Exploiting this space, growers regarded themselves as the 
protectors of undocumented workers, and defined their relations with workers in familial 
terms. 
This study sheds new light on agricultural labor relations into central focus, using 
the history of immigration law and immigration law enforcement to further understand 
the nature of race and citizenship as constraints that workers challenged and negotiated. 
Placing the lens of inquiry on the intersections between the mobility of workers, state 
formation, and agricultural relations allows us to see the significance in the contradictions 
between immigration law and law enforcement practices on the border, and its effect on 
Mexican agricultural workers. 
Building on recent efforts that have explored the junctures between agricultural 
systems in the South and Southwest, this dissertation further contributes to the field of 
agricultural labor history. Agricultural regions in Texas underwent significant 
transformations during the first half of the twentieth century, shifting from farm tenancy 
to seasonal waged labor. Since works about agriculture in California have dominated the 
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historiography on Mexican agricultural labor, the prevailing narrative described the giant 
agricultural operations, what Carey McWilliams famously named the “factories in the 
field.” McWilliams and others saw this system as characteristic of the Mexican 
experience in agriculture. Other scholars have located the racialization of Mexican 
agricultural workers as rootless, wandering, and instinctively migratory in these 
impersonal relations. 
Instead of depicting worker-grower relations in these impersonal terms, this study 
shows that even within the context of seasonal waged labor, growers in South Texas 
exploited workers’ conditional immobility to enact racialized relationships defined in 
familial terms. In using paternalistic, domestic language to describe relations with 
Mexican agricultural workers, growers invoked racialized cultural thinking about 
workers, much like with plantation slavery in the antebellum South, and farm tenancy 
during the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. This racial 
discourse existed in addition to the discourses of Mexicans as great flocks of migratory 
birds, with all the impersonality this definition intended. Thus, agriculture in Texas 
during the mid-twentieth century connected the South with the West, and the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. 
Even before growers from the Midwest arrived in South Texas, they consumed 
images of docile and contented Mexicans in the promotional brochures selling the Valley 
as an agricultural paradise. These images erased the history of the border as a contested 
space and as a place that Mexicans had previously inhabited. 
 Analyzing the simultaneous legal and illegal migrations of Mexican workers as 
part of a larger whole has shown the ways that both governments, through forced removal 
and/or temporary legalization, shaped the movement of Mexican workers during the mid-
twentieth century into circular patterns of migration. Sociologists and anthropologists 
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have studied the circular nature of Mexican migration in the contemporary period. This 
dissertation has also focused on the circularity of immigration; however, it has considered 
the construction of circularity from a historical perspective, showing the state’s role in 
creating these patterns. By articulating the ways in which the state has contributed to their 
making, this history thus challenges scholarship that has mainly attributed Mexicans’ 
circular migration to workers’ own preferences and intentions.  
Studies emphasizing migrants’ own decisions to reject permanent residence and 
citizenship in the U.S. as acts of resistance to hegemonic notions of assimilation offer an 
important critique of the politics of immigration. However, to view such actions in a 
purely celebratory way effaces the painful violence of forced movement.  That violence 
has been accompanied with racist views of Mexican workers’ circular migrations as 
animalistic and instinctual, thereby masking the role of the state in forming such patterns. 
In masking the state’s role, such naturalizing rhetoric makes the idea of circularity a 
neutral one, erasing the violent, jagged process of deportation through mechanisms such 
as voluntary departure. Attributing these patterns primarily to migrants’ choices and 
decisions has allowed critics to depict Mexicans as unable to assimilate into U.S. society 
and accused them of being excessively attached to their own culture. Thus the burden of 
the politics of immigration and the border, during the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first century, has been forced wholly onto immigrants’ shoulders, forcing them to 
carry all its contradictions.  
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